

Wilfrid Ashley


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THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF

GREAT BRITAIN.



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THE RIGHT HON. VISC. PALMERSTON.

In the House of Commons, 26th Jan^r 1841, defending the Treaty of 10th July 1814.

THE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GREAT BRITAIN

ADMINISTERED BY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

HENRY JOHN VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

NOT PUBLISHED

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P R E F A C E.

The Author of the following pages has undertaken the difficult task of endeavouring to lay before his fellow-countrymen a condensed History of the chief of those events which constitute the Annals of the times in which we live—events wherein are enfolded the future Destinies of our Land—which enwrap the future Destinies of the World! He has essayed to regard, as from a neutral spot, the progress of his Country in that Journey which so many mighty Empires have made in their turn—to examine, as with the mind of another Age, those influences which are urging her in the race;—he has looked at the Road by which she has arrived at what she is, and has desired to understand the Direction in which she tends. He conceives that the events he has described and the disasters he has laid bare, contain within themselves the evidences of the source whence they have sprung; for they are a picture of that mental state which alone is a Nation's History. The MIND OF A PEOPLE, and not the Incidents which spring out of its action, is the History of a Nation—but the Incidents which are the result of men's thoughts are the only Mirror by which we can exhibit to the inhabitants of another Region, or to our descendants in another age, that Mental Grandeur by which Empires have risen—that Mental Sinking which has heralded their wreck. If the National Mind of a People be sunken, to say that they

will see the progress of their decay is to trust in their regeneration and feel confident in their safety, for the cause of their danger would be past ; but how slender soever may be that hope, however weak that expectation in the breast of the man who thinks he sees plainly and judges rightly, yet is it not the less a duty incumbent on him, though his thoughts and his judgment be opposed to those of every man of his time, to strive with the Weapons of Truth and of Justice in his hands—to strive without the dread of resistance to impede, or the fear of failure to discourage.

The Author thinks that the best introduction he can give to the work which he now asks permission to press on the attention of his countrymen is the sentiment proclaimed at a time of public calamity, by the noblest member of a nation, once the noblest and the grandest which the earth contained, but then the most sunken and the most abject. The solemn and earnest reflection of the Reader is requested on the speech of M. Porcius Cato.

“Longe mihi alia mens est, Patres Conscripti, cum res atque pericula nostra considero, et cum sententias nonnullorum mecum ipse reputo. Illi mihi disseruisse videntur de pœna eorum qui patriæ, parentibus, aris atque focis suis bellum paravere : res autem monet cavere ab illis, quam quid in illis statuamus consultare. Nam cetera tum persequare UBI FACTA SUNT ; HOC, NISI PROVIDERIS NE ACCIDAT, UBI EVENIT, FRUSTRA JUDICIA IMPILORES ; CAPTA URBE, NIHIL FIT RELIQUI VICTIS.

“Sed, per Deos immortalis ! vos ego adpello qui semper domos, villas, signa, tabulas vestras pluris quam rempublicam fecistis : si ista cujuscunque modi sint quæ amplexamini,

retinere, si voluptatibus vestris otium præbere voltis; expescimini aliquando et capessite rempublicam. Non agitur de vectigalibus: libertas et anima nostra in dubio est.

“Scæpenumero, Patres Conscripti, multa verba in hoc ordine feci, sæpe de luxuriâ atque avaritiâ nostrorum civium questus sum, multosque mortalis ea caussa advorsos habeo; qui mihi atque animo meo nullius unquam delicti gratiam fecissem, haud facile alterius lubrici malefacta condonabam. Sed, ea tametsi vos parvi pendebatis, tamen respublica firma — opulentia negligentiam tolerabat. Nunc vero non id agitur bonis an malis moribus vivamus, neque quantum, aut quam magnificum imperium populi Romani: SED CUJUS HÆC CUMQUE MODI, NOSTRA AN NOBISCUM UNA, HOSTIUM FUTURA SINT. Hic mihi quisquam mansuetudinem et misericordiam nominat? jam pridem equidem nos vera rerum vocabula amissimus; quia bona aliena largiri, liberalitas; malarum rerum audacia, fortitudo vocatur: eo respublica in extremo sita. Sint sane, quoniam ita se mores habent, liberales ex sociorum fortunes, sint misericordes in furibus ærarii: ne illis sanguinem nostrum largiantur, et, dum paucis sceleratis parcunt, bonos omnis perditum eant. * * * * *

“NOLITE EXISTUMARE, MAJORES NOSTROS ARMIS REMPUBLICAM EX PARVA MAGNAM FECISSE. SI ITA RES ESSET, MULTO PULCHERRIMAM EAM NOS HABEREMUS: QUIPPE SOCIORUM ATQUE CIVIUM, PRÆTEREA ARMORUM ATQUE EQUORUM MAJOR NOBIS COPIA, QUAM ILLIS. SED ALIA FUERE, QUÆ ILLOS MAGNOS FECERE, QUÆ NOBIS NULLA SUNT; DOMI INDUSTRIA, FORIS JUSTUM IMPERIUM, ANIMUS IN CONSULENDO LIBER, NEQUE DELICTO, NEQUE LUBIDINI OBNOXIUS. PRO HIS NOS HABEMUS LUXURIAM ATQUE AVARITIAM;

PUBLICÆ EGESTATEM, PRIVATIM OPULENTIAM; LAUDAMUS DIVITIAS, SEQUIMUR INERTIAM; INTER BONOS ET MALOS DISCRIMEN NULLUM; OMNIA VIRTUTIS PRÆMIA AMBITIO POSSIDET. NEQUE MIRUM, UBI VOS SEPARATIM SIBI QUISQUE CONSILIUM CAPITIS, UBI DOMI VOLUPTATIBUS, HIC PECUNIÆ, AUT GRATIÆ SERVITIS; EO FIT, UT IMPETUS FIAT IN VACUAM REMPUBLICAM.—Sed ego hæc omitto.

“ *Conjuravere nobilissimi cives patriam incendere*——

“ Scilicet res aspera est; sed vos non timetis eam. Immo vero maxime; sed inertia et mollitia animi, alius alium expectantes cunctamini, Dis immortalibus confisi, qui hanc rempublicam in maxumis sæpe periculis servavere. Non votis, neque suppliciis muliebribus auxilia Deorum parantur: vigilando, agendo, bene consulendo prospera cedunt: ubi secordiæ te atque ignaviæ tradideris, nequidquam Deos implores; irati infestique sunt.”

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ENGLAND.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

“The policy of Russia is based on the certainty she has of spoiling England of her Hindoo empire.” * * * * *

“In the event of a war in which England should coalesce with France, Russia indulges the hope of prompt success, only when that union shall be broken up.”—*Russian Memoir in 1834.*

“England will feel the unnatural policy of Lord Grey in all its disadvantageous consequences so deeply as to tear to pieces the coil of Talleyrand, and will again separate herself from France.”—*Memoir of a Russian Minister in 1833.*

FOR several years there was nothing to disturb the peaceful progress of the under-current of diplomatic action which was preparing a European crisis—that is to say, there was no event, however dangerous, no encroachment on the rights of Europe however open, no denunciation of wrong, of danger, and of crime, however forcible or precise, that could arrest the attention or reach the minds of two nations whose inhabitants were divided into sections, all warring with each other on grounds which are imaginary—raising the interminable standards of what they call “principles,” around which to battle amongst themselves, although the meaning of the so-called “principles” was far removed from the comprehension of the combatants—two nations, in fact, which, composed of classes having personal interests at variance, and being unacquainted with this circumstance, yielded up their

energies to a vain attempt to secure preponderance over each other—the perception of their NATIONAL interests or security being lost sight of in the struggle.

In this state of things, the events which constitute the history of Europe during the last few years, although passing before their eyes, have remained unseen by the great bulk of the British and French people—by all those portions of them which have taken part in political affairs. What is the consequence? Have other nations been idle or inattentive? No: there is One in which no such prostrating influence has had existence—Russia has used the blindness of England and France to work out her objects! Gradually every event which she has predicted has come to pass; and they have come to pass in the face of, and often at the very moment of the bitterest denunciation and exposure of, the means of action employed to bring them about. The words “Peace,” “Civilization,” “Liberty,” “Increasing Commerce,” “Interest of Nations,” and hosts of general propositions embodied in other similar abstract terms, have constantly intervened to carry away men’s minds from the examination of any tangible thing connected with their country’s safety or interest.

When the current of a nation’s mind is running in a particular channel, it is distasteful and difficult for any of the individuals which compose it to rise out of the stream, and stand alone upon the bank for the purpose of surveying, from solid ground, and in deliberate composure, all the influences which act upon that stream—considering to what goal it may be hurrying them along; but the roar of a cataract suddenly opening on the ear, will fix the attention of the most heedless or indolent; and if not absolutely intoxicated or insane, every man will stop upon the bank and ascertain in what position he is placed—what path he is to pursue. It is thus with England and France at this moment. The course of recent events, though fraught with an importance never equalled in the annals of history, has failed to awaken the national mind, in either country, to the slightest consideration of the end to which it was tending, or might tend. It

has failed to do this—not because there was nothing in the course which had no threatening aspect ; not because there happened no present injury to their material interests ; not because there were no *warners* on the banks to apprise them of the danger, and point out the means of escape, but it has failed because neither the danger, the injury, nor the warnings, have been sufficient to reach the comprehension of men whose minds are absorbed by domestic enmity, sunk in lethargy and ignorance, or steeled by pride and by hatred. Men who having once lost their way, without knowing that they had lost it, become the prey of the first guide who has something to gain by misleading them. The same state of mind which has originally caused them to lose their way, will prevent them from detecting the honeyed falsehoods of their guide, and this it is which makes our present political condition so much more hopeless than the condition of men navigating an unknown stream in a boat. The evil is IN OUR OWN MINDS, and without our whole attention be directed to *it*, there is no hope of safety !

In the affairs of Europe, the peaceful under-current has been succeeded by the roar of the cataract—France, a nation mighty in military renown, arms against England ! In the language of the Russian Minister, from whom part of my motto is taken, “ there is one contest of bombs and bayonets, and one of principles ”—we have long had the contest of principles, we have now the prospect of the contest of bombs and bayonets ! Within sight of our own coasts, we have 33 millions of people breathing war, and manufacturing muskets, cannons, powder ; drilling and raising soldiers, fitting out ships, spending millions of money, in preparation for the combat of “ bombs and bayonets ! ” This looks like something *tangible*—there is here something more than *words* ; if you had said to any Englishman or Frenchman, as much as one hour previous to this becoming known, that such would happen, he would have flatly contradicted you ; he would have told you that such a circumstance was impossible ! If you had requested a reason for its “ impossibility,” and laid before him your proofs of the tendency of every

recent public event towards that end, he would have told you that "France and England were too enlightened" to do what would so decidedly "impede the march of civilization!" He would have told you that it was not for the "interest of nations to go to war"—that in the *nineteenth century* the principles of "Popular Liberty" and "Representative Government," had made too great progress for anything so generally pernicious to the interests of the communities as war to be possible—that the "diffusion of Education" was the best guarantee against such follies as characterised the "dark ages" only—that that "best possible instructor," the *Press*, formed too powerful a check on the movements of the "Despotic Powers" to permit any "disturbance of the peace of Europe"—that the "days of war and tyranny were over," and a thousand varieties of similar irrelevant phrases would be produced, and re-produced, as reasons for avoiding the trouble of examining the tendency of any event, however dangerous, or of analysing any transaction, however infamous.* Of course it is much easier for the indolent, the ignorant, the incapable and the dishonest, to take refuge in these vague general speculations (the stronghold of "modern civilization") than to use the faculties which their enjoyment of the rights of citizenship imposes on them as an imperative duty, or to admit their ignorance or their incapacity to judge of national affairs. So long as no physical calamity was pressing on their personal comfort, the people of England and France continued to look on the consideration of any subject of national interest as the work only of enthusiasts

* Thousands of pages of papers, written for the purpose of explaining to Members of Parliament the bearings of various political proceedings connected with the transactions of England in foreign countries, have been ascertained to contain falsifications, mutilations and even forgeries; yet not a single Member of either House of Legislature has been found to examine a single sheet! Last Session of Parliament, whenever a Member got up to make a remark upon any subject of *Foreign Policy*, (for so has it become the fashion to designate the national interests in England!) the newspapers almost always reported "there was such a noise in the House, of Honourable Members going out, that it was impossible to catch, except imperfectly, the words of the Honourable Member's discourse!"

who were troublesome, or of madmen who were dangerous ! But the threat of a war with France at length came, and it has directed the attention of some few individuals, in a slight degree, to what was previously so universally despised. It has not drawn the attention of either nation to the real situation they are in, nor has it inspired them with the slightest desire to comprehend by what agency they have been conducted where they are, or what path it is now necessary to pursue ; they are still hurrying on to the precipice, and the only difference between the present moment, and that previous to the time when they first heard the roar of the cataract, seems to be, that the attention of the voyagers is divided between the rage of the dissensions which are habitual, astonishment at the folly of each other, and abuse and detestation of those who have been warning them of the danger which was coming, as predicting the events now in course of fulfilment !

The possibility of a war with France excited a little attention in the minds of a few, but it was chiefly among those who feared for the injury it might entail on their commercial relations with that kingdom ; it was almost entirely confined to the baser considerations of individual personal interest, and has been productive of no beneficial result ; but to such as these even, it may not be wholly without eventual good, to address some observations on the prospects which the present state of things holds out as to the realization of their fears, their hopes or their anticipations.

The rupture of the Alliance with France took place at the end of last July, in consequence of a Treaty signed in London, for the purpose of maintaining *Peace*, there being at the time not the most remote danger of *War*, without the intervention of the Treaty of July, or some other *pacific* instrument of a similar nature ! Some individuals, not liking the “*pacific*” appearance denoted by the arming of several hundred thousand soldiers filled with hostile intent against England, enquired of the author of the mischief what he had done to drive the French into hostility ! The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied to them that he had done

nothing to drive any body into hostility—assured them that there would be no war—that England and France had too “many interests in common” for that—that he was only making some arrangements in Syria, and that he could not communicate to them (the House of Commons) what they were, because the negotiations for the intended arrangement were not yet concluded ! The persons who had put the question not being satisfied with this, the Foreign Secretary limited himself to assuring them that when individuals held opposite opinions on any subject, it was for events to decide who was right !* Upon this the fears of the people in England about war were calmed, and in proportion as they were so, the determination of the people in France *for* war increased, and gradually extended to all classes of them, and the process of arming troops and ships in preparation for it, continued with increasing vigor ! England made no preparations, believing that the “civilization” of the two countries would prevent war, and that the author of the Treaty for *securing peace* was too prudent a Minister not to avoid such a catastrophe. In the mean time, abuse, contempt and ridicule in every form was showered by the “best of all public instructors” on France, because she was spending her money on armaments—and returned by France, because she said England was evidently meditating something disrespectful ; but what that was, neither the one nor the other had the slightest conception. Both nations being desirous of peace, the Cabinets of both having for many years been repeating *usque ad nauseam*, that in everything they did, peace was their object, are doing everything calculated for bringing about a war, without knowing why ! Strange exhibition of the “enlightenment of the nineteenth century”—wonderful effects of “increasing civilization !”

The principal author of the Treaty for securing the peace of Europe, which is about to produce a war all over Europe—Lord Palmerston—writes a letter to M. Thiers, the French

* See debate in the House of Commons on Treaty of 15th July, in August last.

Minister, dated the 31st of August, in which he professes the warmest admiration and esteem for that nation, and at the same time details various reasons for committing what is a violation of the Law of Nations, and a violation of the ruling principle of British policy, as interpreted by himself; that is to say, he confesses to have entered on a Treaty with Russia, Austria and Prussia, for “interfering,” by violence, in a dispute between the Sovereign of Turkey and a rebellious Vassal, in order “to preserve the integrity” of the Sultan’s dominions. That integrity, he says, was likely to be endangered by the continuance of the rule of the Vassal in Syria, because such rule might be a temptation to the said Vassal to make himself independent of his master; and therefore the Four Powers think it the best way to enter on a Treaty for dispossessing him, by force, of the government of Syria; the same Treaty making him independent of his master, by guaranteeing to him—rebel as he is—the hereditary possession of Egypt; the choicest part of those dominions which are to be preserved in their integrity!

In reply to this, the Minister of France writes a letter to Lord Palmerston, dated 3rd of October, in which he professes much regard for the Government and inhabitants of England, and states that he does not very clearly understand the meaning of the Treaty in question;—that he does not think it will tend to preserve the integrity of the Sultan’s dominions;—that he does not think it will tend to the maintenance of peace;—that he thinks the coercion of the Vassal in Syria will be dangerous to the peace of Turkey;—that the English Minister has all along agreed with him that Turkey should be strengthened only because it is menaced by Russia, and he (the French Minister) considers it very strange that England should now enter on a Treaty which stipulates for the occupation of Turkey by Russian troops, in the case (duly foreseen by the Treaty) of resistance by the Vassal to coercion! The French Minister hopes that England will not carry the Treaty for *peace* into effect, by spreading the flames of *war* throughout Turkey, and thus bring on, by its dangerous consequences, the same in Europe.

But the French Minister adds a separate Note to this Memorandum; the separate Note is under date of the 8th of October, and it contains the whole views of the French Government on the question at issue. It lays down the line beyond which France will not step—the line which, if overstepped by Europe, will be resisted by France, and will occasion a war in Europe;—the Note of the 8th of October defines clearly what will produce war—what will preserve peace; and this line is precisely that which was adopted by the Powers who signed the Treaty of the 15th of July!

The Treaty attempted to take away from the Pasha of Egypt his authority in Syria, and guaranteed him the sovereignty of Egypt. In the Note of the 8th of October, the French Minister agreed to leave the Pasha's possession of Syria to the good-will of the Four Powers, and insisted only on the sovereignty of Egypt remaining to the Pasha; that is to say, the French Minister stated to Europe, that the only thing that could induce France to respect the peace of Europe was, that the Four Powers would keep to the conditions of their own Treaty of the 15th of July! that otherwise there must be war.* This declaration of France was something tangible and unequivocal—there was no mistaking the line of demarcation between war and peace; the Power which was opposing the Treaty, and was threatening war in consequence of her opposition, now formally accepted the

* "The question with respect to the limits which ought to be established in Syria, in order to divide the possessions of the Sultan from those of the Viceroy of Egypt, *might with safety be left to the chances of the war now actually in progress*; but France cannot prevail upon herself to abandon to such a chance the *existence of Mehemet Ali as a Prince Vassal of the empire*. Whatever territorial limits may ultimately separate the two Powers by the fortune of war, their continued double existence is necessary to Europe, and *France cannot admit the suppression either of the one or of the other*. Disposed as she is to enter upon and take part in every acceptable arrangement which shall have for its basis the double guarantee of the existence of the Sultan and that of the Viceroy of Egypt, she confines herself at present to the declaration on her part that she *cannot consent to the carrying into execution of the act of deposition pronounced at Constantinople*.—*M. Thiers' Note of 8th October.*

Treaty—was there anything that could lead to war?—it was thought now that war was really impossible, and *the funds rose!*

The designs of the authors of the Treaty for securing peace, had been regarded by some as of a character not desiring that which their Treaty bore upon its front, and these arrived at a conclusion that “a settlement” of the dispute between France and England was far from likely to be brought about by the agreement of the former to everything which was demanded by the latter. Lord Palmerston appeared to gain by this Note of the French Minister, all that he had entered on the Treaty of July for; he had within his reach all that he had reiterated his anxious wish for, viz.,—Peace with France.

CHAPTER II.

THE INTRIGUES OF RUSSIA.

“Ce tapageur (Lord Palmerston) finira par mettre l'Europe à sang et à feu.”—Talleyrand.

LETTER FROM A STATESMAN IN PARIS.

“Paris 6th October, 1840.

“The object of Russia and Lord Palmerston is hostility between England and France.

“Lord Palmerston is gradually enlisting, in favor of the Treaty, the sympathies and passions of the British nation, by arousing them against France, whilst lulling them into security. In proportion as Lord Palmerston secures the sympathies of the British nation, will he proceed to outrages against France.

“Until the French Government comes to the decision, and forms the plan of restoring the alliance of England and France, every thought which it entertains, every word which it utters, every act which it performs, every moment that it loses, is so much contributed to bringing about the war which is the end proposed by the Treaty.

“Lord Palmerston's course is very simple; he assures England that there is no danger of war, and he opens to the French Government the hopes of escape; and thus leads the English nation, step by step, into a position of hostility, and prevents the French Government from taking any decision or doing anything that can prevent that war which they seek to avert, and which only can be prevented by their obtaining the support of the British nation against Lord Palmerston.

“It is my firm conviction that nothing can avert war except the declaration of the French Government against the Treaty; except the announcement to the English nation of its resolution to compel the annulment of that Treaty. It is my conviction, from the moment that the French Government has taken the decision, and formed the plan for annulling

the Treaty, that it can effect it with ease and certainty—but every hour that is lost diminishes the chances of success.

“Lord Palmerston and Russia seek to give time, and France, by allowing them to gain time, loses all. France becomes every day more weak, because more despised, and the frightful augmentation of dangers that menace her from without, brings increase of the elements of disorder that will soon convulse her from within. France wavering between propagandism *and rights*, wavering between armaments and submission, can be believed by no one, trusted by no friend, feared by no foe, and exhibits to the world an hourly increasing spectacle of humiliation for her friends, and triumph for her foes.”

I do not know that anything can be of more interest, or more importance at the present moment, than an examination of the soundness of the premises taken up in this singular letter. If these premises should unhappily be found to be correct, then would the destruction of the British Empire be an event to be looked for, and inevitably, within a few years; if they be false, then will the reasoning of all those who think with the writer be worthless, and it is the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of their predictions that will furnish the satisfactory solution of this serious question. But unfortunately if England waits for this solution of the question,* and *if it be* thus solved, she waits until she is powerless to recover from the consequences, for the position in which it would place her, would be such as to annihilate her means of resistance. Although this solution would be “satisfactory” as far as the question is concerned, it would be highly *unsatisfactory* as far as England is concerned, and therefore, to ascertain how far this particular solution may be a probable one, becomes an object of more importance than any or every thought which can occupy the minds of Englishmen. To entertain such a conviction as that expressed in this letter, or an opinion of the fallacy of such a conviction,

* That is to say, until the hostility of France be realized by Russia against her, under the disguised direction of the British Minister.

involves a comprehension of every subject with which the question is connected, and this comprehension is only to be realized by an examination of each and all the parts which constitute the question as a whole.

I have said that if the premises be unfortunately correct, then is the downfall of British power inevitable ; to establish the correctness of this position will not require many words. If the reader will turn to the first clause of the Letter, he will see that *Russia and Lord Palmerston* are classed together as one power—that their object is one—and that that object is hostility between England and France ! If this be correct, the joint power of England and Russia is in action for the subversion of England's power—such action being unknown to Englishmen, because Lord Palmerston has constantly represented himself (in Europe) as hostile to Russia ; and his position as Minister of England has been all along based chiefly on the belief in the Nation that this was in reality the case. Therefore, to suppose a union so preposterous as that between Russia and Lord Palmerston is to admit that they have designs destructive of the interests of England, for, the fact of concealment of their union would, of itself, be sufficient to prove this. Then if the strange assumption were correct, that there really *is* a union between them, concealed under the veil of hostility, of course the downfall of Great Britain is insured, because the joint Power of two nations, such as England and Russia, acting in concert, and by means of the former for the destruction of herself, would be a means of action that would overwhelm every resistance which could be offered ; but such a connection would be more than an overwhelming of resistance, because the circumstance of England's assuming the attitude of hostility to Russia, and in reality acting in concert with her, would give them the power of preventing any resistance from being offered, by a systematic deception of every Court in Europe ; such a union would be sufficient to prevent the possibility of either friends or foes comprehending any question, or the meaning of any propositions, or any negotiations.

For example, the Courts of England and Russia being

supposed to be in a state of antagonism, the Minister of the former would propose something *really* in furtherance of the views of his antagonist, while using the language of indignation at his designs, and calling on England's friends to support him in counteracting them. This would bring the support of every friend of England to what would be for the furtherance of the ends of Russia, who might remain perfectly passive, while England and Europe were working out her designs. The influence of Great Britain would thus be used in every Court and in every region, both of Europe, Asia, and America, for destroying opposition to Russia, and exciting opposition to herself—for fighting against the enemies of Russia, and leaving Russia to annihilate the friends of England; but it would not only be the influence of England which would be thus used—it would be also the influence, or at least the concurrence and moral support of all the friends of England in Europe, that would be added to that of England in the work of raising up Russia on the ruins of herself; that is to say, providing that these friends of England did not perceive that the false union existed between the British Minister and Russia—which would be a matter next to impossible; because if any European Courts had such a suspicion, there is nothing concealed from them which takes place in England, and they could refer, in one day, to everything that is thought in England on the subject. For instance, a Minister in Berlin, in Vienna, or at Paris, is applied to by the British Minister to enter on some negotiation for securing the “pacification of the East,” or for “maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman empire” against the designs of Russia, “in the interest of consolidating the peace of Europe,” and to preserve “the balance of power;” suppose the Minister at the Foreign Court were to entertain the strange suspicion that the British Minister was secretly endeavouring to gain his support in working out some design of Russia, would he not immediately enquire what the British nation thought on the subject? This inquiry would be very easily made, for the “civilization” of England teems with facilities for doing this; there are the debates in Parliament, which treat

of every portion of British policy, which reveal the sentiments of every section of the inhabitants of England; and these debates are published at full length, every day, in hundreds of Journals which are sent to every part of the world, along with the comments of every shade of political party in the State. Not a public meeting, scarcely even a private assembly, in which politics are discussed, can take place in any town or village in the kingdom, but full accounts of all that is said are put into several of their provincial journals, and generally copied into the London newspapers for the express purpose of bringing to light the sentiments of all classes in the Empire. It is impossible for means to be used more perfect than are already in operation, for enabling politicians to judge of public opinion in England; and there is not a Capital in Europe where these means are not within the reach of any public man, and indeed where they are not forced on his attention. What, then, would a Foreign Minister find if he consulted public opinion as to the policy of Lord Palmerston, for the purpose of satisfying himself of any doubts he might entertain on the honesty of that policy, and of its being for the benefit of England?—I believe I may say, without fear of contradiction, that public opinion has been favourable *almost* to unanimity—at least it is admitted by the most hostile factions, that there has been no Foreign Minister for generations in England whose policy has met with such decided and general support and approbation as the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston. The policy of Lord Palmerston is the only ground on which hostile factions have laid aside their enmity, and met as friends and brethren; and what must strike every Foreign Court is, that this approbation has not been conceded to his lordship by any want of will, or of exertions, on the part of faction to overthrow him; on the contrary, we find that the exertions of one of the most powerful factions of the State, and the most determined opposition of the greatest names in the British Legislature, have been employed against him on every question where they conceived it practicable to attack his policy, but as constantly have their weapons only been turned against themselves, and

furnished a triumph to his Lordship, till at length opposition has almost ceased, and while "Tory" and "Radical" have joined the ranks of "Whigs" in support of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the "Chartists" have split themselves into two sections, of which the most numerous sent emissaries to perambulate the country for the purpose of preventing any opposition being manifested by the discontented, towards the policy of this talented and distinguished Statesman! It is only necessary to call to witness a few of the most important diplomatic transactions which have marked the career of Lord Palmerston; there is the Commercial Treaty with Turkey, as also the Treaty with Austria. These elicited the warmest approbation, both in Parliament and out of Parliament, of the enemies of the domestic policy of the Cabinet of which Lord Palmerston is the leading member, even more than of his own friends, and throughout the country there was but one sentiment as to the extraordinary *ability* which they evinced! I am assured by many merchants engaged in the trade to Turkey, that the sentiments of the British merchants in that country in favor of the Treaty are unanimous, as are also (nearly so) those of the merchants in our own. The same universal meed of approbation both of the political opponents of the Cabinet of Lord Melbourne in Parliament, and the merchants out of doors, has followed the negotiations of Lord Palmerston in regard to the Sicilian sulphur monopoly: indeed we have seen the ablest lawyer and statesman of the tory faction, Lord Lyndhurst, rise in his place in the House of Lords, and attack the government with vehemence on that question; but before the close of the debate, his Lordship concurred unequivocally in the line that had been pursued by Lord Palmerston. In like manner, in the questions of Poland, of Cracow, of Circassia, of Persia, of Cabul, and of Greece, his Lordship meets with nothing but approval of his policy; and although in the affairs of Portugal, of Holland and Belgium, of Spain and China, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Londonderry, Lord Aberdeen, Colonel Sibthorp, and other leaders of the tory faction, combatted the policy of the Foreign Office, yet they

only exhibited their own ignorance of everything really connected with these affairs, and prolonged their exclusion from power by the contempt with which they inspired the country for their factiousness and incapacity. And now in the last grand diplomatic triumph in course of being achieved by Lord Palmerston, the Treaty of 15th July, we find the almost unanimous voice of all parties in the State coming to ratify the course he has pursued ; and the most virulent of his opponents making amends for their former opposition, by tendering their warmest gratitude and applause.*

The truth of these assertions is undeniable, for there are the Journals of the Houses of Parliament, as also the public papers throughout the kingdom, to refer to as the evidence ; and therefore for any Minister at a Foreign Court to entertain a suspicion of the collusion of Lord Palmerston with Russia against his country, would be to believe in the INSANITY of the whole British Legislature and of the British people. It would indeed be a Quixotic enterprise for any man to come and endeavour to convince the people of England that they were insane—that her merchants could not distinguish between what was for their interest, and what was against them—that neither her Parliament nor her people could distinguish a friend from an enemy ! Any foreign statesman who should seriously entertain such a sentiment, and should act on such a supposition, would at once place grounds of hostility between his Court and Great Britain ; and if he really did entertain the suspicion, he must be a bold man to express it in the face of the public opinion in England as it is at present ! It has been strongly asserted by one party in England that PRINCE METTERNICH entertained the opinion

* “Certainly a most extraordinary, a most desirable, and a most delightful change seems to have taken place in the opinion and foreign sentiments of Her Majesty’s Minister.”—*Marquis of Londonderry*, 6th August, in the debate on the Treaty of the 15th July.

“We have then defended the policy of Lord Palmerston, because it is a *conservative policy*—because the allies he has chosen were the allies of Great Britain in the old trying times when the government was *Conservative*.”—*Morning Post*, 23rd Nov., 1840,

of the crime of Lord Palmerston ; but if he did, how does he come to enter on the Treaty of 15th July, along with the two Courts in collusion ? Prince Metternich, more than any other statesman in Europe, stands in awe of the designs of Russia, and has more perseveringly opposed her. Would he not be able to judge whether Lord Palmerston's propositions were calculated for carrying out Russian designs ? If Lord Palmerston be in league with Russia, what object could his Lordship have in view in conferring that inestimable blessing on England, and striking so fearful a blow at Russia as he did by the publication of the Russian dispatches in the *Portfolio* ? In the *Portfolio*, Lord Palmerston laid before the public of Europe, the most secret designs and means of action of Russia, and united thereby against her the Courts of nearly every country in Europe, because in the despatches there published, there are designs against almost all the States of Europe brought to light. This did not appear very like the work of a Minister who was working out Russian objects !

I will conclude the present chapter by condensing before the mind of the reader the chief considerations which arise out of the subject under discussion :—

1st. The vital importance of understanding whether there be a secret union between the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

2nd. The stupendous consequences which must result to England, supposing such a union to exist, from its action on Foreign Courts.

3rd. The difficulty of Foreign Cabinets detecting its existence, and the danger they would incur in attempting to prevent its effects, supposing conviction to be entertained.

4th. The extreme improbability of the existence of such a union, from the circumstance of the national approbation having, in an unusual degree, been awarded to Lord Palmerston ; and in consideration of his Lordship's acts of hostility to Russia.

CHAPTER III.

THE DESIGNS OF RUSSIA.

"It will not escape your Excellency, that the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen have put everything in motion to wrest from us *confidences* as to the conditions of our future peace with the Turks. It appeared to us useless to repeat the assurances which, on this point, all the declarations of the Emperor contained, or to add even any development of them. We shall confine ourselves to *these generalities*; for every circumstantial communication on a subject so delicate would have drawn down on us real dangers; and if once we were to discuss with our allies the articles of a TREATY WITH THE PORTE, we shall only content them when they would have believed that they had imposed upon us irreparable sacrifices. It is in the midst of our camp that peace must be signed, and it is when it shall have been concluded that Europe shall know its conditions. Remonstrances will then be too late, and it then will suffer what it can no longer prevent."—*Dispatch from Prince Lieven to Count Nesselrode. London, 1st June, 1829.*

"As to our war in the East, whatever may be the prejudices of the public in general, it does not lack defenders among the most distinguished members of both Houses of Parliament!"—*Dispatch from Prince Lieven, London, January, 4, 1829.*

FROM the dispatches of which the motto to this chapter are extracts, it would appear that London was the headquarters at which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg carried on its operations of preparing the dismemberment of Turkey, and that she had the assistance of "distinguished Members of both Houses of Parliament!" Although in one of these dispatches the Russian Minister mentions the name of Lord Palmerston in terms of approbation,* yet who could maintain

* "The speech of Lord Palmerston, whose name is henceforward associated with those of the first orators in Parliament, has insisted on the *preservation of the general peace*, and proved that an *Austro-Turkish policy* WOULD ONLY SERVE TO DISTURB IT." *From the dispatch above quoted, written by Prince Lieven and Count Materszevitch, London June 1, 1829.*

The reader will have the kindness to bear very particularly in mind the last line of this quotation, for it will be useful in considering the warlike tendency of the "*Austro-Turkish*" Treaty of 15th July.

that his Lordship was one of the "distinguished Members" alluded to, when it was from the Foreign-office, under the care of Lord Palmerston, that emanated these very dispatches? And who can conceive that Lord Palmerston was not fully alive to the evil designs of Russia, and was not actively engaged in the work of defeating their execution, when he thus apprises the British nation, as well as every Court in Europe, of their existence and mode of operation, so as to place Europe on its guard? Lord Palmerston has not ceased to insist on the imperative necessity of preserving Turkey from the designs of Russia, and especially from the presence of Russians at Constantinople, which is the key of India, and it is so important to be fully convinced of the nature of Russian views on this point, that I hesitate not to ask the patience of the reader to the testimony of Russian Ministers of a date long prior to the dispatches so opportunely published by his Lordship. I shall give a translation of a letter which was written by the Field Marshal Munich to the Empress Catherine, dated St Petersburg, 20th September, 1762, and which was published in France about forty years ago, by M. Jean Benoit Scherer.* M. Scherer introduces this letter with some observations on the then exertions of Russia to possess herself of that part of the Ottoman empire called the Crimea. "Peter the Great had traced out the road to his successor, who, without ever losing sight of it, temporised, awaiting the fitting opportunity for attaining the end. They often declared war against the Porte; the Porte often also attacked the Russians, in the hope of reducing them to inaction by continually harassing them; but they (Turks) found themselves at length reduced to the sad necessity of yielding in succession, towns, territory, and finally that Crimea, which will contribute to give insensibly to *Russia a marked preponderance in the political system of Europe.*

"This conquest, unique perhaps in the history of the world, from the circumstances which accompanied it—the object of

* "Ci-devant Jurisconsulte du Collège Impérial de Justice à Saint Pétersbourg," &c., afterwards in the service of the King of France.

the unanimous wishes of the Russian nation, was reserved for Catherine II., who has closely followed in the footsteps of Peter. She effected it by the employment of all the means which it is possible for political *prudence* to put in operation. Bribes, promises, negotiations—nothing was left undone to get possession of the Crimea without effusion of blood, although it was the terror of her arms alone that could overcome all the difficulties.* Thus may we hope to see revived the ancient renown of the ports of this almost island, and its towns, which will soon again perhaps become commercial centres, through which will pass the *riches of the Levant and of Persia.*”†

The further object to which the conquest of the Crimea was chiefly to serve as the stepping-stone, is thus shadowed out at that early period, in the letter of Marshal Munich to the Empress, which is as follows:—

“ St. Petersburg, 20th Sept. 1762.

“ Most Gracious, and most August Sovereign,

“ We are celebrating here this day the anniversary of the birth of his Royal Highness the Grand Duke. I join to the public prayers my ardent vows that I may be able to salute him at seventeen years of age, generalissimo of your armies, and to conduct him, according to the glorious views of Peter the Great, his incomparable great grandfather, to divine service in the church of St. Sophia at Constantinople, and to plant the Russian colours on the walls of that ancient capital.

“ The same judgment will, doubtless, be passed on this conquest, as was passed on the construction of a harbour on

* The depth of the perfidy, and the atrocious cruelty that attended the rapine of the Crimea, are such as the world has indeed seldom witnessed; but a description of them would not suit the Russian functionary to supply!

† He might have added, the riches of *India*; for when the Dardanelles and Persia are in the possession of Russia, and the might of England and France destroyed by each other's hands, are we to throw ourselves on the *magnanimity of the Emperor* for India, where already his emissaries have prepared it for his embraces?

the Baltic Sea. It will be looked on as a chimera. I am, nevertheless, in a situation to prove that Peter the Great during thirty years, that is to say, since the year 1695, when he first laid siege to Asoff, to his death in 1725, had in view as his main object the conquest of Constantinople, the expulsion from Europe of the infidel Turks and Tartars, and the re-establishment of the Greek empire. I could even draw up the plan of this vast and important enterprise. I had laboured at it during several years of my absence. But these documents, as I have had the honour to explain to your Majesty, are lost with many others, in which I had marked out a new system of fortification; * and I must have more time and leisure than I have at present for writing it anew, and laying it at the feet of my incomparable heroine. Your Majesty had very graciously asked me if it was possible to effect the conquest of the Crimea. As I penetrated the first to the centre of that ancient region, which is Baktschi-Sarai, the residence of the Khan, I am perfectly acquainted with all the difficulties which will attend this expedition, and the means of surmounting them," &c. &c. &c.

The remarks of M. Scherer on this letter are the following: "I will add to these details, that in the midst of the last war with the Porte, so firm was the belief, in Russia, of the speedy capture of Constantinople, that the Mint at St. Petersburg had already received instructions to strike a medal, representing on one side the bust of her Imperial Majesty, and on the other, Constantinople and the Seven Towers, struck down by a thunderbolt."

It may perhaps seem singular to those who recollect my intention of devoting these chapters to an examination of the question as to whether there be a secret union between Russia and the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, that I should occupy so much time with extracts from the History of Russia, but I request the reader to bear in mind the

* Prussian officers have lately fortified the Dardanelles, under the auspices of Russia; and now the Treaty of 15th July stipulates for their fortification and *occupation by Russia!*

necessity there exists, for having a comprehension, and thorough appreciation of the *objects* which Russia is pursuing ; of the bearing of those objects on the welfare of England, and the field on which they are pursued ;—it is necessary to bear this in mind as the chief ground on which to base our judgment, for it is by the knowledge of these things alone that we can understand the relation in which Russia and England stand towards each other—that we can judge of what is for the furtherance of Russian designs—that we can distinguish the policy that should be employed, from that which should be counteracted, and see through the snares which may be laid for our deception. The cold-blooded perfidy, the intentions of colossal rapine, blood-thirstiness, and wholesale destruction of nations, clothed in the language of the Blasphemer, which are revealed by the writings of these Muscovite functionaries of the last century ; the undeviating fixedness with which they pursue their scheme at the moment in which we live, and by means of the men whom we see, entertain, and place confidence in, every day, in our own houses and our councils, ought to be present to our minds as an evidence of the fact, that there must necessarily exist deception of the most complicated kind for us to guard against, in our examination of the actions and propositions of the Court which employs them. When we know what these objects are, and that they are hostile—when we know that there is deception, and that the deceivers are in the confidence of “ distinguished Members of our Houses of Parliament,” half our battle is gained ; we have then but to consider WHAT IS FOR THE INTEREST OF OUR COUNTRY, and what is for the FURTHERANCE OF THE DESIGNS OF OUR ADVERSARY, and by comparing these we shall know how to examine the tendency of actions—how to judge of the prospective working of events.

The designs of Russia being, as shewn by the entire history of that nation since the reign of Peter the Great, to attract the commerce of the East through her dominions as a centre, for the supply of Europe, necessarily constitute an attempt to transfer to the land, that which now belongs to

the ocean. The success of this attempt would, therefore, involve the withdrawal from Great Britain of that commercial supremacy which is the fountain of her riches—the destruction of that maritime superiority which constitutes her strength. The possession by a continental power stretching from the Baltic to the wall of China in one unbroken mass, of the Black Sea as the road into Europe, and of the fertile regions lying between Turkey and the Indus, would confer the commercial supremacy of the world on its fortunate Master, provided it were shielded from the action of those European States of which it was the interest, and which had the strength, to oppose it. The possession of Constantinople, and the impregnable fortresses of the Dardanelles, would be a barrier to the Power behind, within which it would enjoy the most perfect security from attack from Europe, while the commercial communication from thence to Europe would be conferred on it, and exist under its control, and in its sufferance. The possession by Russia of such a dominion as this, guarded by such portals as the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, would give to that power, without the shadow of a doubt, the commerce of Europe and of Asia—the accumulation of wealth would follow on this commerce, in proportion as the change would bring the diminution to England of the means of feeding her overgrown commercial and manufacturing establishments, fulfilling her financial engagements, and maintaining her extensive marine.* As England grew weaker, Russia would gradually grow stronger, until she grew irresistible, and if she preferred, not to seize her long looked-for prey—INDIA—by a stroke of sudden violence, she would justify her assuming the “Protectorate” of it, in the eyes of Europe, and of England herself, by exhibiting the impossibility of its retention, or Government, by a Court of Directors in London! In this case, after the effects of Russian intrigue (now in active

* In Note 1 of the Appendix will be found an extract from the plan of aggrandisement laid down by Peter the Great, for the instruction of his successors.

operation in India) had sufficiently shewn themselves in rebellions of the natives, Russia would proceed, as in Greece, to “engage” the Courts of Europe in Treaties for the “pacification” of India, “in *the interests of humanity*,” &c. &c., and perhaps *then* Englishmen might comprehend the meaning of the “Treaties for the pacification of the East!” Of course the way to arrest this would be, to prevent the seizure of Constantinople — and there is no question of the power of England to do so, at the *present moment*. Indeed there is only one way for England to be rendered incapable of doing it, and that would be, to neutralise her strength, and paralyse her means of resistance by the destruction of her power in Europe. A war between England and some European power would do this; but that power could only be France, because the inequality of strength between her and every other European state, is so great as to render any other war impossible; while the equality of strength between England and France would have the effect, in case of a war, of making their mutual exhaustion complete, for neither would yield until they were compelled by incapacity for further exertion, and they would both reach that position by equal and long degrees. Thus, then, the game of Russia is clearly a war between England and France, if that can be brought about—but at any rate, the neutralization of the one by the other, which would be also equally well effected for Russian purposes, by “engaging” one of the two in a participation of the plunder! This might be done in *Peace*. The Russian Minister well understood his means of action when he penned that passage in his Memoir, published by Lord Palmerston, “We can only hope for prompt success when the union between England and France shall be broken up!”

According to what we have here been advancing, the objects of Russia, as laid down by Peter the Great,* are—

* There can be no doubt but these objects were laid down near a century and a half before, in the reign of John Basilowitz, and steadily though slowly pursued, as we shall show in a succeeding chapter on Greece. But the genius of Peter, if it did not give birth to the design, gave an impulse, created and perfected means, and laid a basis for

1. The acquisition of Turkey, and seizure of Constantinople.
2. The dominion of Persia, and of Central Asia.
3. The possession of the Black Sea, Caspian, and extension of influence to the Levant and Mediterranean.
4. The possession of India.

All of which are necessary for the success of Russian designs, and are the preparatory means for transferring the commerce of the world, now in possession of England by sea, to Russia, by the shorter route by land—such transference involving the commercial and political ruin of England, as the commercial and political supremacy of Russia.

The natural policy of Russia, then, would be, to prepare in secret, if possible, the weakness and incapacity for resistance of these countries, and apply the influences necessary for making them subservient to her purpose :—when all this was done, to complete the work by securing the entrance of the Dardanelles—an operation serious and dangerous, as it would require a European convulsion to carry it into execution ; but, when once effected, would be final, and Europe would be taught to “submit to what it could no longer prevent !”

In this policy of Russia towards the countries in question, viz.—Turkey, Greece, Persia, Central Asia, and British India, there is a most important circumstance to be held in view, which is, that for the realization of her ultimate designs, it would be imperatively necessary for her to strengthen her connection with them, and fix her influence therein, so as to prepare for a future dominion, *without exciting such resistance* on their part as to occasion a war, for that would lay her open to the opposition of Europe *before* she could have accomplished the neutralization of the means of resistance in Europe—an event to be concurrent with the possession of the Dardanelles. The progress of incorporation must go on in a manner as

future progress, which will never be comprehended until the time when the outlines of the picture traced by him shall be filled up ; then perhaps the most remarkable man of modern times may be understood See Note I. in Appendix.

*pacific** as possible, previous to the grand drama—at all events it must not go beyond the point at which an awakening of Europe would be risked; for, then, all would be lost. It is equally important in this inquiry to bear in mind that the policy of Russia would also require the placing of England in a position of inability to prevent the accomplishment of these designs when they could no longer be concealed; as the fact of there arising a single man in her councils or her parliament capable of understanding the National Policy and analysing the question, would be sufficient to annihilate the web that has been so long weaving, and of which the undisturbed progress will, in a few short years, be the annihilation of England's greatness! A paramount object, therefore, with Russia would be to gain control over external and internal influences which she could wield against England—to accumulate around her from every region, but *in peace*, the elements of hostility—to bring her, unawares, into a position that, when the blow was being struck which should arouse her from her sleep, she should find the engines of assault so thickly disposed, that the very idea of resistance would be madness!

These objects of the policy of Russia place that power in the necessity of employing a system of deception which is criminal, because they place a power which is physically weak in a position of systematic hostility to the rights and independence of nations and of people in Europe and in Asia; the scheme of Russian policy places her in a position of antagonism with England, which is universal, because there is no country in the world where England has not an interest, and the accomplishment of that scheme requires for

* The Court Historian of the Russian Empire Karamsin, in his History of Russia, gives a faithful picture of Russian Policy:—

“Nothing changes in the character and views of our Foreign Policy. We seek to be at peace everywhere, and to make acquisitions without war; always keeping ourselves on the defensive, we place no faith in the friendship of those whose interests do not accord with our own, and we lose no opportunity of injuring them, without ostensibly violating treaties!”

Russia the disposal, everywhere that they can be found, of influences hostile to England. The danger of this deception will be great, only if Englishmen do not know what is for the interest of England; in such case, indeed, it must be fatal. The people of England have a vague general idea that their country is in a state of antagonism with Russia; but if they do not know what is for the interests of England in every country, nor comprehend the operations of Russian policy, it will be impossible they can form a judgment of the honesty or ability of their public servants. If a minister who directs the External affairs of a country like England, were to be playing false to such a nation as Russia, the means of concealment would be numerous,* because they would be furnished by the patrons he was serving, but the means of detection would be easy, (providing the British people knew what was for their interests), because they only demand an analysis of his actions.

The means of judging of such a question undoubtedly requires a knowledge of the *objects* of our antagonist; and, preparatory to the examination of the imputation so frequently laid to the charge of Lord Palmerston of acting in secret concert with the Russian government, I have thought it necessary to direct the mind of the reader to the considerations contained in this chapter. In the next, we will commence this examination by reference to some of the prominent parts of his Lordship's policy in regard to the States more immediately marked out for the fulfilment of the designs of Russia, and from which the danger to England is the most imminent.

* For instance, "the success" of the British arms, naval and military, all over the world, has recently been signal and striking—if the people of England do not know what is for the interest of England, this "success" may be against her friends, and in favour of her foes; and in such case what will be the effect? Will it not be to conceal a false game, and lead away from investigation the minds of a people ignorant of their position and interests, by the false glare of "victories" *against themselves*? We shall consider this subject presently.

CHAPTER IV.

POLAND.

"Your restoration is defined by solemn treaties ; it is sanctioned by the constitutional charter. The immutability of these external engagements, and of the fundamental law, assures henceforward to Poland an honorable rank among the nations of Europe."—*Speech of the Emperor Alexander to the Polish Diet in 1818.*

"We declare to you that the Institutions which he (Alexander) gave to you shall remain without any change. I therefore promise and swear before God that I will observe the Constitutional Act ; and that I will bestow all my care in maintaining the observance of it."—*Proclamation of the Emperor Nicholas to Poland, on his accession.*

I TAKE the question of Poland first, because the examination we are pursuing requires it in this order, in a two-fold point of view ; viz., its importance in the progress of Russian designs, and because Poland was the first question with which Lord Palmerston had to deal, on his accession to Power as Foreign Minister.

It would be foreign to the subject to take a view of the means employed by Russia to effect the destruction of the kingdom of Poland—that portion only of it comes strictly within the limits of our enquiry, which dates from 1830, the period immediately preceding that of the annihilation of Polish nationality, and final incorporation with Russia. It is necessary, however, to bear in mind, as a question of the last importance, the absolute necessity under which Russia lay, if she were to look for the success of her objects, to extinguish the existence of Poland as a separate kingdom. As much in a commercial as in a political point of view was this object required ; without it, Russia could not move one step in her march to eastern conquest, or make a single advance towards the control, or the possession of eastern commerce. Situated between the Baltic Sea and Turkey, Poland stretched across Europe, flanking the territory of Muscovy, and forming a barrier as well to the march of Russian

aggression, as to the progress of Russian commercial monopoly. Commerce was the main object to which Peter the Great turned his attention—it was the ground-work of the education of that powerful Diplomatic Body which he may almost be said to have created and rendered permanent—commerce has engrossed the attention of all succeeding Russian rulers even more than territorial aggrandisement,—being a means to this end, as well as an object of itself. In Russia, commerce and conquest are one and the same object, and a separation of them would render any part of the whole scheme of Russian policy unintelligible to us. The Czar of Muscovy wished to make his kingdom rich and great by drawing to his dominions the chief part of the commerce of Europe and of Asia, but Poland alone was sufficient to prevent the success of this, and even the very existence of that kingdom, as an independent State, was incompatible with the realization of Peter's object, for the Polish territory was vastly more fertile than that of Muscovy, and consequently possessed advantages of production with which Muscovy could not compete; the situation of Poland was nearer Europe, and was in every respect more convenient for commercial purposes, and therefore as long as freedom of commerce existed in that extensive kingdom, the idea of drawing the commerce of either the East or the West through Russia, was chimerical.

The commercial relations of England with Poland were of a gigantic importance to her, not alone on account of the market furnished by that Kingdom for making sales of her manufactures, and effecting purchases of raw material, but also because a transit of British commerce to the East took place through Poland. The object of Russia was to upset this connection, and appropriate to herself this commerce; so the very first proceedings of Peter were to paralyse the commercial operations of Poland (as she has since paralysed those of Turkey) before he dared to alarm Europe by its conquest. This constant action of Russia on the commercial prosperity of States is the most powerful weapon she uses, and cuts in several directions; 1st, It secures to Russia herself the enjoyment of commercial advantages greater than those

which the nature of her territory would by fair competition permit; 2ndly, It creates, or increases, in the countries which Russia has to dread, the internal misery, confusion and anarchy which neutralize their power, and prepare them for incorporation; 3rdly, It forms the ground-work for the writings of those literary *protégés* whom Russia keeps in her service throughout Europe, and who cry up the greatness, benevolence, and humane policy of the Emperor in protecting neighbouring states from the *evils of anarchy and poverty*;* 4thly, It secures Russia from the resistance of the minor states of Europe to her commercial and political aggressions, *by the inaction of England*. It is most important to understand whence this inaction of England proceeds, for the mischief and the danger with which it is fraught, are as terrible to contemplate as they are unsuspected by Englishmen. The men who fill the situation of Legislators in England are chiefly taken away from grammar-schools and Universities, where they have learned *words*, or, at least, where they have intended to learn words; the Greek and the Latin, which they imperfectly learn, are considered the

* I pray the reader to turn to Note I of the Appendix, and read carefully over the extract which I have given from the plan of external policy left by Peter the Great for the guidance of his successors; I repeat in this note the first article:—

“1^o. Pierre prescrit de ne rien négliger pour donner à la nation Russe les formes et les usages des Européens, et pour obtenir dans ce but le concours de toutes les Cours, et surtout, de *tous les hommes de lettres, et de tous les Savans de l'Europe*, soit par des spéculations d'intérêt, soit par les *principes philanthropiques de la philosophie moderne, soit par tout autre moyen qui serait reconnu plus efficace.*”

In reference to Poland I quote the 6th article:—

“*Exciter et soutenir l'anarchie en Pologne, y soulever des factions, y entretenir la discorde, y faire élire les Rois plus convenables à la politique Russe, et par ces moyens, affaiblir, morceler et subjuguier cette Nation.*”

That this was printed upwards of a century ago, when Poland was a great, “civilised,” and powerful Kingdom, and Russia a little province, called Muscovy, unknown to Europe; and although that every thought contained in this pregnant sentence has been developed *in acts*, and although the *result* pointed at has *taken place* within

object of their studies, not the *means* of enabling them to obtain a knowledge of tangible things, which is to fit them for a comprehension of the material interests of their country. The idea of obtaining a knowledge of the action of commerce on the political condition of nations, and so on the interests of England, would be, in the eyes of these gentlemen, so preposterous, that the very mention of such studies would be sufficient to clear a college of students, and to exclude from society the man who should be mad enough to suggest such a proceeding! Besides, success in the Senate does not require such knowledge; it would even render success there impossible. What is called “dexterous debating” is the road to Ministerial power and Diplomatic patronage—so that the British Diplomatic Body is composed of men who would consider it an insult to be supposed capable of understanding the things which they are sent to foreign countries to take charge of! There is an entire separation in the minds of Englishmen of every grade between Commerce and Statesmanship, and therefore is their comprehension of the policy of any Nation, or of their own Nation, impossible. As the action of the Russian government always begins by an interference with the commerce of the States she intends to absorb, and as this (the cause of her future success in the absorption) is unnoticed and unintelligible to the governing power in England, the root is quietly placed in the ground, and gradually produces fruits which only serve to confuse and perplex; for if the CAUSE whence they spring be unknown, how is it possible for the effects to

the last eight years, still these things will not excite any reflection in the minds of Englishmen of the present day, nor will they do so until the same result (also written in the archives of the Russo-Greek Theocratic Cabinet) shall have been accomplished in reference to *England*. The man who expressed his opinion of the necessity of preventing the absorption of Poland by Muscovy, and quoted the official documents of the Russian Cabinet, *previous to the result*, was denounced as a madman, or an impostor, for entertaining a belief in the intention or in the possibility of its execution—as the writer of these pages will be denounced for entertaining a belief in the Will, or the power, of Russia to injure the interests of England.—It is, therefore, to Posterity I address this.

be comprehensible? These complications are then reasoned upon in reference to abstract ideas on the nature of Government in general; a general misunderstanding of the whole subject results; the Nation is split into factions; Passion takes the place of Reason; and Russia secures as many defenders in England of the means of obstruction to her own commerce and the peril of her ultimate safety as there are objectors to them; thus is the power of *action* destroyed, and sounding phrases are the harmless weapons which England supplies for the amusement of the Court of St. Petersburg! But it is the influence of this inaction of England on other nations which is so fearfully disastrous, for it confers on Russia the whole strength of the *support* of England. The commerce of England being with every country, and in a proportion to each prodigiously greater than that of any other nation in the world, it is HER that suffers the greatest injury from the progress of Russia; and thus her interests place her in the position of a jealous guardian against commercial injustice or encroachments; and the other nations, being unable to comprehend this total misunderstanding, on the part of England, of everything that concerns her nearest and most vital interests, consider either that *their* commercial interests will not permanently suffer as ENGLAND does not object, or that their resistance will be useless, if England dare not protect herself; or that England and Russia have some object in common which unites them in a bond that renders them irresistible! Thus the action of every State, both in Europe and in Asia, is paralysed by the ignorance of England to her own interests—an ignorance which raises Russia, the weakest and most contemptible nation in the world, as far as physical strength goes, into the most powerful and successful. In country after country, the march of Russian aggression progresses—1st, Commercial interference, —2nd, Political “protection,”—3rd, Conquest and absorption.

I have conceived it necessary to say thus much concerning Poland, that the extreme importance to England of the commercial and political independence of that Kingdom may be present in the reader’s mind—that the equal

importance to Russia, in her unhallowed career, of its destruction, may be appreciated. At the Congress of Vienna, therefore, the Russian Plenipotentiaries moved heaven and earth to effect the annihilation of the Polish Nationality, but a few sparks of the dying embers of old British feeling fortunately yet lingered in the breast of the British Plenipotentiaries ; and Lord Castlereagh, with a firmness for which I conceive he has never received sufficient acknowledgments, insisted on the preservation of an existence for at least a part of Poland. The Emperor Alexander proposed, at the Congress, and urged that the then remaining portion of Poland, the Duchy of Warsaw, should be *incorporated with Russia*, but the Ministers of every State, *except Prussia*, instantly and decidedly resisted it. So strongly did the Court of Austria express itself on this head, that the Emperor Francis declared himself ready to sacrifice a portion of his own dominions for the sake of re-establishing Poland as an entire, and an independent kingdom. Prince Talleyrand, who represented the French Court at the Congress, was so deeply alive to the necessity of freeing Poland from any connection with Russia, that it is said to have cost the Court of St. Petersburg several millions sterling, in her exertions to neutralize his influence at that and subsequent times ! In December 1815, the Prince wrote a Letter to the Austrian Court, in which he said that “ of all the questions discussed at the Congress, the affair of Poland was incomparably the most important to the interests of Europe, if there was any chance that that Nation might be restored to complete independence.” That eminent Statesman held out long against the Duchy of Warsaw being in any manner whatever connected with Russia, and is said to have upbraided the British Plenipotentiaries, in the tone of polished sarcasm peculiar to him, with pusillanimity and want of comprehension, for agreeing to the terms they did ! That he should have done so is, indeed, not a matter to excite the surprise of any man possessing the free use of his faculties, for the conclusion that was come to seems almost too strange for belief. It was agreed that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw should be

erected into an independent Kingdom, in order to serve as a barrier to Russia, and therefore the Allied Powers stipulated that "it shall be *united to Russia*—irrevocably bound to Russia by its Constitution," &c. The Allies certainly stipulated that Poland should be placed under the protection of a Constitution, and that it should be united to Russia only by the title of its own Constitution,* and therefore, for Russia to violate this constitution would be for that nation to place herself in a position of hostility to the Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna—it would, virtually, be a declaration of war by Russia against Europe. As "liberty of commerce" was guaranteed by the Constitution to Poland, and as that commerce was an object of the greatest importance to England, so could not Russia violate this portion of the Constitution without wounding English interests in their most vital part—without imposing pecuniary loss, as well as political danger on England. What was the policy pursued by Russia? She could not quietly set aside the deliberate act of the Powers of Europe assembled at Vienna, by issuing a formal Ukase for the immediate destruction of the Constitution of Poland, and the incorporation of its territory with her dominions ; but she was the no less resolved on effecting this in time, and she was not long in bringing about the pretexts for crushing Polish nationality.

* "A constitution adapted to your wants and localities, and your character ; the use of your language preserved in your public acts, public functions and employments conferred on Poles only ; *liberty of Commerce and Navigation* ; the facility of communication with the parts of ancient Poland which remain under another Power ; your national army ; all means guaranteed for improving your Laws ; the free circulation of knowledge in your country ; such are the advantages which you will enjoy under our dominion."—*Proclamation of the Emperor Alexander to the Poles, May, 1815.*

"It is with peculiar satisfaction that I announce to you that the destiny of your country is about to be fixed by the concurrence of all the Powers assembled at the Congress of Vienna. The Kingdom of Poland shall be united to Russia by the title of its own Constitution," &c.—*Letter of the Emperor to the President of the Senate, 30th April, 1815.*

The heir to the Crown of Russia was Constantine. This prince was of a disposition at once so imbecile, so tyrannical, so ignorant, and so ferocious, that it had been found necessary to exclude him from the succession, or any governing authority in Russia, and place his brother Alexander on the throne in his stead. *This madman was sent to carry out the Constitution of Poland.* Not only was there no outrage that he did not perpetrate, but there was not a SINGLE ARTICLE OF THE POLISH CONSTITUTION THAT HE DID NOT SYSTEMATICALLY VIOLATE. By that constitution a Representative system was given to Poland, and the Diet was to be convoked every two years;—*five years were allowed to elapse, and no Diet was assembled.*

The Constitution provided that the right of granting supplies was vested in the people; that no taxes should be imposed except with the consent of the Representatives, and that a budget should be submitted to the Diet every fourth year;—*taxes were imposed without the consent of the representatives, and no budget was submitted to, or voted by, them for fifteen years.*

The Constitution provided in the most perfect manner for the liberty of the person; for if any man was arrested, he was within three days to know the accusation against him, to be brought before the proper Authority, and if the charges were not substantiated, he was to be discharged within that time;—*for the most trivial offences or supposed offences, numbers of Poles were constantly imprisoned by Constantine, without any form whatever, and kept in prison months without even being examined! An insurrection at St. Petersburg was made the pretext for filling the prisons at Warsaw with individuals, who were treated with a degree of barbarity that caused many to commit suicide—many to sink under their torments. The survivors were brought to trial EIGHTEEN MONTHS after their committal, and were acquitted in a mass—no suspicion or offence appearing against them; yet many of these very acquitted men were transported to Russian mines.*

The Constitution provided for the liberty of the Press, and that the proceedings of the Diet were to be made public;—

instead of this, *when any one spoke or wrote what might not please Constantine, he was seized and imprisoned during the Governor's pleasure, and the publication of the debates in the Diet was suppressed by an ordinance of the Emperor!*

The Constitution provided that no Russians should fill offices in Poland, and that no Russian troops should be quartered in Poland;—*the highest offices were filled by Russians; Russian troops were poured into Poland; 10,000 of them were quartered permanently at Warsaw, chiefly at the expense of the inhabitants!*

There was no article of the Constitution which was not systematically violated from the commencement. Existence was rendered a misery to every Pole; and at length its inhabitants fulfilled the sacred duty which was imposed upon them, of resisting the violation of their Laws—the Polish Revolution of 1830 broke out. Had it not done so—had the Poles submitted to the dissolution of the social state, by the annihilation of their laws, they would have been infamous and deserving of their fate—they would have deserved the contempt instead of merited the protection of Europe. At this time the fervour for Liberty was manifested so strongly in England that a new Administration was forced into power, and the unanimous voice of the British people called upon it, to see the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna fulfilled—to see the rights of England preserved—to prevent the equilibrium of Europe from being menaced—by doing justice to Poland. Never was a combination of circumstances so fortunate for easily compelling the fulfilment of the Treaty of Vienna, and thus preserving the commercial and political rights of Europe in Poland. There was Russia engaged in a crusade of outrage and injustice. There was the whole People of England, the enthusiastic voice of the People of France,* demanding the protection of Poland from this injustice. There was Austria ready to meet the signal of

* Louis Philippe, in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies, in 1830, said “the nationality of Poland shall not perish;” and it was loudly and unanimously echoed by the Chamber.

England to march to the relief of the Poles. There was Sweden on the eve of marching to attack Russia, on the North; and on the South and East there was the Shah of Persia actually three days on his march to the assault! Georgia was in insurrection, and every tribe of the Caucasus was panting for the exercise of their vengeance for the wrongs so long suffered at the hands of the Muscovites. With such a fearful accumulation of the elements of convulsion round the head of the Ruler of the Russian empire, the only difficulty would seem to be to arrest its fall; the existence of the British Ministry would seem to depend on their zeal to see that justice was accomplished in Poland. Lord Palmerston at this crisis became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and such was the position in which he found himself. This affair of Poland is a grave question both for him and for Europe; Justice requires that we should impartially inquire into his conduct on it. It is of course known to every one that Lord Palmerston took no steps whatever either to assist Poland, or to prevent the annihilation of British commercial rights by the Ukase of the Emperor of Russia applying the Russian commercial Tariff of *exclusion* to British commerce in that country. The impression on the mind of nearly every man in England was, that Poland was safe because Lord Palmerston was Foreign Minister, and was placed in power in a great measure on the understanding that Poland should be assisted;* and it is yet a matter inexplicable how no assistance was rendered; but this much is certain, that the inaction of England paralysed every other country in Europe. It cannot be said that the necessity of *preserving peace* restrained Lord Palmerston, because, in such a state of things, no war could be possible,

* The agitation throughout England respecting the Polish Revolution was intense, and formed a main item in the dissatisfaction with the Government of the Duke of Wellington, for his wavering policy regarding the invasion of Poland by Russia. The friends of Polish nationality exulted on the accession of Lord Palmerston; and powerful was the support Lord Grey's Cabinet received in consequence of the moral certainty that prevailed that it would act up to its *professions* regarding Poland and Liberty!

without England and Prussia were to *have joined Russia* in a war against the rest of Europe, for the purpose of assisting her to crush Poland—a step which would have hurled Lord Palmerston from power! The British Minister carefully refrained from making any declaration on either one side or the other of this question, and England continued to expect his protection of its rights in Poland, until at length he informed them that it was of no use opening out the question of Poland!

Before examining the opportunities possessed by Lord Palmerston of explaining himself on this matter, it is desirable to state the steps which his Lordship *actually took* on the extraordinary crisis which had taken place on the affairs of Poland and Russia.

1st.—The assault of Persia* on Russia, in favour of Poland was arrested by Lord Palmerston! The Secretary of Legation in Persia, Mr. Macneil, was directed to use his influence, which was all-powerful at the Persian Court, to prevail on Prince Abbas Meerza to withdraw his army from the assistance of Poland—after it had already been three days on its march. This circumstance seems incredible, and for years I could not believe it to be true, in consequence of my predilection in favour of Lord Palmerston; but it has long been a matter of notoriety in Diplomatic circles, and has been advanced in a great many Publications without contradiction, while other portions of the same publications in which it has appeared have received reiterated contradictions.

* Immediately prior to the Polish Revolution, Russia had plundered and dismembered the Persian Kingdom of its most valuable Provinces, after a successful war which the Emperor had declared against Persia, because she declined to submit to the plunder, in an orderly and “*pacific*” manner, and the outraged Shah saw in this new outrage of Russia on Poland, a legitimate occasion for recovering his rights by the prostration of the power of his Robber—it was for this he marched to the assistance of his neighbour in misfortune, when Lord Palmerston interfered to prevent him! A similar position, and similar views, actuated the Court of Sweden in wishing to declare for Poland; and Austria’s hostility to Russia was only kept from declaring itself in the same manner by the fear of the *hostility* of England, and the *co-operation* of France!

2nd.—The assault of Sweden on Russia was arrested by the attitude of England, and it has been publicly stated that Lord Palmerston threatened Sweden if she made a movement in favour of Poland.

3d.—The intervention of France in support of the Treaty of Vienna as respects Poland was paralysed by the attitude of England, whose interests were compromised by the Russian outrage on that country, still more than even the interests of France. It is currently believed in the Diplomatic circles in Paris, that Prince Talleyrand offered the assistance of the military means of France in favour of Poland, and that Lord Palmerston refused. I cannot give any opinion as to the truth of this report, but I conceive it desirable to mention what is said and extensively believed on a subject of such an interest as the question of Poland.

The inaction of England, whether active means were used by her Minister against Poland, or whether his conduct were merely passive, was sufficient to prevent the intervention of other States which were not so secure in their ignorance as England seems to be, against the danger of Russian designs; and thus was the support of Great Britain given to Russia in assaulting an independent Kingdom, and destroying her own commerce in one of the most important Regions of Europe.

In this question of Russia and Poland, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between the relation of the Poles towards the Russian Government, and the relation of their Kingdom towards Great Britain, as affected by the subjugation of it by Russia. Although there is no question in the mind of any man who is not a mere tool of Russia that the violation of the Constitution of Poland was a virtual declaration of war by Russia against all the Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna; yet some "legislators" in England have endeavoured to evade the subject by assuming that it was an *Internal Question* between Russia and Poland; and that if the Poles were unable to protect their own domestic affairs from the usurpations of their Ruler, it was not incumbent on Foreign Powers to intervene. But supposing this were admitted, I am not aware that any one has had the hardihood to advance, that

the Statute of Incorporation of 26th February, 1832, which annihilated the right of Commerce possessed by England in Poland was not a measure necessitating the interference of the British Court. Russia had no sooner succeeded in effecting the subjugation of Poland, in 1831, *by means of England*, than she put forth this Ukase, by which the prohibitive Tariff of Russia was applied to that extensive and fertile country ! It was the interests of England, more than all other countries put together, that were injured, in a pecuniary point of view incalculable, by this illegal act, and yet her Minister uttered not one single word of even remonstrance on the subject ; England, therefore, exhibited herself the partisan so strong of Russia against the rest of Europe, that, although that nation struck the two-edged dagger of political outrage and pecuniary loss into her heart, hurled defiance in her teeth, and trampled her rights and her honour in the dust,—still did she support Russia in her career of general outrage on the Rights of Man ! If it was dangerous for Austria and France to interfere, it was only so in consequence of the inexplicable attitude of England.

This support of Russia by Lord Palmerston, in political and commercial hostility to his own country—a support, too, given her against almost all Europe, and part of Asia, as well as against the whole country of whose power he was the Depository,—is, without doubt, an important and seemingly unaccountable consideration in the examination of the charge of secret union between his Lordship and the Russian Court. It is necessary to bring into view all the public conduct of the Foreign Secretary in the parliamentary deliberations on so important a subject ; and readers will be greatly aided in forming an estimate of the probability of the charge, if each will mentally place himself in the position of a secret agent of Russia, holding the office of British Minister, and consider what line of conduct he would pursue if thus playing the game of Russia.

In April, of the year 1832, a member of the House of Commons, Mr. Cutlar Ferguson, a partisan of the Ministry of which Lord Palmerston was a member, gave notice that on a particular day he would bring the question of Poland before the House. According to appointment, on the 18th of that

month, he did do so, and in a speech of the utmost eloquence laid open the wrongs of Poland, the violation of the Treaty of Vienna, the outrage on Great Britain, and called on the Ministers for interference. The Honourable Member impressed on the House everything which I have advanced in the preceding pages, only with more minute detail, greater power of language, and more indignant feeling ; he then moved for a copy of the Russian Statute of Organization of the 26th February, 1832, incorporating Poland in the Muscovite dominions, and by which, in his own words, “the political existence and nationality of Poland were attempted to be extinguished.”

These sentiments were unanimously concurred in by the House, but chiefly by the supporters of the Government, and by the present colleagues of Lord Palmerston, who did not confine themselves to a tacit concurrence. That Party which was in opposition to the Ministry, with one or two exceptions, only agreed to the sentiments of MR. FERGUSON by silent approval ; but the leading Members of the Party to which the Cabinet of LORD PALMERSTON was indebted for its existence, were too enthusiastic in favour of Poland, to be content with silent approval, and MR. LABOUCHERE, DR. LUSHINGTON, COLONEL FOX, and MR. SHIEL, all Members of the present Cabinet, or attached to the present Administration, echoed in detail what had been stated by MR. FERGUSON. DR. LUSHINGTON, one of the highest Authorities in Europe on International Law, and so appreciated by the Ministry as to have been called to a high office under it, which he now holds, not only begged leave to “express his hearty concurrence in the observations made by Mr. Ferguson,” but with all the weight of his Judicial and Legislatorial character, recapitulated the arguments which had been advanced, and concluded his speech with the following words, which ought to sink deep into the minds of every Englishman who has a heart to feel for his fellow-men, or a capacity to comprehend what is for the interest or safety of his country. That learned Statesman and Judge addressed the following language to the Government :—

“It (the Government) ought to say, YOU (Russia) MUST NOT MAKE AN INCREASE TO YOUR TERRITORY IN CONSEQUENCE OF CONDUCT WHICH YOU OCCASIONED. YOU MUST NOT MAKE YOUR OWN CRIMES A PRETENCE FOR YOUR OWN AGGRANDISEMENT. WE CALL UPON YOU TO FULFIL THE TREATY OF VIENNA; WE CALL UPON YOU TO PERFORM THOSE ENGAGEMENTS YOU ENTERED INTO WITH US; WE CALL UPON YOU TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH EVERY PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF NATIONS; WE CALL UPON YOU, IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE AND HONOR, NOT TO SACRIFICE THOSE SOLEMN PLEDGES YOU GAVE TO THE PEOPLE OF POLAND. THIS IS NOT MERELY A CASE OF HUMANITY, BUT A DUE REGARD FOR THE NATIONAL HONOR COMPELS US TO INTERFERE.”

A distinguished member of the party opposed, in general, to the Ministry, LORD SANDON, rose to echo those sentiments, and MR. COURTENAY, SIR FRANCIS VINCENT, MR. HUME, SIR CHARLES FORBES, and MR. EWART, all made speeches in the same sense. Finally, MR. HUNT stated to the House “that he had reason to believe, if the British Government had not held back, France would have afforded assistance to the Poles, at a period when assistance was useful.”

As we find that, in the question of Poland, not only were the feelings of the British people pronounced with enthusiasm, but also that the unanimous voice of the Legislature called on the Executive to perform what was, after all, a mere ordinary matter of justice; so the entire weight and responsibility of the question rested on that Executive. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs being invested with the power of England, and by virtue of his office wielding all her might, *he* becomes identified with any question of Foreign Policy, even where no special instructions should be given him by Parliament; but in this case both Parliament and Nation pointed out a national act which it was imperative on him to perform. If Lord Palmerston was at that time hostile to the aggressive projects of Russia, was it in the nature of things that a more perfect opportunity could have been offered him for arresting it? If his lordship was her secret friend, the circumstances which surrounded him seemed to leave him

not a possibility of befriending her ; for, in that debate, if he uttered one word in support of the Russian violation of the Treaty of Vienna, it would have been the signal of his instant overthrow as a Minister, and the admission to power of another who would be pledged to carry out the desire of Parliament. If he had urged the cry of “peace” as a reason for non-interference, the state of Europe was such as to have made it appear too evidently the expression of a partisan. What then was it *possible* for Lord Palmerston to do in such circumstances to serve Russia ? Let the reader endeavour to satisfy his mind as to whether *any* path was open to the service of Russia in this case, and what ?—HE, LORD PALMERSTON, KEPT AWAY FROM THE DEBATE ! that is to say, that on the most important question of the age for England and for Europe, proper notice having been formerly given, the Depositary of the power of Great Britain *absents* himself ! His colleague, Lord Althorp, alleged to the House as a reason for not saying or doing anything on the subject brought before them, “the absence of his noble friend, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was unavoidably kept away by very important business !” Lord Althorp alluded several times, in his short speech, to the “importance” of the question, and confined himself to the “*generalities*” which the Russian Minister recommended as the desirable mode of dealing with English Legislators. “They had as yet,” said his lordship, “received no official information of the occurrences which had recently taken place in Poland ; and for that, as well as for other reasons, it was not to be expected that he should at that moment enter into any explanation relating to the views entertained by his Majesty’s Government, with respect to this most interesting and important question,” &c. In this manner the debate dropped, without any results—the whole subject forgotten—the Act of Land Piracy of Russia, sealed by the passive acquiescence of England, and the nations of the world made to know, that although the People and Legislature of Great Britain were perfectly acquainted with the dangerous consequences and monstrous injustice of the act of Russia towards Poland, yet that England herself lent all the

weight of her influence, as well direct as indirect, for the successful perpetration of the outrage !

The next time that the question of Poland was brought before the House of Commons was on the 28th of June, 1832, when Mr. Cutlar Ferguson again recapitulated his arguments, urged the intervention of England, and moved for the production of the Russian Statute of Incorporation, of 26th of February. The most distinguished Members of the House again echoed these sentiments with enthusiasm ; as also three Members of the present Administration. Lord Morpeth said, “ A case was made out for the energetic intervention of England and of Europe.” Lord Ebrington’s (now Lord Fortescue) words deserve to be impressed on our memory—as also on his *Lordship’s own memory*:—“ Independent of all considerations of Humanity, there were considerations of Policy which could not be overlooked ; was it to be supposed that if the present aggression of Russia was suffered to pass unnoticed—if the perfidy of which she had been guilty to the country she was suffered to rule over, on conditions every one of which had been violated, was suffered to go without punishment—there would not be any permanent security for the peace of any of the neighbouring States ?” Lord Ebrington concluded by saying, that if war was necessary to preserve Poland from the hands of its robber, he would cheerfully endure it. Colonel Evans spoke to the same purport, and hoped that this country would not be satisfied with speaking, but that *it would act*. Lord Sandon, Mr. O’Connell, Mr. Hume, and a number of other members of each party, supported Mr. Ferguson in every word he said. The only speech that had anything equivocal in it was that of Sir Robert Peel, and whether the Hon. Baronet agreed in the sentiments of the House or not, I cannot determine, for I am unable to understand the meaning of what he said. The conduct of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on this debate becomes an object of great importance to the investigation we are pursuing. He was not absent, of course, on this second occasion, and it behoves us to examine the tendency of that which he said in reply to

the arguments that had been adduced urging intervention in favour of Poland. I conceive it so important that I quote Lord Palmerston's speech entire.

"Viscount PALMERSTON said, that if it were his intention to object to the present motion, he should feel it his duty to enter into the subject somewhat in detail, and to discuss the question at full length; but that would be unnecessary, as he was prepared *to accede to the production of the papers*. And as his honourable and learned friend had had the good taste and judgment to say that, neither by his arguments, nor by the motion with which he intended to conclude, did he mean to drive his Majesty's Government into any defence or explanation of the conduct which they had pursued in reference to the affairs of Poland, he should avail himself of what had fallen from his honorable and learned friend, and beg the House to excuse him from entering into any discussion or explanation of the conduct pursued by Government in those transactions. He was sure there was no person who must not see that, with reference to all the interests concerned, and on every account, he should best discharge his duty by not entering into any statement of that nature. At the same time, he was bound in justice to add, that the government of this country was not blind to the rights conferred upon us by the Treaty of Vienna. No man could entertain a doubt that Great Britain possessed a full right to express a decided opinion upon the performance or the non-performance of the stipulations contained in that Treaty. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that England lay under no peculiar obligation, individually, and independently of the other contracting parties, to adopt measures of direct interference by force.* For the reasons, then, which he had already stated, he took for granted that the House would not expect him to explain at length

* Did England lay under any peculiar obligation to threaten with war other States which intended to interfere by force for the protection of themselves? What were the "peculiar obligations" which called for England's interference "by force" in Spain, Naples, and Egypt?

the communications which had taken place between his Majesty's Government and their agents at foreign courts, upon the subject of Poland. The hon. and learned gentleman, in the course of his speech, had adverted to the severities practised by the Russian government towards the Poles, and expressed his apprehension that other and still more objectionable severities were likely to take place. He (Lord Palmerston) should not at that moment enter into details, but he thought every man who heard him must feel that it *was the interest of Russia to take a very different course*, and to attach the people of Poland to her government, not more by the justice of her policy, than by the concession of those institutions which were known to be the most agreeable to their feelings. No man who heard him could doubt that it was the policy of the Russian government to win the attachment of the people to the sovereign appointed to rule over them; and he must say, that any idea of exterminating a whole people, in the manner represented by the hon. and learned gentleman, *seemed to him so improbable*, that he really could not *understand on what grounds the supposition rested*; and, at all events, he was confident it would be found not to be correct. With respect to the case of Thours, which had been alluded to by the hon. and learned gentleman, he felt it necessary to state, that he understood Thours to be a subject either of Prussia or of Saxony, and therefore the Hanoverian Government, in arresting him, was merely performing a duty, which according to the constitution of Germany, it was not able to refuse. He did not conceive it to be his duty to make any further observations; and the more so, as he had already said he did not intend to refuse the papers which were moved for. If, however, any observations were made in the course of the evening, which required explanation on his part, he trusted the House would extend to him its indulgence, and permit him to say a few words in reply."

This speech is more important than all the rest of the debate put together. The reader will perceive that it is a string of "generalities," having no bearing upon the question,

and tending to destroy, in the minds of the listeners, all perception of any tangible point in it. Lord Palmerston accedes to the production of the papers, and thereon finds an excuse for not entering into any discussion or explanation of the conduct of Government! The effect of this is precisely that which the Russian Cabinet could desire: if Count Nesselrode had been consulted on what should be done, he would have advised the course adopted by Lord Palmerston. The production of the papers in question by the British Cabinet was tantamount to a *recognition by Great Britain of their validity!* The Statute of Organization by which Russia annihilated the Nationality of Poland was in possession—undisputed—of the British Cabinet; it was presented to Parliament, not protested against, not remonstrated against—and consequently *adopted by England!* this very adoption alleged as a Reason for not entering into the Question—making the matter final;—the World saw that it was indeed true that the power of England was added to Russia for the destruction of Poland, for her Minister not only prevented opposition to Russia by his interference, but proclaimed from Parliament the ratification of Poland's destruction!

The rest of Lord Palmerston's speech is too obviously evasive to require to be dwelt on. In reply to distinct facts brought forward by the speakers, his Lordship goes into general propositions about its "being *for the interest of Russia* to take a very different course," &c.! that "the idea of exterminating a whole people *seemed so improbable,*" and so on, which is the natural refuge of a man who tries to avoid coming to an explanation of Realities by flying into Generalities.

Thus was the Kingdom of Poland turned over to the possession of Russia—the Barrier of Western Europe converted into a weapon in the hands of the aggressor on the Rights and Liberties of Europe—the commercial resources of a fine country destroyed to England, and conferred on the commercial and political enemy of England—the principles of Law, Justice, and Humanity, as of British right, trampled in the dust; the example given to the World that Russia can

declare war against the Powers that signed the Treaty of Vienna, and that she is supported by Great Britain in the outrage against the rest of Europe—and all this in opposition, not only to nearly the whole of Europe and Asia, but in opposition to almost every man in the British Empire! This fearful catastrophe produced by ONE MAN in England,—the Depositary of England's power—the Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston. Let us turn away from this inexplicable subject to another phase in the career of an individual who can thus set at nought the Will of a whole “civilized” people, and make that people, like a flock of sheep, the means of gorging the rapacious Vulture!

CHAPTER V.

CRACOW.

“The city of Cracow and its Territory shall be considered in perpetuity as free, independent, and strictly neutral, under the protection of the three High Contracting Powers.”

“The three Courts bind themselves to respect, or cause to be respected, at all times, the neutrality of the free town of Cracow and its Territory. No armed Force, under any pretence whatsoever, is to be introduced there.”—*Treaty of Vienna*.

The Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna were not content with constituting the Duchy of Warsaw into a Kingdom of Poland—they also judged it necessary to fix upon another spot of ancient Poland, in which to preserve the remains of Polish Nationality, and they raised the territory of Cracow into an independent State. They, by a solemn treaty, gave a Constitution to Cracow, which could not be violated without a declaration of hostility against them. By that Constitution the right of choosing a President was vested in a Representative Assembly. It provided that there should be twelve Senators. It provided for the establishment of a University, in which, among a number of Professorships, one was devoted to the teaching of Polish Literature and Law.

In direct violation of the Treaty of Vienna, a Russian force, in 1831, entered the State of Cracow, and refused to pay the expense of the occupation, alleging that it was a just punishment for their disaffection, while there was no disaffection whatever that could be proved against them! The Agents of Russia laboured unceasingly in Cracow to excite tumult, to foment conspiracies, and to exasperate the inhabitants against their own Government. Russian Agents distributed seditious books among the students and endeavoured to inflame their passions. The cabinet of St. Petersburg then denounced to Austria and Prussia, Cracow, as a hotbed of

disaffection, as a Depot for revolutionary Principles, and a place of refuge for intriguing Characters. In 1832, the troops of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, poured into Cracow, without any notice of the violation of the Treaty of Vienna being given to France or England; and directly afterwards they took on themselves to abolish the Constitution guaranteed by it, and to establish a new one! By the new Constitution, the three Powers vested the appointment of the President *in themselves*. They reduced the number of Senators from twelve to eight, and Russia has, since then, contrived to place her own protégés in office. They abolished nine Professorships in the University, among which was that of Polish Literature, for the purpose of annihilating every vestige of Polish Nationality.

Every pretext alleged for the violation of the neutrality of Cracow, and the subversion of its Constitution, have been found to be false. Notwithstanding the utmost exertions of a rigorous police, and numerous arrests, no evidence of any plots or of any disaffection could be traced. The seditious books were discovered to have been placed in the hands of the Students by the *Professor of Russian Literature*, who was allowed to continue in his Office! No refusal, on the part of the Authorities of Cracow to deliver up the Polish refugees, could be alleged against them, for the moment that application was made by the three Powers on that subject, it was immediately complied with, and 300 were dismissed the City. The act was a wanton outrage—an act of deliberate rapine without a pretext. But, by this violation of the Treaty of Vienna, the commercial Rights of Great Britain were also violated, for Cracow was a valuable and most important depot for British Commerce, which was suddenly destroyed. It is an important point in our investigation, to know what was the line of conduct pursued by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in this transaction; did he watch over the interests of England—did he baffle the policy of Russia—or did he neglect the one, and make his Office of British Minister subservient to the purposes of the other? Let us examine.

On the 1st of March, 1836, SIR STRATFORD CANNING

called the attention of the Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons, to the intelligence that a violation of the neutrality of Cracow had taken place on the part of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, by the illegal occupation of that City by their troops, and that Proclamations had been issued by them, and Acts of authority exercised, which were in contravention of the Treaty of Vienna, and in violation of the Constitution there guaranteed to the Republic of Cracow. The Honourable Member reminded the Foreign Secretary of the ninth Article of the Treaty, which was violated by the interference of the three Powers, and formally demanded whether his Majesty's Government had received information on the point, and if so, whether it was their intention to take any notice of the transaction.

LORD PALMERSTON stated, in reply, that his Majesty's Government had not received any official account of the entrance of the troops of the three Powers into Cracow; that it was probable the Austrian troops might have entered the place; that it might be a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, but that he was not then prepared to give an opinion on the subject. His lordship promised that it was a matter to which the Government would direct its attention, but that the House could not expect him to state what steps the Government might deem it expedient to take. The subject then dropped.

It does not appear to me that if a Russian Minister were holding the Office of Foreign Secretary in England, he could by any possibility have acted more for the interests of Russia, and for the destruction of the interests of England, than Lord Palmerston did on this occasion. For, if his Lordship had denied the truth of the Occupation and violation of the Constitution of Cracow, its proof was so easy that his displacement from Office was sure to result from such a course; if he had stated the Occupation *not* to be a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, there was every member of the House, and the most eminent Authorities on International Law, including the Law Officers of the Crown, all ready to declare that it *was* a violation,* and thus would his overthrow have been cer-

* Which was subsequently done. The case of Cracow was formally

tain; if Lord Palmerston had *defended* the occupation of Cracow, and stated at once that his Majesty's Government intended to permit the sacrifice of the independence of Cracow, and of British Rights there, his overthrow, and with him the overthrow of the cause of Russia in Europe, was equally sure; because the whole Nation, and every member of the House of Commons agreed on the necessity of a contrary course; but more than this, the late revered and patriotic Monarch held opinions so decided on these points, that his attention was absorbed by the means of arresting the progress of Russian encroachment, and Lord Palmerston only held his Office on condition that he would direct the Policy of England to this end, having several times threatened his Lordship with expulsion if he acted otherwise! It is clear, therefore, that the only means by which the interference of England could be prevented from upholding the Treaty of Vienna, and the preservation of her own Rights in Cracow was, for the Minister entrusted with the direction of her affairs to decline making any statement of his opinions or intentions, and to leave the country to infer that he *intended* to take the course in accordance with the feeling of the Nation, without *doing* this, but by appearing to sanction the violation by his *acts* (inaction in such a case becomes a positive act) prevent the interference of other States.

Finding that there was no intention on the part of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to attend to the act of rapine in course of being perpetrated in Cracow, Sir S. Canning found himself under the necessity of bringing the subject at full length, and in a formal manner before Parliament and the Nation, and he therefore gave due notice of his intention. On the 18th of March, 1836, that Honourable Member put

submitted to the Law Officers of the Crown, who decided that the Russo-Dutch Loan ought not to be paid by England, *because Russia had violated her engagements*. The interest on that loan has been continued to be paid, and Lord Palmerston, four years after, defended the act of Russia in Cracow, as we shall presently see. This transaction is to me utterly inexplicable, and must doubtless be referred to our "increasing civilization!"

this intention in execution, and at great length entered into every particular of the violation of the Treaty of Vienna—of the violation of the Constitution of Cracow—of the violation of the Rights of England, by the Three Powers; he proved them by documentary evidence, and warned the House of the danger that would accrue to his Country by submission to an act of outrage like this. He concluded his able speech by “contenting himself for the present with placing the question in the hands of his Majesty’s Government, reserving to himself the right of hereafter putting his Motion, should he find it necessary to do so.”

In reply to this, Lord Palmerston made a speech of much greater length than his Lordship is wont to do, but to seize the meaning of any portion of it is a most difficult task. Each sentence in that speech is so nicely balanced by a succeeding sentence in an opposite sense—each tangible point brought forward is so beautifully annihilated by a vague “generality” which follows on its heels, that the subject of Cracow, of the Treaty of Vienna, and of British commercial Right, is liable to be wholly lost in admiration of the ingenuity with which a web of language has been woven, on so plain a subject, purporting to say intelligible things, and ending by rendering every portion of it unintelligible!

After much labour, however, I have come to the conclusion, that the following points may be set down as coming within the signification of the words used by Lord Palmerston, if they have any signification at all:—

1st.—That it was perfectly natural the House of Commons should take the important subject of Cracow into its most anxious consideration.

2nd.—That “the State of Cracow had been created and established by a Treaty to which England was a party.”*

3rd.—That “Government had not received any official communications from the Three Powers, either as to the causes of the military occupation, or as to the fact of its

* The *precise* words of his lordship.

having taken place;” and that he had written to our Ministers abroad for information on the subject.*

4th.—That the occupation certainly did constitute an infraction of the Treaty of Vienna, if true.

5th.—That “if the Three Powers had determined to do that which was a measure of unnecessary violence, he was inclined to regard the circumstances of their *not communicating it as an act of involuntary homage tacitly paid to the Justice and Plain-dealing of this Country*; for the Three Powers well knew that if their intention had been communicated, the answer which would have been returned would have had the effect of *endeavouring to dissuade* them from the Measures they intended to carry into effect.”†

5th.—That with regard to the mode of executing the outrage, “he could not but regard the selection of Austrian instead of Russian troops for the purposes of the occupation, as a measure of *good feeling* and *kindly discretion* on the part of the three Powers !” (In addition to the *soundness* of this Reasoning, the Assertion is not true—Cossacks formed part of the occupying troops.)

6th.—His Lordship praised Sir S. Canning exceedingly for having taken up this most important subject, and assured

• This part of the subject was repeated twice in different parts of the speech.

† By this, then, it appears that a Foreign Government is at liberty to commit any act of plunder or violence on the property or persons of British Subjects, when it can find any, and “pay an act of tacit homage to the Justice and Plain-dealing of this Country,” by refraining from communicating the intention of the act, “for It would know that if its intention had been communicated, the answer It would receive would have the effect of *endeavouring to dissuade* it from carrying its intention into execution !” In a subsequent debate on this subject, Sir Robert Peel defended the violence done to Cracow, on the general proposition that the Three Powers were “*Conservative Governments*,” and therefore their Policy would no doubt be a “Conservative Policy.” Does the above Reasoning of Lord Palmerston spring from the “triumph of liberal Principles,” or does it unite the “Blessings-of-peace Principle” to the safety of “Conservative Policy?”

the House that it was not compatible with his duty to express any opinion, or give them any information on the matter.

This contains, as far as I am able to understand it, the meaning of the speech of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but yet so difficult a matter is it to decide whether its meaning be precisely this, or precisely the reverse of this, that I earnestly recommend every Reader to refer to it and decide for himself.*

LORD PALMERSTON was followed by members of each Party in the House, viz., LORD SANDON, MR. O'CONNELL, MR. HUME, and LORD DUDLEY STUART, who all agreed in everything that fell from SIR S. CANNING. The speech of Mr. O'CONNELL deserves to be quoted, not only from the great talents and the standing of that Gentleman as a Lawyer, but as the Power to which the Cabinet, of which the Foreign Secretary formed a part, was indebted for its existence.

MR. O'CONNELL said "the matter lay in the narrowest compass. The State of Cracow had not violated the Treaty in any part; but the three protecting Powers—the three plundering Powers, as he should call them—had been guilty of the grossest, most undisguised, and unmitigated violations of the Treaty. In their Note itself they did not pretend that this act came within the terms of the Treaty, and yet they marched their troops into the neutral Territory that ought to have been protected by the guarantee of France and England, and thereby committed what, on a small scale, would have been a Felony, and what in the circumstances amounted to Land piracy. Ministers must now speak out, or they would next hear of the seizure of the Bosphorus and Constantinople. It was time to do justice, not only to Poland but to Sweden; and unless it were speedily accomplished, Europe must be plunged in war. It was time, too, to make enquiries after the Russian-Dutch loan. But how was the crime against the inhabitants of Cracow made out? If there were traitors in Russia corresponding with Cracow, why were they not tried and punished? No charge had been made except that of the Wolf against the Lamb—the Vulture against the Chicken; and

* See Hansard's Debates, vol. xxxvii, page 416.

on such trumpety grounds, on a mere assertion, without the slightest proof, 400 persons had been sent from their homes, from their country, and from their families. Should such things be, and no indignant cry be raised against the Monsters who caused them?"

SIR ROBERT INGLIS agreed in the truth of the above, but seemed to recommend that no steps should be taken, because "the power of public opinion would exercise its influence to check such proceedings!"

The only Member of the Ministry (besides the Foreign Secretary) who took part in the debate, was Lord John Russell, who said he agreed in what had fallen from Sir Robert Inglis. His Lordship stated that the *explanation required by Sir S. Canning had been given by Lord Palmerston (!)* and recommended that as a very important question (the Municipal Reform Bill) was coming before the House, the subject should be allowed to drop. It accordingly was dropped—and the infamy of England was sealed.

The next opportunity which presented itself to Lord Palmerston for asserting the rights of England in Cracow, was on the 30th of March, when MR. PATRICK STEWART pressed it on his attention. Mr. Stewart enquired of the Foreign Secretary whether he had communicated with the Authorities of Cracow; and if any answer had been received?—Whether the Noble Lord was aware that the Polish Refugees, having been induced to pass out of the district in which they were, instead of being forwarded to the place of their destination, had been delivered up by the three Powers into the hands of Russia, and had been marched to Siberia or Tobolsk?

LORD PALMERSTON replied, "That he had received answers from most of the Ministers to whom he had written for information respecting the affairs of Cracow; but that he had not had any communication with the Authorities themselves. It was the intention of the Government, when first they heard of the state of Cracow, and of the disposition to expel certain Refugees from that Country, to send the British Consul at Warsaw to Cracow, to obtain full information; but before the Government could give effect to their inten-

tion, they heard of the actual occupation of the town by the three protecting Powers, and it did not appear to them that that was a fitting occasion for the Consul at Warsaw to present himself in the town of Cracow !”

On the 20th of the ensuing April, MR. PATRICK STEWART brought before the House, at great length, the aggressions and systematic outrages committed by Russia—complaining of the “utter hopelessness of seeing an end put to this aggressive policy, unless some practical steps were adopted by the Government.” The Hon. Member concluded by moving that “An address be presented to His Majesty, praying that He will be graciously pleased to order a diplomatic Agent to be forthwith sent to the free and independent State of Cracow ; and that His Majesty will be graciously pleased to take such steps as to His Majesty may seem best adapted to protect and extend the commercial interests of Great Britain in Turkey and the Euxine.”

This Motion having been seconded in a warmly expressed and serious speech by SIR EDWARD CODRINGTON, an habitual Supporter of the Government, and it being their determination to press the Motion to a division, in which case the Government would have been overthrown if they opposed it, there seemed no possibility of an escape from compliance—which would have been the decided interference of Great Britain in favour of the independence of Cracow, and an instant settlement of the question, in opposition to the objects of Russia.

What could the British Minister, supposing him to be in secret concert with Russia, do in such an embarrassing situation ? Was there *any* means of escape from opposing her ? Could ingenuity devise any plan which should cheat Parliament and the country out of their object, and serve the interests of Russia in this question ?—Let us state simply the course which Lord Palmerston took.

LORD PALMERSTON said, “With regard to that part of the Motion of my Honourable Friend, in which he proposes to request the Crown to send an Agent to the State of Cracow—upon that part of his Motion, I am prepared to state to my Honourable Friend that *Government do intend to send a*

consular Agent to Cracow. I should trust, therefore, that my Honourable Friend will consent to withdraw that part of his Motion (!) With regard to the other and more material part of the address which my Honourable Friend proposes to move, I confess it does not appear to me that he has laid any sufficient Parliamentary grounds to induce the House to accede to his proposition, and I am not without hope that I may persuade my Honourable Friend to *desist at all events from pressing his motion to a division*. Possibly I may call upon him to withdraw it, instead of formally taking the sense of the House upon it! My Honourable Friend has stated the great importance, politically and commercially, of our relations with Turkey, and with other countries lying beyond the Black Sea. The Government entirely concur with my Honourable Friend as to the extreme importance in both these points of view—both politically and commercially—of our relations with these countries.”

Other Members of the House, Supporters of the Government, having urged Mr. Stewart to withdraw his motion in consequence of Lord Palmerston having assented to the first part of it, viz., that he would send a diplomatic Agent to Cracow; and that he had received the assurance from his Lordship of the opinions and views of Government respecting Turkey and Persia being in accordance with his own—the Honourable Member consented to do so, and at the conclusion of the debate, expressed himself thus:—“The debate has been very satisfactory to me. Having succeeded in the first part of my Motion, and the second part having been in substance conceded, I will, with the permission of the House, withdraw the Resolution.

The Resolution was accordingly withdrawn, and the ministerial position of Lord Palmerston preserved, on the promise, distinctly given, that he would uphold British rights in Cracow—that he would oppose the proceedings of Russia, by sending a diplomatic Agent to represent Great Britain in the Republic of Cracow, which promise has, *from that day to this hour, remained—UNFULFILLED!* This is the last method of escape from the fulfilment of a solemn duty, which I should have conceived possible to be used by a British Minister!

This breach of faith was not suffered to pass unnoticed, for on the 22nd March, 1837, LORD DUDLEY STUART called the attention of the House to the fact, that in April of the previous year a Motion of the Member for Lancaster had been withdrawn, in consequence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs having assured the House that it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to send a diplomatic Agent to reside at Cracow. The Honourable Member reminded the Foreign Secretary that this promise was made near a year ago, and asked him whether the appointment had yet been made, and if so, when the Agent was to proceed to his destination?

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, "that the Noble Lord had stated with perfect correctness the answer which had been given upon the occasion referred to. He stated at once that it was his intention to send a consular Agent to Cracow, and such, at the time, had undoubtedly been his intention; but having since found that there would be considerable difficulty attending it, greater, indeed, than he had then anticipated, he had altered his intention, and had not sent a consular Agent to Cracow, and it was not at present his intention to do so."

LORD DUDLEY STUART said, "that in consequence of this most extraordinary contradiction on the part of the Noble Lord, and of which he had now, in the hearing of the House, made admission, he would give notice that he should take as early an opportunity as he could avail himself of, after the Recess, of bringing the subject of Cracow under the consideration of the House."

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON "was quite aware of his contradiction. He had stated his intention of sending a consular Agent to Cracow, but he had been subsequently induced to alter that intention. When the Noble Lord should bring the question before the House, he was sure he should be able to state reasons sufficient to show that he had exercised a sound discretion in having changed his original intention." Upon this the subject was dropped.

In accordance with the notice thus given, Lord Dudley

Stuart, on 25th May, called the attention of the House most solemnly to this question of Cracow—"a question," said his Lordship, "affecting the character of the present Government, and particularly the conduct of the Noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. If he should succeed in shewing the House that there were Parliamentary grounds for the present Motion, he trusted the House would support him, and not allow the Noble Lord to put aside his Motion, if he felt so inclined, upon some flimsy excuse, or some unsatisfactory explanation. The Motion which he should submit to the House was, for copies of any correspondence between this Government and the Governments of Russia, Prussia, or Austria, or between this Government and the Government of Cracow, relating to the entrance of foreign troops into the Territory of that Republic ; also, copies of any correspondence between this Government and the before-mentioned Governments relating to the appointment of a British Consul at Cracow." The Noble Lord then recapitulated the case of Cracow, in an able and convincing speech.—LORD PALMERSTON WAS ABSENT! *The House was counted out, without one word of reply being spoken by any Member !*

But even this was not the last act of degradation to England which has appeared through her Parliament in this deplorable Affair of Cracow. On the 13th of July, 1840,*

* This was the debate in which Sir Robert Peel made the grotesque exhibition to which I have before alluded, about "Conservative Policy." The Honourable Baronet said "none felt more deeply than he did the necessity of using great caution in the consideration and discussion of such immense interests as the Right Hon. Gentleman had introduced to the attention of the House in the present question—a question on which they were not perfectly informed, and the issue of which might be of the utmost consequence to the peace and tranquillity of this country. He entirely agreed with the Noble Lord that nothing could be more incautious than that a political Assembly, acting upon excited feelings, should urge on a Government to threaten measures of immediate force. It became this country to assume a dignified forbearance, without being moved by foreign menaces. But speaking with all caution and reserve, yet he thought public opinion, expressed in the House of Commons, would not be without its due weight and influence ; and therefore he would say he hoped the time was come when the three Powers, with

SIR S. CANNING again brought the subject before the House of Commons, and enumerated, in a speech of great research, the wrongs and misery which had been inflicted on the unoffending inhabitants of this free Republic, from the three occupations of its territory by foreign troops, in violation of public Law, and England's commercial Rights.

MR. GALLY KNIGHT supported the views of Sir S. Canning, and reminded Lord Palmerston of his frequent promises to interfere in behalf of that State, and of the constant falsification of them.

The reply to this on the part of Lord Palmerston was so humiliating, that I blush to record it or to allude to it. After

whom he wished that relations of the utmost amity should be kept up, and who, he believed, were actuated by true *Conservative principles*, should revert to the settlement of 1815, and re-establish Cracow in the position of freedom and independence that were guaranteed to her at that period—(hear). The three Powers must see that it was their interest to act up to the Treaty of 1815—they must feel the immense importance, when temporary necessity had subsided, of re-establishing all States, small as well as large—and, perhaps, the moral obligation was stronger in respect of the Small than the Great—the three Powers must feel (as he was sure, from the course they had uniformly pursued, they did feel,) when the necessity for delay was at an end, the absolute obligation they were under of restoring Cracow to the full enjoyment of her former independence—(hear, hear). The discussion in the French Chamber would show how strong the feeling on behalf of this small State was beginning to be; and it was to be hoped that considerations of Prudence, as well as of Justice, would induce the three Powers to fulfil the Treaty in behalf of Cracow. With his views of the moral obligation of preserving Peace, he should be slow to counsel any course that would lead to so deplorable a result as War. Considering the language held by the Minister of France, it was impossible not to see that matters were in a very unsatisfactory state, when there was a protest on the part of England and France to the occupation of Cracow. He should conclude by saying, as he had already done, that he hoped the defenders of *Conservative principles* in Europe would, of themselves, without the intervention of England or of France, restore the independence of Cracow—that without any interference they would take a course consistent with their own dignity, and by so doing extinguish one of those seeds which, in its maturity, would be so dangerous to the public tranquillity.”—(hear, hear).

having taken up a long time in the indulgence of a vein of indecent jocularly on general subjects, until all seriousness in the House was at an end, and the impression produced by the speeches of Sir S. Canning and Mr. Gally Knight was effaced from the minds of the Audience; the Foreign Secretary gave expression to the following mournful sentiments—“As for the occupation of Cracow, he (Lord P.) was not going to unsay anything he had formerly said, nor did he mean to retract any of those opinions he had advanced in those passages of speeches read by the Hon. Baronet on the subject as between the three Powers and the State of Cracow, or the three Powers and the other Powers who had signed the Treaty of Vienna. He said at the time, and he still said, that the occupation of Cracow was against the principles of the Treaty of Vienna. But it was one thing to state an opinion, and another thing to compel three Powers to undo acts which they had done, while, from geographical circumstances, there were no means to enforce the opinion of England, unless by an appeal to arms, which would involve us in a war with those Powers, for Cracow was a place in which no English action could directly take place.”—This is quite sufficient; here is the confession (a monstrous and treasonable falsehood, I should say), by England’s Minister, of England’s inability to preserve her own Rights from rapine—the public Law of Europe from violation! Lord Chatham and Lord Nelson, and William the Fourth, must have turned in their graves at so fearful a moment as this!—So sunken is the spirit, and so degraded and incapable is the intellect of Englishmen of the present day, that it is possible this appeal to “Peace” might, in some breasts, be attributed to a sincere desire in the Minister who could utter them, for the welfare of his country, by thus making Peace the price of Robbery and Infamy; but when we recollect that the French Senate, the French Prime Minister, and the French Nation had expressed their desire to co-operate with England in seeing justice done to Cracow;—when we bear in mind that France and England which, in their Union, are the sole controlling power of the world, were

united in resistance to a flagrant violation of the faith of Treaties, and the Rights of Man—when we consider that this very resistance brings to their support every minor State in Europe and in Asia—when, with such a power as this arrayed on the side of JUSTICE, we can hear of the dread of the resistance by Russia and Prussia* in support of OUTRAGE AND RAPINE, urged by a British Minister, as a reason for allowing their Rights and their Honour to be trampled in the dust, I cannot conceive how any man can distort such a cry as the cry of “Peace,” into a desire for the welfare of his country. But it is worse even than this; for, at the very time when this Minister was justifying submission to an act which he confessed to be an outrage, on the plea of *not disturbing the peace of Europe*, he was preparing a Measure of illegal and unconstitutional interference in an *internal* quarrel of another State, which he knew was to *excite a commotion in Europe*—which he knew was to drive this powerful Friend France into hostility,—and he persisted in carrying this act of Piracy into execution in the face of an army of 900,000 men which was levying by France to resist it—the object for which this hostility was braved, being the destruction of a Power† (Mehemet Ali) created by himself and by Russia; the effects of it, the convulsion of the Ottoman Empire which he acknowledged should be strong that it might be able to resist Russia—the very terms of the Treaty stipulating that Constantinople and the Dardanelles should be occupied by *Russian troops*, in case the execution of it gave rise to disturbances in that Capital! It is by a Minister who does this that the cry of “Peace” is raised, to justify submission to the pecuniary Loss, prospective Danger, and political Degradation, of England!

It may be said I have been intent on giving only the unfavourable side of Lord Palmerston’s actions, but verily I have been anxiously searching for evidence in his favour, and

* Austria is only searching for support, anywhere, against Russia—well aware that *she* will be the next Victim of Russian aggrandisement.

† Treaty of 15th July, 1840.

I have hitherto, in the cases of Poland and Cracow, been able to find nothing. The cases of Cracow and of Poland show us how Russia may infringe the commercial Rights of England—violate the faith of Treaties—trample on the Rights of Nations—perpetrate every crime in accumulating the means of aggression, and be supported by the power of England, in opposition to the Will of the Nation—against the resistance of an indignant World !

CHAPTER VI.

GREECE.

“The internal Organization of Greece is a vital Question for the Emperor.”—*Count Nesselrode*.

AN examination of the march of British and Russian politics requires a *coup-d’œil* over the recent transactions between the Court of St. Petersburg, the British Minister and the ill-fated Kingdom of Greece.

The origin of the Russian Empire—the Source whence has sprung the Russian diplomatic System—the immediate object to which that System is directed—is, Greece. The importance of the Russo-Greek question is so stupendous—its action on the fortunes of the World, destined, within no short period, to be so all-powerful, that, although I intend only to make allusion to one or two features in the connection between the British Cabinet and the Russian, during the last few years, yet for the proper appreciation of any portion of them, I conceive it will be both beneficial and interesting, as indeed it is necessary, to take a brief survey of those early events which contain the germs of a future Empire of the East and West.

The Russian Empire, now of greater territorial extent than of old the united empire of Rome and Greece, though not much known to Europe till near the end of the seventeenth Century, was well known to, and in communication with, the Greek Emperors, at Constantinople, near eight Centuries before that Time. We have no authentic History as to its existence till about the year 840, when the Prince Ruric laid its foundation, whose Dynasty reigned till the commencement of the seventeenth Century, when the succession to the Throne of the Czars passed into the present reigning Family of Romanoff. The Christian Religion was first introduced into Russia by the Princess Olga, widow of Igor, who was Son and Successor of Ruric. This Princess came to Constantinople in 941, during the Reign of the Emperor Zimiscos, who had stood

her Sponsor at the baptismal Font. On her return to Russia, she was accompanied by a number of Greek Priests, Literary men, and Statesmen, who were intent on using the means which this conversion of a Russian Princess might afford them, for gaining some strength to the Empire—then in the deplorable state of Imbecility, Anarchy, and Faction, which are the unfailing Precursors of the dissolution of Nations. The labours of this Colony soon appeared in the mental grafting of the Grandson of the Princess, Vlodimir, one of the greatest Princes that has ever occupied the Muscovite Throne. Gifted with great ability, both military and civil, Vlodimir was inspired with the loftiest aims, and with unbounded ambition. He was imbued by the Greek Priests (*the founders of Russian Diplomacy*) with the desire of allying himself with the Roman Emperors of Constantinople, and he promised to embrace, with all his subjects, the Christian Religion, if the then Emperor Basil Porphirogonetus would give him in marriage his Sister, the Princess Anne.

The Empire, a prey to the bitterest religious Feuds, and torn by intestine Factions—exposed to aggression from every quarter, and its power of resistance neutralised by the excess of fanaticism and party dissension raging within its Bosom, rejoiced in the prospect of a union with the Slavonic Savages, and regarded the proposition of Vlodimir as a benefit conferred by the Great God, the Protector of the Empire ! The offer having been accepted, the Princess Anne was sent with every form of Imperial *étiquette*, and in great pomp, into Russia, accompanied by Anastatius, the Bishop of Corfu, who was sent by the Patriarch of the Greek Church, Photius, to administer Baptism and celebrate the marriage. Vlodimir was baptised under the name of Basil, with 20,000 of his subjects, in the year 987, when he proceeded to build Churches, Monasteries, and exerted himself to introduce the Christian Religion into Bulgaria. Photius, at the same time, sent into Russia, Bishop Michel Cyrus, as Patriarch of the country, with another colony of Priests, Monks, Metaphysicians, Artists, and every description of functionary adapted for bringing the arts

of civilised life into that savage State—"Civilisation" being at that time at its *acmé* in the Greek Empire ! The Government of Russia then became a compound of the wild excesses of the Slavonic hordes, with the selfish and polished ingenuity of the sophist Greek—a struggle between the unbridled ferocity of the wandering Savage, and the mild, but crafty and unprincipled Learning of the fanatic Greek. From the death of Vlodimir in 1005, the Russian Empire continued to make little progress in its impulse Eastward, in consequence of the confusion and civil strifes with which it was afflicted, till at length, in the middle of the fifteenth Century, there appeared one of those extraordinary men who are formed by Nature to change the destinies of Empires, and modify the lot of countless generations;—such was JOHN BASILOWITZ the First.

The career of this Monarch was an eventful and an arduous one. After rescuing his country from dangers both foreign and domestic, his power became confirmed and complete and his Genius laid the foundations of Russian greatness.

It was at this Period that the fall of the united Roman Greek Empire was accomplished, and Constantinople fell into the hands of the Turks. Many of the "enlightened" and "civilised" Metaphysicians, Sophists, Rhetoricians, Priests, Statesmen—(that is to say, the choicest of the Fanatics, Hypocrites, and Scoundrels, which composed the population)—of the Greek empire, took refuge in Italy, but the attention of the most eminent of them was turned to the Colony of their Brethren which rankled in Muscovy, whither they looked as the only Seat of their Religion (!) and by means of whose assistance they hoped for the re-establishment of their Empire and their Church. The Genius and Ambition of John Basilowitz seemed to offer hopes of success to their Enterprise, and it was not long before the exertions of the Greek Priests found a means of placing on the head of a Muscovite Sovereign the Crown of the Cæsars, and in perpetuating the authority of "Divine right" in a Race of Monarchs of their Faith, whose whole power and policy should centre in the unique object of re-establishing the Roman Empire in Constantinople.

The Princess Sophia, daughter of John Palæologus, the

79th Roman Emperor, and niece of Constantine, the 80th and last Emperor, had, during some years, taken up her residence at Rome, where she had embraced the Communion of the Roman Church. At the death of Constantine, Sophia remained the sole legitimate Heir of the Throne of the Cæsars, and the Greek fugitives and courtiers proposed her marriage with John Basilowitz—the Empire of the world was to be the fruit of this Union. The Pope seconded the proposal of the Grand Duke of Muscovy with joy, hoping to make it the means of effecting the union of the two Churches ; but no sooner had the Princess arrived in Russia than she again reverted to the Greek Schism. The pride of the Heiress of the Roman Empire could not brook to be the Spouse of a Prince who was tributary to the Tartars, and the efforts of John Basilowitz delivered Russia from their yoke. It was on taking possession of their Capital, Casan, and in that City, that the Conqueror took the title of Cæsar, and was crowned with the same Diadem which is used by the Emperors of Russia to this day. He adopted at the same time the Arms of Sophia, the daughter of the Cæsars—the two-faced Eagle, emblem of the Dominion of the East and West. The Eagle holds in his talons the Imperial Sceptre, and the Globe of the World surmounted by a Greek Cross !

John Basilowitz then talked of the “Divine Right of Kings,” and his two successors claimed the title of Cæsar, and traced their descent to the Emperors of Rome ! The origin of the title of “CZAR” is very significant, and the Nations of Europe will understand it when the Russo-Greek Cabinet is transferred from the temporary settlements of St. Petersburg and Moscow, to Constantinople—and the Empire of the CÆSARS stretches its wings, long pinioned, once more over Europe and over Asia.

The Policy of Russia is an affair of centuries—has an object fixed, and is undeviatingly pursued. It is not dependent on the Will, the Caprice, or the Ability of a King or a single Ruler ; it is a *System*—a religio-political System, conceived and founded by the fanatic Greeks of the Lower Empire, and perpetuated in a religio-political Body, of which an Emperor is the organ, composing the Secret Council of the

Government. The most fearful Despotism the world has ever seen, this Secret Council unites the terrors of a false and corrupt Religion to the Tyranny of absolute temporal control, and not only wields the energies of the mighty Slavonic population to a single object,* but exercises unbounded spiritual influence over the Nations and Tribes which, scattered throughout Europe, acknowledge the tenets of the Greek Church.

The *strength* of the Theocratic Ruling Power of Russia is founded on something vastly more powerful, as it is more fearful, than the Will of Monarchs, or of Representative Assemblies—the Secret Council of Russia unites in Itself both the one and the other, for it is a concentration of the hopes and aspirations, both religious and material, of a whole Race; it is an embodiment, in a few able Hands, of the impulse of sixty millions of people—its Watchword, *the Plunder and Possession of the Regions of the Sun!*

The most powerful weapon possessed by Russia is this spiritual Dominion which she exercises over Foreign States, for it gives her a footing in Europe which could not, by any other means, be possible. By it she claims a community of feelings and interests with many Nations which are unconnected with her—secures an ascendancy which she uses as a means of action on other countries, and, by constant intervention, prepares the decomposition of whole Empires;—then denounces them to Europe as convulsed, and anarchical, and takes them under “*her protection!*” Fearful has been the progress of this religious action on Turkey—it may be comprehended what must be the importance, both in a religious and a territorial point of view, to Russia, of the recently secured Turkish Province, now called the “KINGDOM OF GREECE.”

* I request the reader to have the kindness to turn to the Appendix, Note I, and read over carefully the extract from the Plan of external conquest laid down by Peter the Great, which contains instructions to his Successors, as to the details of the means to be pursued—the mighty impulse given by that vast Mind to the Russo-Greek system, by the method which he taught them of enslaving Europe, requiring a European System of demoralization to be contained within the Grand System.

The community of Religion between Russia and modern Greece has been the chief lever by which she has, within the last ten years especially, used the strength of the Nations of Europe against themselves, and in furtherance of the grand object of preparing for Russian supremacy. Although the utmost exertions of Russia have constantly been used to excite convulsion and rebellion in Greece,* yet the Government of the Turks baffled the demoralizing influence almost for centuries. The Rights of the Greeks were respected—their Religion tranquilly enjoyed under the Supremacy of a Patriarch at Constantinople—the happiness and prosperity of Greece was constantly on the increase. Under the Turks, Greece enjoyed an extent of Liberty wholly unknown, and indeed inconceivable to people so “enlightened” as those of England or France. The country was divided into Municipalities, and the Greeks administered their own Laws, managed their own Courts of justice, elected their own Magistrates, and COLLECTED THEIR OWN TAXES. No tax of any description, either required by the Sultan for purposes

* In 1770 the Morea rose against the Turks by the efforts of the Greek ministers at St. Petersburg, under Catherine II. This incarnation of the Genius of Evil, the Empress Catherine, was precisely suited to her masters, the Secret Council of Russia. It is singular that the chief difficulty of this theocratic Council is, to procure a Representative, or Organ of acting, *sufficiently diabolical* for the successful march of their Plan. Peter I. and Catherine II. precisely suited them, but the moment that the Imperial Representative shall exhibit any of the feelings of Humanity, or if his passions are too strong for control, the bowstring is the instant remedy. Peter III. was *removed* for having proceeded to ameliorate the abject slavery of the Nobles, and having otherwise evinced a disposition towards Benevolence and Justice. His son Paul I. shared his fate, more for having paid a tribute to the memory of his murdered Father, and exhibited a repugnance to his Murderer (Orloff) than for any interference with the march of Russian policy—the elegant, esteemed, and influential Count Pahlen, present Muscovite Ambassador at the French Court, being the chief executioner! The *accidental* death of Alexander at Odessa, serves as a lesson for Nicholas (if he requires one) not to march too slow, and the setting aside of the heir Constantine, warns future Emperors not to be under the influence of their personal Passions, or to desire to march too fast for the realization of *Success*!

of government, or for local expenses, could be levied without the express consent of the provincial Councils, as also of the Mayors of the towns and villages, who assessed them proportionally among the Families of their Municipality. Commerce was free, but in this country I believe it will be necessary to explain what is meant by *Commerce being free*; it means—not that a revenue was raised by an enormous amount of taxation levied on the importations from all foreign countries equally, but that there were *no taxes on articles of consumption*—no bar placed by a central power on the freedom of exchanging products between man and man—between Greece and other Nations; there was, therefore, in Greece, the advantages of the cheapness consequent on an unclogged importation and manufacture of every article which made up the things used for the comforts of man, and the facility of living arising from the perfect freedom of exchange of goods possessed or to be acquired. Hence the prosperity of Greece under the Turkish dominion, and the extreme difficulty to Russia of gaining a footing in Greece, notwithstanding all the facilities of acting on their religious passions. But there are always in every country Passions to be aroused, and Interests to be raised up in individuals, at variance with the general interest; and as Greece was, in the language of the Russian Minister, “a vital question for the Emperor,” no efforts or no resources were spared to secure the base, the corruptible, the dupes, and the fanatics of that country, as a Faction in the interests of Russia. There became soon a *Russian faction* in Greece, whose exertions were devoted to excite to civil war, and soon after the Congress of Vienna, the secret society of the Hæteria was formed by Russia, for the purpose of urging the Greeks to throw off what they were pleased to call “the Turkish yoke.” The people of Europe were taught by the legions of literary *protégés* of Russia to believe that the confusion in Greece was a struggle of the Cross against the Crescent—between Civilization and Barbarism! Many of the petty European Courts were tempted to favour the insurrectionary proceedings, by the inducement artfully held out of a

Crown for the younger Princes; scholars were enlisted under the idea of aiding the descendants of Socrates and Plato; philanthropists were worked on by the unblushing falsehood of the "persecuted Greeks;" disappointed Demagogues and needy Adventurers were inflamed with the jargon about "liberty" and "glory;" Traitors and Criminals were urged to join the "Greek cause;" and *Capitalists (!)* were seduced, by hopes and promises of gain, to furnish money, for carrying on a Rebellion, more absurd, more disgraceful, and more disastrous in its consequences than perhaps has yet had place in the history of the World. A ferment was excited by Russia, both in Greece and in Europe, more wonderful and more complete than anything yet effected by that wily Cabinet, solely by Corruption, Deception, and Falsehood; but it must be recollected that there was not a Court in Europe, to the pettiest State of Germany, that she had not Statesmen or Agents devoting their whole energies to the work. Count Capodistrias, ex-Minister of Russia, scattered the flames of Revolution from the British Ionian Islands;* from Switzerland the "Liberals" of Europe were gained to the "cause," and in 1820, Ypsilanti entered Moldavia from the Russian territory.

The Head of the Greek Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, was compromised by the Russian Embassy in the treason of his countrymen, was denounced and betrayed to the Divan, and executed by the Sultan, by which the Greeks were exasperated against the Sultan, for the persecution of their Faith, and Europe was excited to horror of "Turkish barbarity!" The Greek revolution broke out, under Russian auspices, and the Emperor *denounced it to the Sultan—offering assistance to suppress it!* The Sultan, being perfectly aware that the Greek insurrection was the work of Russia, rejected the assistance of the Emperor, so as to prevent the wished-for pretext of interference—having already seen enough of Russian "*Protection.*" The Emperor denounced the Greek Revolution to Europe, and proposed a collective Interference, but the Court of London refused to permit it. In

* He drew up an address in this spirit at Corfu, in 1819, for dissemination in Greece.

the mean time the Greek Nation being able no longer to tolerate the undisguised perfidy of Russia, and perfectly aware that her exertions were only for the assimilation of their country to the state of ruthless Tyranny and brutal Barbarism which exists in every Nation brought under Russian sway, resolved to free themselves from the connection, and took steps for the overthrow of Ypsilanti* and the Russian Faction.

In the year 1822, the National Assembly met, which promulgated the Declaration of Independence, elected Mavrocordato President, who was an enemy to the Russian Faction, and adopted a Constitution presented under his auspices. The whole proceedings of the Assembly, the code of Laws adopted, the very national Colours and Emblems chosen, all were done with the view of excluding Russian interference.

The alarm of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg at this manifestation of the People of Greece knew no bounds, and the utmost exertions of Russia were now turned to exciting the fears of the "legitimate," the "conservative" Sovereigns, and factions of Europe, against the spread of "*anarchy*" and "*revolution*" in Greece! At length, in May, 1824, Count Nesselrode drew up his famous Memoir, calling on the Courts of Europe to aid Russia in the work of crushing this "Anarchy and Revolution," which, he says, will make "subversive doctrines triumph there," and it closes by the following sentence: "they (the Revolutionists) might even succeed in misleading the world, by accusing the Alliance of only seeking to replace Greece under *an anarchical and barbarous Power*, and of ranging on the same line, Mahometanism and the Christian Religion!"

It is difficult here to decide which emotion to give way to in contemplating the progress of Russia in this Greek affair;—admiration of that Policy by which She succeeded in exciting rebellion and revolution, and gaining the support, and rendering subservient to her views, the Liberals, Demagogues, Fanatics, and Usurers of Europe;—of the matchless change of Policy by which, on the realization of the first portion of the

* Ypsilanti was a Major-General in the Russian Service.

operation, she secured the favour and support to the next phase of her views, of the Princes and Courts of Europe, by denouncing the Movement in Greece as *anarchical and revolutionary*;—or, shall we confine ourselves to feelings of contempt for these Demagogues, Courts, Fanatics, and Princes, who were so easily made the dupes of the monstrous imposture!

On becoming acquainted with this new treachery of Russia, the Greeks were roused to an indignation unspeakable, and they looked to the Justice of England to support them against the interference and designs of their *quondam soi-disant* Friend on the Bothnian Gulf. In reply to their application, Mr. Canning, on the 1st December, 1824, addressed a letter to Greece, recognising the provisional Government, and also the belligerent Rights of Greece; and two months afterwards, the Greek Nation made a loan in England of £2,800,000, as a security for which it pledged the whole of the national property in Greece—thus binding itself to England by the strongest of all ties.

In the mean time, the unceasing exertions of Russia to annihilate the free Institutions of Greece gained her the support of the continental Allies, when the Greek Nation placed, by a formal Act, dated Nauplia, 20th July, 1825, “the sacred deposit of its Liberty, Independence and political Existence under the absolute protection of Great Britain,” and solicited the nomination of a Prince to reign over it, connected with the Royal Family of England. At this time Russia, having convulsed and weakened Turkey by the dismemberment of Greece, was bent on a speedy invasion of the Sultan’s Dominions,—but the intervening appeal of the Greeks to England was instantly seized by her as the ground-work of complications which should at once procure her the prostration of Turkey and the mastery of Greece. That appeal gave occasion to the “*Treaties for the Pacification of the Levant*,” which was the most perfect measure of success the theocratic Cabinet of St. Petersburg could desire. Here were England, France, Prussia, Austria, all “protocoling,” “interfering,” “mediating,” between Turkey and Greece, about the affairs of which they were totally ignorant, with *Russia*, who was as

thoroughly acquainted with the East, as she was with the incapacity of the blundering Statesmen whom she had to deceive and mislead in the West !

The sudden and unconscious hostility of England and France to the Sultan, and the destruction by them of his fleet at Navarino, were the first masterly Results which Russia realised by the “Treaties for the *Pacification* of the Levant”—the immediate events for which she postponed her invasion of Turkey ! They gave to Russia the overwhelming influence which the co-operation of England and France naturally conferred, and brought a Russian fleet into the Mediterranean to support her Agents in the work of destroying the liberties, and effecting the subjugation of Greece. It was in the same year as this disastrous battle of Navarino, that it became necessary to elect a new President of Greece, and the ex-Minister of St. Petersburg, Count John Capodistrias, was proposed by the Russian Party. Capodistrias had devoted himself, by a retirement in Switzerland, to the necessary means of action for arousing the sympathies of Europe in favor of the “oppressed Greeks,” and at the same time for cultivating the acquaintance and securing the confidence of the “Liberals” in France and England, but especially those of the latter, on which he acted chiefly from the Ionian Islands.

The veil of deceit was not thick enough for the Greeks, for they saw through the trick of this *liberal* Russian Candidate, but he had done his part *too* well in London, for, wonderful and incredible as it may appear, his nomination was insisted on by LORD COCHRANE and GENERAL CHURCH, who conceived him to be the enemy of Russia and the friend of Greece, because he professed himself to be “*liberal* !” The Greeks reluctantly yielded up their judgment to the importunity of these distinguished Englishmen, who were really their friends ; or rather who intended to be their friends, although too ignorant to do anything but serve their enemy. This was a master-stroke of Russia ;—in establishing Capodistrias in the Presidency of Greece, the poor Greeks indeed brought a Scorpion into their House. Forced in this manner upon them, they, however, did their best to endeavour to

prevent his intrigues, which they knew would go to prepare them for the "protection" of Russia, and the Representatives of Greece would not assent to his election until he had sworn a solemn oath to maintain the Laws and the Constitution.*

The work of Russia was now done in Greece; she not only had her own Agent there to work out her ends—to sow and cultivate the seeds of demoralization, which was to prepare that country for incorporation at the *proper time*, but she had more. Russia arranged the establishment of a triple Alliance in London, called the "Conference" where the Ambassadors of her Court and that of France should exercise, with the British Minister, a control over the affairs of Greece, both internal and external—whose duty was to be *the foundation of a regular order of things* in that country;† and also she arranged that the Three Powers should accredit Ministers to Greece, for the purpose of assisting Capodistrias to administer the affairs of the country—the duty of the Residents not being to represent the interests of their respective Countries in Greece, but to be invested with the unconstitutional, illegal, and inconceivably monstrous functions of *regulating the internal affairs of that Nation!*

In this nineteenth century, it seems beyond the possibility of belief that England could be a party to such a Scheme—but such is the naked fact. By this process Russia not only secured the direct object she had in view—the convulsion and decomposition of Greece, but, through Greece, secured a connection with the Cabinets and people of Europe, as a means of action on them, as well as on Turkey, Egypt, and the various populations of the East!

* The oath was as follows:—

"I swear, in the name of the Most High, to preserve inviolate the fundamental Laws of the Greek Government, and not to abrogate them, or to permit them to be abrogated, in any case, or under any pretext.

"I furthermore swear to defend and preserve, with all my efforts, the independence of the Greek Nation, and the general and individual freedom; to respect the Rights of all and each; to preserve and increase the general and individual happiness, and to neglect none of the means with which the Laws have entrusted me.

† See Dispatch of Prince Lieven, 12th March, 1828.

The Constitution of Greece, as agreed to by the Assembly at Epidaurus, confirmed nearly every detail of Government as they existed under the Turkish Rule ; that is to say, a representative System, freedom of Religion and Commeree, the collection of taxes by the people themselves in their Municipalities ; and thus they possessed the only perfect and legitimate control over the Executive Power. This was a description of Government which is not only unknown to "free" countries (like England and France) of the *present age*, but is utterly incapable of being in the faintest manner conceived by almost any Englishman or Frenchman throughout the two empires ;—RUSSIA knew it well ; and her history, since the reign of John Basilowitz, has been one prolonged struggle against Municipal Government ; for, the demoralization and subjugation of Nations in which it exists is impossible. "The internal organization of Greece was," therefore, without doubt, "a vital question for the Emperor :"—the existence of Liberty or Prosperity, in the little province of Greece, would have annihilated the whole structure of four centuries of the march to a Russian (Greek) Empire of the East and West.

But the difficulty of extinguishing Liberty in Greece, and of securing a footing there, and means of action on Turkey and Europe, was too great to be achieved by Russia—it was impossible for her to accomplish it without the aid of the armies, the fleets, and influence of England and France. THIS was the meaning of the "Conference" at London, and the "Residents" in Greece ! *this* was the meaning of the union of England, France, and Russia, at London, for securing to a little Turkish Province the "blessings of Peace and *good Government!*" *this* was the meaning of the millions of British money raised as subsidies, and sent to be placed at the disposal of the Russian Faction to—BLAST THE PROSPERITY AND ANNIHILATE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNFORTUNATE GREEK PEOPLE !

When Russia succeeded by this master-stroke in entangling England and France in a sea of "duties," which they could not comprehend, everything was in her power. Then were oceans of Protocols, Memoirs, public documents of every shade and kind poured out upon unhappy Greece.

On the installation of a Russian President in Greece, and a Russian Protectorate of Greece at London, the "instructions" for governing that country were showered forth by Count Nesselrode without mercy ; the first thing done was to propose a *new loan* for Greece.* It is to be recollected that the war was over in Greece—that there was no money wanted for the expenses of Government—that the Greek Nation never asked for, and were highly incensed at the idea of any money being given them, which they no sooner heard of than they stigmatised as "not gold from London, but chains from St. Petersburg." But the work of assaulting the Constitution of Greece, and annihilating the Laws which he had sworn to defend, could not be done by Capodistrias without large means of corruption ; for the Greek People would not grant, through their Municipalities, money for the subversion of these Municipalities—it was necessary to procure it elsewhere, and it was resolved that *England* should provide these means ! So, the first Act of the President was, to propose to the Assembly *to get rid of the first debt of £2,800,000 due to England*, by a new loan, *to be raised in Russia*, of 60 million rubles!† Russia, who had denounced the Greek Revolution as the works of *Republicans and Revolutionists*, urged this proposal of a loan to carry on the Government of this Republic, under a President, and it was accordingly raised, and *forced on the Greeks* ! We shall revert to the proceedings connected with these two loans presently.

Fortified with a large sum of money, and thus rendered independent of the representative power of Greece, as also

* See Dispatch of Count Nesselrode, annexed to the protocol of the Conference, held at the Foreign Office, London, 12th March, 1823.

† The object of this was of course two-fold, as will be perceived at once by any man acquainted with the tactics of Russia.—First, to procure the money ; but next, and chiefly, to do away with the connection which bound England to Greece in the first loan, by *transferring, by the proper forms, the mortgage of that country to RUSSIA, as security for the payment.* The loan, although raised by Russia, and guaranteed by Russia, would of course be actually *raised* in England, as all loans are, whether "negotiated" in Amsterdam, Paris, or London !

set above the restraint of the Laws, the "liberal" Russian President set to work in good earnest to root up every vestige of the Liberties and Constitution of the unfortunate People he was thrust upon. These exertions were met, however, by some difficulty at first, for the Ambassadors of the Three Powers, in their Conference at Poros, drew up a Report in a sense the very reverse of what was required by the Emperor, in this "vital question." Their Report, which reached London in 1829, stated that it would be "both unjust and dangerous to deprive the Greeks of the Representative Principle," and that the right of apportioning the taxes ought, as under the Turks, to be preserved to the people; also, that it was obligatory on the Alliance "to regard as a primary consideration the imprescriptible rights of the Capitalists who had taken part in the loans made in England by the Greeks." This blow to the Russian President was severe, but was merely one of those temporary obstacles which the Russian Cabinet often meets with, and invariably overcomes. Capodistrias and the Russian Resident immediately transmitted a Memoir to St. Petersburg, which was thence transmitted to London, and Protocols, Memoirs, and Memorandums, were again poured out in merciless abundance! The chief instrument used for perplexing and confusing the British Ministers on this point was, long "Memoirs" of Count Nesselrode and Count Boulgari, *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*, confusing and mixing up all sorts of Events, Principles, &c.—a means so admirably adapted for drawing out of the brains of British or French Ministers the abstract Theories and absurdities which form the curse of modern society, and thus rendering anything about the state of Greece so totally unintelligible, that one is almost reconciled to the idea of the coming universal Dominion of Russia, in our admiration of the genius of the men who are preparing it! Count Boulgari's memoir ends thus: "It is in this manner that the Powers would strike at the heart of the Demagogues in all countries,* in proving to them that there is no Revolu-

* It is to a "Tory" Administration (1829) that this is addressed! The "*non-intervention*" ministry had not yet come in.

tion which is not necessarily put an end to by the union of the Allied Sovereigns ; and that even *when revolts are encouraged and feasible*, they find, in the combined action of the Crowns, an insurmountable Barrier, and an inclination always ready, to destroy them, or to turn them to the advantage of social order !” The result of this was, that the Ambassadors were ordered to return to Constantinople to *re-open negotiations*—the “ Memoir ” being annexed to a Protocol (of 22nd March, 1829) drawn up to that effect, and on the basis that Greece should enjoy “ an Administration as much as possible approaching to monarchical forms, and should be confided to a Christian Prince, &c.”

It is not my purpose here to dwell on the ocean of intrigues and villany brought to bear against the liberties of the Greeks. Those who desire to do so may refer to the works of Professor Thierch, M. Von Maurer, Mr. Parish, the Portfolio, and many other sources. It may be sufficient to say, that the commencement of Capodistrias’ “ good Government ” was, to abolish the legislative Council, and establish an absurd Institution which he called the “ *Panhellenium*,” consisting of twenty-seven Members, who were to share the Government with him until the meeting of the National Assembly, which he promised to convoke in two months. In violation of this promise he postponed convoking the National Assembly for upwards of a year, under various unmeaning pretexts, and in the mean time he filled every Office with his own partisans, appointing Prefects and Commissioners over the Provinces. He destroyed the Representative System, by a Decree, dated 16th April, 1828, in which he ordered that the electoral Colleges should be presided over by commissioners *designated by the Government*. He issued instructions that the Justices of the Peace could only administer the affairs of their Commune, according to the decisions of the Central Authority. Then lists were ordered to be drawn up of the electors, and of those who were eligible ; when objections were made, the Commissioners judged of their validity, and his Decisions were without appeal.* The municipal System of Greece was shattered

* The most striking part of this subject is, the singular resemblance

and broken by a Russian Minister, supported by Foreign subsidies. A rigorous Police was established—Spies swarmed through the country—letters were broken open by system—and even conversations were carried to the secret police.

The time was now coming when the Conference was about to proclaim to Greece their intention to place the Government under a Christian Prince ;—warned of this in good time by the Russian part of the Conference, Capodistrias anticipated the arrival of the Protocol, by perfecting the necessary preparations for neutralising it. For this purpose he had recourse to the National Assembly promised a year ago—he thought his control over the elections was safe, by means of his Prefects and Commissioners. He applied to the *Panhellenium* respecting the elections ; but, much to his disappointment, that Body drew up a Memoir of a nature so subversive of his schemes that—*it never met more !* The people of Greece no sooner heard of the intention of sending a Prince to rule over them, than in the hope of getting rid of the Russian Pro-consul, they gave way to a delirium of joy. Every violation of Law, and outrage on personal Liberty, was committed by him to suppress this manifestation of feeling ; and the most prodigious exertions were made by his Agents and Spies, Prefects and Commissioners, to influence the elections in favour of Himself, but were unsuccessful. No disguise was used by Capodistrias, who openly proclaimed his opposition to the intention of the Conference to establish the Government of Greece under an Hereditary Sovereign.

The National Assembly met at Argos on the 11th of July, 1829. The proceedings were, without doubt, among the most extraordinary exhibitions to which deliberative assem-

between the plan adopted by Capodistrias, for the decomposition of the Greek State, and that by which the Liberties and Constitution of Great Britain have in late years been annihilated. The one is a positive counterpart of the other—agreeing as well in principle as in the details : Registration Act—Poor Law Amendment Act—Municipal Reform—Police Force Act—Election of Justices of Peace submitted to central Authority—Commissioners without end, and for everything ;—in fact, a perfect control of internal affairs given to the Central Power !

blies have given rise. It was a struggle between the President, aided by the vast number of his partisans, whom, by corruption, he had secured the election of ; and the Representatives of the Greek State. Every proposition that came from a Deputy, tending to establish the Laws of the Constitution which Capodistrias had sworn to defend, as the fundamental Law of Greece, was combatted with unwearied and pertinacious obstinacy by this very President. The result of it was, that the Panhellenium was replaced by a Senate composed of 27 members, of which 21 were to be chosen by the President out of 63 persons to be named by the Assembly, and six to be chosen entirely by the President. Thus was there given to the admiring eyes of Europe, the pretence of a *Representation*—composed of creatures of the President. The power of negotiating with the Allies was entrusted to the President. The modifications of the President in the Judicial System were sanctioned, and a blow struck at the Municipal System through its finances, which was fatal. In fact, the extinction of the liberties of Greece was effected by the power, fraudulently usurped by Capodistrias.

In the mean time the sovereignty of Greece was officially offered by the London Conference to PRINCE LEOPOLD, and accepted by his Highness. The thrill of delight and exultation that reverberated throughout Greece, and not only throughout Greece, but through every population of the East, at this intelligence, can only be conceived by those who have witnessed the moments when the slightest connection with England seems to hold out a hope of gaining HER support against the system of Russia. The President showed his usual skill in defeating this blow to his Russian Masters. As soon as the official communication of the choice of Prince Leopold was made by the Residents of the Three Powers in Greece to Capodistrias, he affected to consider it necessary to submit it to the Senate, which (his creatures) he called the representation of the *national will*. Under his auspices they drew up a Memoir containing such a labyrinth of difficulties in the way of the Prince, that these alone were almost sufficient to deter any one from accepting the sovereignty ; but the intrigues

and complications set in motion by Capodistrias to terrify the Prince are amongst the most extraordinary things on record. The monstrous falsehoods promulgated were not more singular than the successful suppression of the Addresses and enthusiastic expressions of devotion which were sent from every part of Greece to his Royal Highness. *Not one of these Addresses reached their destination till long after the efforts of the Russian faction had been successful in inducing Prince Leopold to resign the sovereignty!* The Addresses were stigmatised by Capodistrias as illegal, and the Signers of them were denounced as impostors and traitors, along with all those who even spread the news of the choice of the Conference. It will be asked what was the Resident Minister of the British Court doing, to permit this?—He not only has upon his head the responsibility of not forwarding the Addresses, but he actually joined the Residents from the French and Russian Courts in supporting the President in *stigmatising the Primates who signed the addresses*, and representing them to Great Britain as the *enemies of Greece and of Order!* Thus is the Russian faction represented by the British Resident to the British Government as the National Party, and the National Party denounced as the enemies of good Government! But the rage of the people of Greece was so universal at the intrigues by which Capodistrias deprived them of the election of Prince Leopold, that the whole country was on the eve of revolt—the President gives this as a proof of the Anarchy that prevails, and asks the Conference for troops to quell it—the British Resident joins the other Residents in asking for the presence of this Force, to overthrow, in fact, the *very decision of the Conference itself!** The Conference, fatally misled, instructed their Admirals and Commander to *assist Capodistrias in “baffling these intrigues”!*

About this time, Maina, Hydra, and the Cyclades found themselves under the necessity of resisting manifold violations of the law by the President, and revolted. The British Re-

* See the Letters of the Residents and the President, which have been published in a variety of places—the most extraordinary documents perhaps on record.

sident encouraged this Revolt, and the Hydriotes were given to understand that the British and French fleets would not assist the President, and that as the fleets of the *Three Powers* were ordered to act in *strict union*, and never separately, it would not be possible for the *Russian* fleet to act against them. Capodistrias applied to the Residents for means of attacking the Hydriotes—the Russians approached, accompanied by the English and French Squadrons; it was concerted by overland communication, that the two latter should return to Nauplia for instructions, and—the moment they were out of sight, the Russian Admiral attacked the Greeks, when an action ensued, which terminated in the *Destruction of the Greek fleet!* The British Resident now wrote a letter (dated 31st August, 1831) denouncing the Primates and the Revolt—a proceeding among the most disgraceful things on record.

All Greece was now in the most deplorable state to which a country can be reduced. Capodistrias had, by the support of Russia, (and through her deception, by that of England and France) trampled on every Law and every Right—overthrown social Order—destroyed the Constitution—paralysed the Commerce of Greece. Ruin and Famine stalked through the Land—Wretchedness, Misery, and Despair was the lot of one of the finest, most docile, and most industrious populations on the Earth, living in one of the finest countries under Heaven. The whole country now again demanded the convocation of the National Assembly, and Capodistrias, unable to stem the current of the national Will, convoked it for the 15th of October, but in the mean time a most extraordinary occurrence intervened.

In this state of excitement, there appeared in the *London Courier*, of 3rd Sept., 1831, a newspaper considered an organ of the British Government, an article showing in all the vivid colours of the precise truth, the monstrous and treasonable Administration of Capodistrias—the ruin brought on Greece solely by him; it arrived in Greece, went like wildfire through the country;—"at length, then," cried a noble and distinguished Patriot, "ENGLAND has awoke to a sense of our danger and our condition. Now Capodistrias is

the sole obstacle between Greece and her independence ;"—and the Monster of iniquity fell by the pious Dagger of the Patriot, on the 27th of September, 1831 !

It is not my intention here to give details of the History of Greece, but a knowledge of the means by which Russia compassed her ends in that country, is necessary for the investigation on which I have entered. I will now only give an enumeration of some of the Events which followed, referring the Reader who may find it his duty to investigate more in detail the villany practised on England as well as on Greece, to the parliamentary Papers and the able Works I have already mentioned.

By the death of Capodistrias the functions of the Senate were at an end, for the thirteenth Article of the second Decree of the Assembly at Argos provided that, in the event of the death of the President, a National Assembly should be convoked. But, in the teeth of this, the Residents of the Three Powers, assisted (or rather directed) by the Russian Admiral, took upon themselves the outrageous office of supporting in the Senate a permanent existence, and of conferring on it the functions of a Constituent Authority ; and thereupon, in direct violation of the authority which called it into existence, the Senate selected an administrative Commission of three Ministers, Augustin Capodistrias (brother of the late President), Colocotroni, and Colletti—thus investing with power, the Russian faction, for carrying on the decomposition of Greece. This Faction was supported by the Conference at London, which, by Protocol of the 16th September, 1831, had placed the Marine and Military of England and France at its disposal, and the Senate usurped the right of interfering with the elections of the ensuing National Assembly. The Deputies who opposed the Russian faction had come to Argos, with their armed followers, and, refusing to recognise the illegal and treasonable usurpations of the Senate, a civil war ensued, in which the Russian faction elected Augustin Capodistrias President, who instantly attacked the legal Authorities with as many of the troops of the late Government as would obey him. The Constitutionlists applied to the Residents for protection,

but they declined interfering, on the pretext, that any *interference would infringe on the independence of Greece!*

At this time, Sir Stratford Canning arrived in Greece, on the part of Great Britain, and the admirable Memoir which he drew up and communicated to Count Augustin Capodistrias, dated 28th December, 1831, urged a course of policy precisely the opposite of that which had been pursued, and was then pursuing. The answer of Augustin Capodistrias to this, was a personification of insolence and falsehood. He proscribed the most illustrious of the Greek Patriots, declared the monstrous Acts of his brother to be in full force, and was shortly after—*recognised by the Conference of London* as President of Greece! The Russian Admiral used incredible activity in coercing the Greeks, and compelling submission to his authority. About this time, Professor Thierch arrived with news of the appointment of King Otho to the throne of Greece. Although Russia accomplished another stroke of successful policy in enlisting the King of Bavaria into her service, by the choice of his son as King; yet the learned and excellent Professor Thierch, who was sent into Greece in the interests of the new King, was so horror-stricken with the progress of Russian demoralization and intrigue, that he has exposed the villany in a voluminous Work. The conditions which the Conference at London imposed on the King of Bavaria, when he consented to accept for his son the sovereignty of Greece were, that he was to adopt, and “make respected and obeyed,” the infamous Acts of Capodistrias! Need anything more be said? *Can Greece be other than she continues to be?*

In the mean time, but previous to the arrival of King Otho in Greece, the National Assembly opened its Session, in accordance with the Laws, and as agreed by the Provisional Government.

The National Assembly, in the determination to support the character of Greece, as well as with the fixed desire of binding themselves to the Alliance of England, and identifying the interests of England with the independence and prosperity of their country, passed a solemn Decree, *garan-*

teeing the payment of the Debt due to England, and disposing of the national Lands so as to be security for this Debt.

What are the proceedings of the British Minister in Greece in reference to this Decree? It seems too much for belief. As soon as this announcement appears, the *three* Residents oppose the National Assembly with all their exertions, and actually insist on *absolving the Greek Nation from liability to the Debt due to Great Britain!* They write a letter to the Foreign Secretary of Greece, containing, among other inexplicable sentiments, the following paragraph in reference to the Debt:—

“2nd.—THAT, IN THE MEANTIME, NO SALE OF THE NATIONAL LANDS SHOULD TAKE PLACE, NOR SHOULD ANY MEASURE BE ADOPTED WHICH MIGHT TEND TO GIVE RISE, IN THE NEW STATE, TO FINANCIAL EMBARRASSMENTS”!

Thus was the Bond of union between England and the Greek Nation destroyed, and the money of British subjects flung to the winds by *the British Minister!*

I conceive that the question we are prosecuting, viz., whether Lord Palmerston be acting in secret concert with Russia, requires the epitome of Russian connection with Greece, which I have given in this Chapter, although as far as I have yet gone, his Lordship has only been about a year and a half the Foreign Secretary of England. It is to be borne in mind that *the whole* of what I have advanced is perfectly known to Lord Palmerston—that the Secretary of Legation in Greece, as well as several other high Diplomatic Functionaries, urged upon his attention every shade, however minute, and every detail of the progress of Russian Rule, and the subserviency to Russian interests of the British Resident in Greece—nay more, that his Lordship has even published, in the Portfolio, everything I have written, and exposed vastly more than I have touched upon, and that, notwithstanding this knowledge, he has not only not struggled against the villany, in the manner, incapable as it was, of his Predecessors in Office, but that every part of his Policy, has been to the unqualified and direct *furtherance* of that villany. In the Portfolio, published under his own auspices, he has exposed the furtherance of Russian and the frustration of British

Policy by the British Resident in Greece, and yet he continued to employ that same Resident for years in the same fatal course! Lord Palmerston sees this Resident act in collusion with the Resident of Russia to annihilate the claims of British Bondholders to the extent of £2,800,000, without an object or a necessity, and yet he approves of the act. What are we to say or think—what construction are we to place on such conduct? I confess I am unable to discover any ground on which to place an explanation, much less a justification of such a method of conducting the affairs entrusted to his charge. The positive act of rejecting money justly due, which was proffered, and rejecting it, too, in favor of this very Faction which England was affecting to oppose, cannot be explained even on the plea of blundering, or of ignorance of Eastern habits, for it is a *positive act* on a simple matter of every-day business—what can it be? Let us try to come to a conclusion by examining some other positive acts in the next period of Greek Policy, after the accession of King Otho.

The appointment of the Son of the King of Bavaria to the Crown of Greece at length came, and the Laws which formed the Constitution of the new Monarchy, were laid down in the Quadruple Convention of 7th May, 1832, and the Protocols which accompanied it. The young King being within three years of arriving at his majority, it was decided that the Government should, in the interval, be entrusted to a Council of Regency, to consist of Three Members, appointed by the King of Bavaria. It was appointed by the King of Bavaria, and ratified by the Three Powers, England, Russia, and France, that “all State affairs should be decided upon by the *Majority of Votes in the Council of Regency* thus constituted.” It was announced by the Quadruple Convention that Greece was to be “an independent State,” and that the “*Three Courts should afford the Regency all the support in their power.*”

The Regency was appointed to consist of Count Armansperg, M. Von Maurer, and Colonel Heydecker; and M. Von Abel was appointed a Supplemental Member of the Regency, with

permission to attend at the Sittings, and have a consultative Voice in them.

The whole Greek Nation took the oath to observe the Laws of the Monarchy, and to regard the Regency as the Sovereign Power until the Majority of the King.

The proceedings of the Regency were marked by an earnest desire for the Well-being, and a respect for the feelings of the Greeks. Their Measures were wise and highly conducive to the national prosperity—the anti-national party of Capodistrias was discountenanced, and the offices were given to men who had the interest of their country at heart. Although everything which might have been desired for the welfare of the country was not attempted, because Eastern habits and customs were but imperfectly understood by the Bavarian Regency, yet the most salutary change was effected, the demoralising system of corruption abolished, and the course of justice administered with impartiality. The prosperity of Greece returned, and Joy and Tranquillity went once more smiling through the Land. The influence of the Nominee of Russia—Count Armandsparg—was paralysed in the Regency by the integrity and ability of the other two Members, who constituted the Majority, for although Count Armandsparg had the title of President, it had been expressly decreed that the *Majority* carried all Measures, and that the Presidency was *only a title*. The disappointment of the Russian party knew no bounds at the change—their efforts to excite insurrection and convulsion were unremitting, and as soon as the Measures of the Regency were known, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg sent an Envoy Extraordinary to Greece, M. Catacazy, to endeavour to overawe the Regency. His attempt excited disgust, and the Regency formally requested from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, his withdrawal.

The efforts of the Court of Russia had long tended to prepare the way for procuring the Emperor to be SUPREME HEAD OF THE GREEK CHURCH.* M. Von Maurer, the ablest and the best Mem-

* The indignation of the Greeks knew no bounds on hearing of this intention of the Emperor. They exclaimed, "Our's is the Mother-

ber of the Regency, foresaw the Design, and also that it would be an engine for the speedy annihilation of the Independence of Greece. He took prompt and well-timed steps to convoke the High Clergy of Greece at Napoli, and with their support, established an independent Synod, placing King Otho at the head of the Church of his own Kingdom. M. Catacazy absented himself from the Grand Assembly, although all the rest of the diplomatic Bodies attended.

The prosperity of Greece was increasing, when it was overthrown, and the liberties of the country once more annihilated, by a Conspiracy attended with more remarkable circumstances than anything we have yet described. The exertions of the Russian party to revolutionise the country were being redoubled, and from St. Petersburg both gold and Leaders were supplied in abundance. Secret Societies were formed, as in 1821, and their Declarations were all *against the Regency*. The correspondence between the Russian Cabinet and the Greek Insurgents was freely made use of as encouragement to the Rebels. Addresses were drawn up, of which one was directed to the King of Bavaria, soliciting the recal of M. Von Maurer and General Heydeck, who were the two Members of the Regency opposed to Russian domination in Greece, and expressing a desire that the other Member, *Count Armansperg*, who was a Russian tool, *should be sole Regent!* The other Address was presented to the *Emperor of Russia*, desiring that the Regency should be abolished—the majority of King Otho proclaimed, and the Capodistrian faction restored to power.

Count Armansperg was convicted of having been privy to this treason for the overthrow of the Regency—his own Secretary, Dr. Franz, having drawn up the Address to the King of Bavaria!

The discovery of the Conspiracy by M. Von Maurer frustrated the outburst of a general rebellion, which was organised by the Russian party for the 16th September, 1833. The

Church, of which the Russian is the Daughter; St. Paul preached not to Russians but at Athens.”

trials which were consequent on it brought out, not only that Count Armansperg was privy to it, but also *the British Resident*. The proofs of the treason of Dr. Franz* were brought home, not only to him, but also to Count Armansperg, who was compelled *to confess that the Secretary had imparted to him his views!* Franz was arrested and brought before that Regency of which his employer was the President, and he was banished by the *unanimous* decision of the same! In the confession of Dr. Franz he stated that he had "*unequivocal proofs of a higher protection!*"† The British Resident took an active part in the attempt to get Armansperg made sole Regent, and the Count confessed to the truth of this. The majority of the Regency who had been plotted against, traced the chief intrigues to the British Resident, and appointed a sitting for the purpose of investigating it, which they did, with witnesses. It was *unanimously* resolved to complain of his conduct to the British Government, and solicit his recal. A special Mission was to be sent to London, and Count Armansperg agreed to write a letter to the Greek Minister, expressing the urgent necessity for the recal, which was to be delivered to Lord Palmerston; but afterwards, on searching the Archives of the Regency, the original was nowhere to be found, and no one knew anything whatever of it!

But the most extraordinary part of the drama has now to be told.—Lord Palmerston sent instructions to the Resident to support, with the whole weight of his authority, Count Armansperg against the majority of the Regency; and denouncing M. Von Maurer, General Heydeck, and M. d'Abel, *as Russian!* Lord Palmerston split the Regency into factions, by supporting the minority against the majority—by supporting the Nominee of Russia, and ordering the expulsion of the other Members on the plea that they were Russian! This proceeding being contrary to the Quadruple

* The original of the letter of confession, as also of the examination of Dr. Franz, are in possession of M. Von Maurer.

† For full particulars of this Conspiracy, see the admirable Work of M. Von Maurer, which has been published several years.

Convention, as well as an outrage unheard of in the annals of history, it was conceived that the two Constitutional Members would resist.—I give the words of M. Von Maurer, “The world then witnessed the extraordinary spectacle, that the Successor of the man who had been denounced to the British Government, as too warm an adherent of Russia, himself arrived at the hotel of the Russian Minister in Greece, *to eject, if necessary, the man denounced as a Russian, WITH RUSSIAN ARMS!* Count Armansperg, at least, took care to see to the execution of the Russian dispatches.”

On the 31st July, 1834, M. Von Maurer, and M. d’Abel were expelled from the Regency by Foreign interference, and thus the independence of Greece annihilated, and transferred once more to the grasp of Russia. Thus is, then, committed by Lord Palmerston, a violation of the Constitution of Greece—a violation of the Quadruple Convention—a violation of the Law of Nations—a destruction of the interests of England—A TRANSFERENCE OF THE CONTROL OF GREECE TO RUSSIA, on the pretext of opposition to Russia.

The Policy of Russia in Greece had failed by the efforts of the Majority of the Regency, notwithstanding the colossal efforts she made to secure its triumph—*that Policy is established and rendered triumphant* BY THE BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

If Lord Palmerston be not the Minister of Russia, I do not see how he can be the Minister of England, for the excuse of ignorance cannot be alleged; not only was the true state of matters urged on him by individuals of the highest claims to consideration, but the upright and able Secretary of the British Legation in Greece, horror-stricken at the march of Russian demoralisation in that country, and conceiving that the inexplicable acts of the Resident proceeded from collusion on his part with Russia, communicated the whole truth to his Lordship;—the Secretary was recalled—his charges never met—his conduct never condemned—his official functions suspended, and the whole circumstance hushed up! M. Von. Maurer has appealed to public Documents and private Despatches for the truth of his allegations—has offered

to produce them—and his statements have never been disproved, but have been buried in oblivion !

The hapless condition of Greece since the fall of M. Von Maurer and M. d'Abel is familiar to every one cognisant of diplomatic affairs ; if it were not, it is not my intention to describe them, for I am not writing the History of Greece, but examining the connection of the Policy of Lord Palmerston with that of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

I may allude to the second Loan to the Greek Government for which a Bill was brought into Parliament by his Lordship. It had been agreed on in 1832 to raise a Loan, for which the Three Powers were to be Guarantee, and of which Two Instalments had been raised. The Russian Government of Greece then applied for the Guarantee of the Three Powers to enable it to raise the Third Instalment, but the Cabinet of St. Petersburg pretended to make difficulties, and so Lord Palmerston brought a Bill into Parliament to enable Great Britain to Guarantee Two Portions of the Third Instalment *without the Concurrence of her Allies*. This Loan was not required by the Greeks, nor by the Government even, for it was proved that there was no deficiency in the Greek Exchequer at the time ; but the accounts of the Greek Finances presented to Parliament are contradictory in themselves, and at variance with those subsequently published by the Government of King Otho. The extraordinary falsification of the Greek Accounts is a subject more adapted for a Court of Law than these pages, and therefore I shall only refer the Reader to the Parliamentary Papers ; suffice it to say, that on these falsified Accounts were based the arguments for the guarantee of the Third Instalment. The guarantee by England, apparently in opposition to the views of Russia, of her proportion of the Loan, was precisely suited to the purposes of that Power, for she immediately made it the pretext for *separating Herself* from the other Powers in the affairs of Greece, and declared her intention of doing as she liked for the future. After Russia had succeeded in making use of England, and, through her of France, for securing in Greece precisely the objects she required, she then found means of acting independently of them

—which she has since done. The end of this Second Loan was, that Russia bound over the National Domains and Revenue of Greece to herself, in Security for her proportion of the Debt, and has now not only an influence over that country, which makes it a mere Russian Province, but holds a lien over her Body, which she can never, under the ruinous state of affairs consequent on Russian demoralization, overcome, and therefore presents to Russia an enduring opportunity for interfering in the prosecution of her claims *when the time is arrived*.

For the first loan of £2,800,000, in 1824 and 1825, the National Domains were held in security, but this was rejected, and the destruction of the Security was ratified by the contract, by a British Minister, for the second Loan guaranteed by the Three Powers, for which the National Lands and Revenue were given in mortgage, and by which all *other claims on Greece were superseded!*

The commercial Rights of England in Greece have been violated by the Tariff imposed on the imports of merchandise, whereas formerly commerce was free—her money sacrificed by millions, as we have seen, with scarcely a pretence—the independence of that country annihilated on pretence of its being established—the whole power over Greece transferred by England to Russia, in opposition to the inhabitants, in opposition to, and by deception practised on, the people of England, and on pretext of British *opposition to Russia!* Greece made, in fact, into what she is—A RUSSIAN PROVINCE, and England, wearied, perplexed and disgusted with the failure of all her exertions, accuses the Greeks of being incorrigible! What has Lord Palmerston done for Russia in Greece? * What has he done

* The last and not the least fearful consequence, to England, of the ascendancy of Russia in Greece, will burst upon her unconscious and ignorant people when the moment arrives for the 100 or 150 Russian sail-of-the-line to emerge from the Baltic and Black Seas into the Mediterranean, and change their Boors and Conscript-sailors for GREEK CREWS—mariners not surpassed by any in the world, not even those of Albion herself! If the fleet of England be not then paralysed or destroyed by a prolonged struggle with France and the United States, she will come to understand the “complications of the East,” when she

for England? What would a Russian Minister have desired that he should do? Let the friend of his country determine.

wishes to "*negotiate*" for the evacuation of Constantinople by Russia, in the presence of the baby-fleet grown to manhood?—A fleet filled with Russo-Greek sailors, thirsting for the plunder of Turkey, and burning to see the Cross once more planted on the Church of St. Sophia.

CHAPTER VII.

CIRCISSIA.—TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE.

“The contracting Powers will not seek in these arrangements any augmentation of Territory, nor any exclusive influence or advantage for their Subjects, which shall not be equally attained by all other Nations.”—*Treaty, 6th July, 1827.*

“The first and most essential of all, is, that which prohibits to the Powers who signed the Treaty of London, conquests and exclusive advantages. His Majesty has already announced that, in *any supposable case*, he will never deviate from it. He charges me to repeat in this place the expression of that firm resolution.”—*Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven, 6th January, 1828.*

IN the preceding chapters I have pointed out the objects of Russia in destroying the internal prosperity and the independence of Poland, Cracow, and Greece; and, by an examination as impartial as it has been in my power to give, of the process by which these operations have been brought to a successful issue, it appears that by some singular fatality the acts of Lord Palmerston have tended, with undeviating consistency, to further the policy of Russia, and not only *tended* to do so, but even that had the Foreign Secretary pursued any *other line whatever* than the one he did, the success of that policy would have been impossible. We also see that his lordship constantly based *his* policy on opposition to Russia—even when he ejected from the Regency of Greece, the two Members who were opposed to Her, to place the entire Government in the hands of Armansperg, who was the mere agent of Russia.

In respect to the policy which has been pursued by his Lordship in other parts of the world, it is not my intention at present to enter into the details, for, brief as are the particulars which I have given of the three questions alluded to, if I were to enter into the others at the same proportionate length, many volumes would not suffice to contain one half of the

exposition. I shall give but the results of several of them, with a few words of explanation on each.

The motto to this chapter will show, that, when Lord Palmerston came into office, he found Russia bound, by the faith of a solemn Treaty as by the public promises of her Government, not to pursue conquests or to desire advantages of any sort in the East, except what should be common to France and England. The course, then, of the British Minister was clear and simple—he had nothing to do but to prevent any departure from this Treaty and promise, if indeed it can be supposed that Russia would dare to attempt a violation of them, in the face of such a Power as Great Britain, which, with her thousand Vessels of war, and her intimate alliance with every Nation both of the East and West, was surely strong enough to protect her commerce or interests. A violation of this Treaty could not be permitted by a British Minister, without his being placed in the position of a man who had committed a crime against his country. *Has any violation taken place?* This is a grave question, and cannot be evaded by any of the vague “generalities” which the Russian Ministers are instructed to use in England when any question of the East is to be discussed! There is the question of CIRCASSIA:—let it not be dismissed with our usual phraseology of “barbarism,” “liberalism,” and “conservative policy,” or deluged with cries of “*Russia again!*” &c. &c. Our business is with THE INTERESTS OF OUR COUNTRY. This is a distinct and positive question, which cannot be answered by abstract speculations, or annihilated by theories. The case is as simple as the simplest matter of every-day life.

1st.—HAVE WE INTERESTS IN CIRCASSIA, OR HAVE WE NOT?

2nd.—IF SO, HAVE THESE INTERESTS BEEN VIOLATED BY RUSSIA, OR HAVE THEY NOT?

The position of Circassia is too familiar for a description of it to be necessary. Every one laying claim to “Enlightenment” knows, that the Chain of Mountains inhabited by the Circassians is most stupendous, and has formed the Barrier between the Regions of the South, and the plundering

Hordes of the North for thousands of years. Those labouring under the oppressive weight of modern "Civilization" will have some difficulty in comprehending a state of Society where there exists the primitive virtues, and the heroic noble-mindedness of the Race of men to whom these Mountains belong, but the material Benefits to be derived from them to England, may perhaps be accessible to their understandings. I shall therefore remind them that Three Hundred Miles of the finest Coast of the Black Sea, studded with the best Harbours for shipping, are to be found in the possession of the free and independent People called the Circassians; that the country behind it is fertile, and cultivated in a degree unknown in any part of either Turkey or Russia, producing, in the utmost abundance, every article of Commerce on which the resources of Russia depend.* The Circassians have not arrived at the "civilized" practice of erecting CUSTOM-HOUSES in every village—they consider it impious to interfere with the freedom of exchange of merchandise between man and man, and cannot comprehend the benefits to be derived from the system of placing all imaginable difficulties and obstacles in the way of such exchange. They consider that men have a right to deal with each other, and buy and sell the things which belong to them, without the intervention of swarms of individuals called Custom-House Officers, to whom they have to pay 100 or 2000 per cent. *for permission* so to deal. They do not consider it beneficial to invent means for rendering every article which is necessary for life, *as dear and scarce as possible*, nor do they regard the System which does this, and which excludes from being brought into their country the produce of other Lands, as "PROTECTING THEIR INTERESTS!" The consequence of this want of "enlarged views"—of this ignorance of the "Science (!) of Political Economy"—this want of "a Code based on sound principles of Commercial Legislation" is,† that the Circassians buy from every one that

* The produce of Circassia is Timber of the very finest quality for Ship-building, Corn of every description, Linseed, Olive Oil, Bees' Wax, Tallow, Hides, Hemp, Wine, besides an infinite variety of minor articles.

† A work published last year, under the auspices of the British

has anything to sell, and sell to all who wish to buy, with the same freedom as we walk in and out of our houses ; the produce of their country being abundant, it is also cheap—and the perfect freedom of Commerce which exists, renders the trade with Circassia more valuable than that with any other portion of the world. The extraordinary cheapness of all raw produce in Circassia makes it a purchasing market peculiarly advantageous to England, which requires it for her manufactures ; while the absence of Manufactories in that country, makes it a market of the utmost importance for the reception of British goods. The superiority of the Circassian Harbours, and the absence of expense on Shipping, together with the freedom of buying and selling, offer advantages to British Commerce transcendentally superior to what is to be found in any other part of the Earth, while the hostility of the Circassian people to Russia, their friendliness to England, and their elevated and heroic character, constitute Circassia into the natural, as it is the best, Barrier against the march of Russia on Constantinople—against the progress of the Muscovite to India. The subjugation of the Circassians is, therefore, an object indispensable to the success of the *ultimate intentions* of Russia, and this “ Conservative ” Government has, in consequence, carried on, for 120 years, against these Mountaineers, a warfare marked by more determination, more sacrifices to herself, more blood-thirstiness and ferocity, than the annals of History perhaps contain. Yet, on the accession of Lord Palmerston to office in 1830, he found Circassia unsubdued—free—victorious. He found

Government—Supplement to Macculloch’s Dictionary—has the following most marvellous paragraph. Under the head of Russian Tariff, which contains a list of the enormous Custom-House duties exacted by Russia on everything that is imported into her Countries, and into the free States which she succeeds in absorbing, and which totally prohibit some hundred articles of British Commerce from entry at all, we find it remarked—“ Nothing will do half so much to excite the industry of the people (Russian) and to make them avail themselves of the vast capacities of production within their reach, as the establishment of a *Liberal Commercial system* ! Her conquests, however objectionable in some respects, have, in most instances, materially promoted the interests of *Commerce and Civilization* ! ”

the right of trading between Great Britain and these coasts not only free, but not even pointed at by a single Edict—the Russian Government had not even dared to level a single Ukase against the commercial rights of Circassia, because to do so would have been to violate the commercial rights of England. At that period, too, the access of England to the Commerce of Circassia was of more importance than at any previous Epoch, for Russia had just concluded the Treaty of Adrianople, by which she destroyed the freedom of Commerce in every other part of the Black Sea, so that it was the freedom of Circassia alone that prevented a monopoly to Russia of the whole trade of the Euxine, and a consequent dependence of England on Russia for the chief raw articles necessary for her manufactures. It must be borne in mind that the Russian coasts of the Black Sea offer the *smallest* facilities for Commerce, are supplied with produce by a country *less* fertile, and cultivated by a people *less* civilized than those of Circassia. The ports of Russia (Odessa, Kertch, and Taganrog,) are bad, expensive, and dangerous; the articles shipped there not so numerous, and enormously more expensive; and the British ships which proceed thither to purchase them are obliged to go *in ballast*, because the Russian Government will not purchase British merchandise,* whereas to Circassia they would carry cargoes of valuable goods, for the Circassians stand in need of manufactured articles, “especially Hardware, and eagerly flock to purchase when a supply appears on the coast.”†

In this state of things, the value of Circassia was too great to be estimated—its importance, both political and commercial, to Great Britain was perhaps greater than that of all other questions put together—the protection of British rights in

* The Russian Tariff excludes everything except those articles which she finds necessary for enabling her to compete with British Commerce in other countries; say Cotton Twist, Lead, Bricks, Coals, Machinery, &c.; therefore our exports to Russia are small in bulk, low in value, and a weapon to them of danger to us!

† Extract from the Journal of Mr. Stewart, a gentleman sent by Lord Ponsonby to report on Circassia for the Government.

Circassia (which was synonymous with the preservation of Circassian independence), a question which *was vital*.

In an examination of the question of concert between Russia and Lord Palmerston, this question of Circassia is of paramount importance. What did his lordship do in so important a case? On his accession to the administration of Foreign Affairs, he found Russia bound by the most solemn Treaties to *refrain* from any action on Circassia, or *interference* with its commerce :—The principles which brought him into power were, “NON-INTERVENTION” in the affairs of Foreign Countries, but it would be thought that if he could, in any case, be justified in breaking through this rule, it was in defence of the independence of so important a country as Circassia—he was even bound to do so by the Treaty in question, if Russia evinced a desire to violate it. Russia did violate it, by pursuing a system of warfare against Circassia for purposes of aggrandisement; but what did Lord Palmerston? He not only did *not* interfere in defence of Circassia—he not only did *not* uphold British commercial rights in Circassia, but he DID ACTUALLY HIMSELF OVERTHROW BRITISH RIGHTS in that country and transferred them to Russia! The seizure of the “Vixen” is too familiar to require anything but an allusion. The examination of the papers presented to Parliament shows that the owners of that Vessel sent her to Circassia by the sanction of Lord Palmerston, and on the faith of the Official Gazette, to which they were referred, as showing that there was no Russian Blockade; they (the papers) prove that she was seized by a Russian cruiser on the pretext of a breach of blockade; and that she was confiscated on the pretext—not that she had broken a blockade, but on the plea of a violation of the Custom-house regulations, imposed by Russia on a coast of which she was not in possession, and of which to evince an intention to be in possession, was to violate a Treaty with England! The seizure of the Vixen, even supposing every form of International Law to have been complied with, was virtually a declaration of war by Russia against England, but independently of the violation of the Treaty of 6th July, 1827, *every principle of International*

Law was outraged by the seizure. In the first place, there was no blockade ; in the next, there were no Custom-house regulations, for not only were there no official documents of Russia to show that such regulations *ever had been imposed by Russia*, but she was not in possession, nor had she ever been in possession, of the port in question, to carry them into practice. To the truth of these two points of fact there were no less than thirteen British subjects to testify, on oath, if required ; viz., the sailors of the *Vixen*,* who had no interest in making a statement at variance with the truth ; and the owner of the cargo, who was in the vessel, and had landed along with the sailors in the port where she was captured by the Russian cruiser, which entered *seaward*.

Russia was now in a dilemma from which escape would seem to be impossible. She had committed an outrage on Great Britain such as it is not in *the power of Ministers* in England to overlook—such as a Nation *cannot* overlook, without yielding up its position in the world. This was a deed on the part of Russia against England such as it was for the *Law* of England alone to deal with, and which could not be passed over or accepted by any Minister without a previous abrogation of the Laws of the Realm ; it depended no more on the Minister of the day to accept or resist the seizure of the *Vixen* than it depends on a Judge of Assize to award the punishment, or to refrain from awarding the punishment, which is ordained by the Law, to a criminal who has been convicted of an offence against the Law. The case of the *Vixen* was a matter for reference to the Law Officers of the Crown, for their decision in accordance with the Laws of Great Britain. There was not one single phase or feature in this whole transaction of the *Vixen* in which a direct violation of the Law had not been committed by Russia—the confiscation had been attended by a violation even of the internal Laws of the Russian Empire, as also of the Constitutional Law of Great Britain ;—a more perfect opportunity could not have presented itself for establishing the freedom of commerce in the Black Sea, and for making strong as a rock of adamant that best Barrier of the

* And many other persons besides.

freedom of Europe, CIRCASSIA, by a simple vindication of Justice and Law. The course pursued by Lord Palmerston in this case is one of immeasurable importance to his Lordship's character as a Minister of *England*, as it is also one of the last importance to every man in Great Britain.

By referring to the debate in the House of Commons, of the 17th March, 1837, it will be seen that Mr. ROEBUCK laid the case of the *Vixen* at full length before the House—demonstrated its illegality and enormity in almost every point of view, and proved the intention of the possession of Circassia by the Russian Government as absolutely demanding a declaration of war by England, if war should be necessary for its frustration. Mr. O'CONNELL, Mr. HUME, and all the supporters of Government concurred with him, and the opposition side of the House gave their tacit consent. The motion of Mr. ROEBUCK was for the production of the correspondence connected with the voyage of the *Vixen*, that the House and the Nation might judge of the case. LORD PALMERSTON concurred, in the most explicit terms, with everything advanced by Mr. ROEBUCK as to the danger of permitting, and even the invalidity of, the Russian claim to the dominion of Circassia, and denounced her attempt as a violation of her own solemn promises. I do not know that I can better explain the tendency of the sentiments which LORD PALMERSTON delivered, in reply to Mr. ROEBUCK, on the occasion, than by quoting from an organ of the Government:—"Lord Palmerston admits the absolute necessity of curbing the insolent ambition of Russia—he charges her Government with the commission of the most heinous crime that one Nation can perpetrate against another, viz. an unprovoked seizure of Territory, contrary to the sacred faith of Treaties; his Lordship, therefore, stamps his own character with infamy, unless he takes such measures as will prevent such a crime from passing unpunished, and such insatiable ambition from destroying the Balance of power in Europe.

"The several Members who addressed the House in the course of the debate appeared to entertain but one opinion respecting the seizure of the *Vixen* by Russia. Mr. ROEBUCK at the outset denounced it as an act of 'piracy,' and all who

followed the Honourable and Learned Gentleman, with the exception of Doctor Lushington, endorsed that opinion. Lord Palmerston declared that Russia had not notified the blockade of Circassia to the British Government, thus admitting that a most gross violation of the Law of Nations had been committed by the Imperial Government.”*

Thus, then, the House of Commons—including Lord Palmerston—was of opinion that the independence of Circassia was to be maintained; but his Lordship objected to the production of the papers relating to the act of attempted infraction of its independence, and of outrageous infraction of British rights, on the plea that “it would be inconsistent with his public duty to enter on a discussion of the particular case of the Vixen! He assured the House that his Majesty’s Government felt quite as strongly as the Honourable and Learned Member for Bath, or any other gentleman could, the great importance of the question itself, as well as the consequences that, in one way or other, might result from it. He assured the House that the question occupied the serious attention of the Government, and he trusted that those who felt any degree of confidence in the Government would act consistently with the usual practice of Parliament—would *permit the Government to deal with the question in the manner which it deems most in accordance with the Rights, Interests, and Honour of the Country.*”

On the strength of these sentiments of LORD PALMERSTON, the House consented to leave it in the hands of his Lordship, —not doubting but those sentiments would be adhered to. The world then saw the extraordinary spectacle of an *act* of that Minister at direct variance with *convictions* solemnly *expressed* in his place in Parliament—saw the permission and approval, by a British Minister, of an act condemned as “piracy” by an unanimous † House of Legislature, and com-

* “Sun” Newspaper of 18th March, 1837.

† The remarks of Dr. Lushington, in the debate of the 17th March, were not the expression of dissent from the position laid down; they were merely a string of words containing neither assent to or dissent from anything in particular! They simply signified—nothing at all, but

mitted against the British Nation—saw the justification, by a Minister of Great Britain, of an act denounced as illegal and outrageous by his Nation and Parliament—saw the defence undertaken by a British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of a Foreign Government in the commission of an act which had plundered British subjects of their property, which had trampled the hitherto-unsullied British flag under foot, which withered the fair Fame, and turned from Strength to Weakness, the character of England in the eyes of the myriads of Central Asia ; which annihilated the commercial rights of England in the most important portion of the wide world, and tended to the destruction of the independence of a Nation, which was the stronghold of Freedom and the Guardian of the British colonial dominion.

Lord Palmerston “ dealt with the question” by justifying the capture and confiscation of the *Vixen*, and when required by the House of Commons to explain the meaning of the unparalleled breach of Faith as of Law, gave in as his defence of the Russian Government, the following monstrous falsehoods : —1st. That Russia had established Custom-House regulations in *Soudjouk-Kalé*, the port where the capture took place. 2nd. That *Soudjouk-Kalé* was in possession of Russia.

He did not recollect that the denial of the claim of Russia to possession of Circassia at all, put an end to the whole question without any reference to points of this kind—which could only be entertained by reversing the doctrine held both by the Government and the House. But even if the validity of the claim *were* admitted, the two points on which the Justification is made to rest, are so false as to form solid grounds for impeachment of the Minister who could act upon them. The evidence to which Lord Palmerston was driven in support of the fact (falsehood) that Russia had established Custom-House regulations on the Circassian coast, rested on a Note written by the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Mr. Mandeville, the British Chargé d’Affaires there, in October 1831, and which contained a Dispatch from St. Peters-
seemed as if he desired to take precautionary measures for supporting any method of settling the *Vixen* question that *might be expedient*.

burgh, expressing the Will of the Russian Government that these coasts should be considered as interdicted to all vessels ! Lord Palmerston received this communication from Mr. Mandeville in 1831, and the proof that he did not consider them as anything but waste paper is furnished by the fact that he not only did not publish any notification of it in the *Gazette*, but even when Mr. Bell applied, in 1836, for information as to the existence of any impediment in the way of a ship proceeding to Circassia, his Lordship did not even allude to such document—nor did Lord Ponsonby at Constantinople, to whom he also applied on his way to the Black Sea ; but, by the Foreign Office in London, and the Embassy at Constantinople, he was allowed to proceed on his voyage. No copy of “ regulations ” has ever yet been produced either by the British or the Russian Government, and no Official Act has yet been notified of the Custom-House regulations referred to. For a British Minister, therefore, to adopt and announce officially, the validity of Russian Regulations which never existed, is for Great Britain to impose *on herself*, commercial prohibitions, and to execute upon *her own subjects*, outrage, rapine of property, and commercial loss, in *favour* of the Government of Russia !

In respect to the case of whether Soudjouk-Kalé was or was not in possession of Russia, on which the Government stated that the *whole question* depended, I have already adverted to the fact that the crew of the *Vixen* were there to testify that the assertion of its being in the possession of Russia was *false*, and yet this was the plea on which Lord Palmerston based his Justification of the capture of that Vessel !* To enter on any argument to prove its falsehood would be useless waste of time, for the very supposition bears absurdity on its face. If the port was in possession of Russia and occupied by a Russian garrison as Lord Palmerston pretends, how could the *Vixen* enter it and hold free communication with the shore for two days, as she

* See Note of Lord Palmerston, dated 23rd May, 1837, and addressed Lord Durham.

did, without seeing one Russian, or being resisted by the "garrison" (!) or being accosted by the Russian Custom-House Authority? Why was it necessary for a Russian ship of war to *enter from the open Sea* to capture her? In direct, unmitigated falsehood, no statement ever put forth can compete with this. On what does Lord Palmerston then found his assertion?—*On a Note of three lines of Lord Durham's written from St. Petersburg!*

But I have stated that the case of the *Vixen* was a question of *LAW*, to be decided by the Law Officers of the Crown, in accordance with the Laws of England. A Legal investigation would not admit a Note of Lord Durham from St. Petersburg on a minute point of which he neither did know, nor could from his position know anything, as conclusive evidence in any circumstances; but to suppose that a Court of Law, or a Judge, would accept such *evidence*, in the teeth of accumulated proofs both of its falsehood and its impossibility, is to suppose a degree of public corruption to exist, which I believe we have not even yet arrived at. A Judge who should be guilty of such a crime, would expose himself to the heaviest consequences that can befall a man—public infamy, if not ignominious punishment. It is of interest to know in what manner the *Law* was disposed of. On the 6th of February, 1837, Lord Palmerston replied to a question put to him by Mr. Charles Buller respecting the *Vixen*, in the following words:—"With respect to the capture referred to by the Hon. Gentleman, the circumstances attending it are now under the consideration of the King's Advocate, and until the Report of that Officer should be received as to the bearings of International Law upon this question, his Majesty's Government would be unable to form a decision on the case."

On the 2nd June of same year, Mr. Roebuck requested the Government "to produce copies of the dispatches and correspondence which had taken place between the two Governments with one another, and with the Owners, together with the *opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown.*" Lord Palmerston replied by justifying the act of piracy committed by the Russian Government—by promising to lay before

Parliament the "Correspondence" which contained the vague Russian documents about "Regulations," and by this presentation of them ratified the claims which Russia herself did not even dare to officially announce—by stating "that with regard to the opinion of the King's Advocate, he was sure that Honourable Members would see that he *could not comply with the Honourable and Learned Members' wishes. The opinions of the Law Officers of the Crown were always given confidentially ; he must, therefore, object to THAT PART OF THE MOTION!*" This is a course of proceeding totally inconceivable. The transaction compromises vitally the character of the "King's Advocate," for there was no resignation of his post that has ever been heard of ; he must, no doubt, have tendered his resignation, but he retained his situation. The opinion of the Law Officer must, of course, have been pronounced as opposed to that acted on by the Government—it is inconceivable that it should be otherwise. If not, why did not Lord Palmerston state that the course he pursued was in accordance with the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, whose decision was the matter to be attended to? If the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is to decide on a Question of Law, why consult "Law Officers"? If the opinion of the Law Officer is set aside by a Government to which he belongs, and a flagrant outrage committed in opposition to that opinion, the Law Officer becomes himself morally responsible for the enormity, if he gives a tacit sanction to the overthrow of the Law and the Constitution. Lord Palmerston was driven to suppress the opinion of the King's Advocate ! To fly for refuge to the doctrine that the King's Advocate only judged of the bearings of the *Law* in a *supposable* case, and that the Foreign Secretary supplied *the facts*, would make the matter worse, for that would be shewing the Minister to have been guilty of giving the appearance of a solemn legal decision to an outrageous falsehood !

Without an explanation of this transaction—and it has never *yet* been explained—it is impossible that any man can avoid the suspicion of criminal collusion with Russia, on the part of the Foreign Secretary, and I believe it is, in a chief

degree, to this question that is to be ascribed the charge so pertinaciously made and so widely believed, of the crime of Treason in his Lordship.

The part played by a distinguished Lawyer and eminently able Statesman—Dr. Lushington—in this infamous transaction, is so mournful, so black, as almost to make the heart sick and despairing. Dishonest and infamous as the Statesmen of “civilised” countries almost universally are—ignorant and contemptible as the people of “enlightened” Nations are, in all questions of Right or Justice, better things might have been hoped from Dr. Lushington, both in his character of Lawyer, Judge, and Englishman. In a debate in the House of Commons on the legality of the capture of the Vixen, Dr. Lushington was prostituted to the work of defending Lord Palmerston’s justification of the outrage. It was chiefly on the high reputation of this gentleman as a Lawyer, as well as his eminent station as a Politician, that the House of Commons forebore to overthrow the Minister who had, in this case (as in Poland, Cracow, and Greece), committed England to a course of policy in direct opposition to his own supporters, as well as his opponents. Let the sentiments of this *lawyer*, on this *legal* question, be produced in all their deformity; and let the reader turn back to the same man’s words, which I have quoted on the case of Poland!*

“Then came the question whether all these proceedings were right or wrong, and that depended upon this—whether Soudjouk-Kalé was or was not in possession of the Russian Government. Now, Lord Durham, in a letter addressed to the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated that there was a fortress at Soudjouk-Kalé, and that it has always been occupied by a Russian Garrison. *Whether this was the case in fact, or not, this was the strongest and best evidence of which the House could be in possession, whether there had or had not been a military occupation of Soudjouk-Kalé at the period of the capture of the Vixen! (!) and assuming this to be the FACT,* the Russians had military possession of all the

* At this time Dr. Lushington held a situation in the Government of Lord Melbourne.

shores in the Bay. He would remind the House that *it was desirable, if possible, that this matter should be accommodated without coming to a rupture with Russia!*" *

This speech confirms all I have advanced as to the *evidence* on which the decision of Lord Palmerston was founded—even a Lawyer so distinguished as Dr. Lushington is obliged to confess, in his formal defence of the act, that *no evidence* was used or sought, and, in support of a decision at law, adduces a general proposition about War! Such a speech requires no comment—what can be thought of the public character of the man who could speak it?—what the opinion which must be entertained by the speaker of himself! Is the position of Dr. Lushington elevated by this transaction? How does it affect his character as a Lawyer, a Statesman, or an Englishman? Can he escape from subservience to *any* line of Policy, good or bad, which may be imposed henceforth on him by the man in whose service he has so exhibited himself.

The analysis of Lord Palmerston's negotiations with Russia respecting Circassia presents us with the following considerations, in the examination of the question as to his Lordship's secret union with the Russian Court; we find

1st.—That he has not interfered to assert British Rights, in the country of the world by far the *most* important, both in a commercial and political point of view.

2nd.—He has connived at the infraction by Russia, in respect to that country, of solemn Treaties and Guarantees.

3rd.—He has transferred to Russia, by official Acts of the British Government, the commerce of Britain, the property of British merchants, and the dominion of the coasts of Circassia, although all the exertions of Russia herself failed to accomplish this. He has done so in opposition to the wishes of every man in the House of Commons—of every man in the British Empire—having given them to understand that he intended to take an opposite course, at a time when to have revealed his real intention would have frustrated his policy and driven him from power.

* Refer to Speech of Dr. Lushington in the House of Commons, 21st June, 1838.

4th.—In this attempted transference of Circassia, and successful transference of British rights and property there, to Russia, he has violated the Law of Nations and the Law of Great Britain. The consequences of his acts are, to England, loss of money and trade to an incalculable amount—loss of character for justice and for capability of defence—danger to India. The consequence to Russia is, the whole power of Great Britain, and consequently of the world, placed at her disposal, for the attainment of a position of attack on England; and which no exertions of her own ever could realise.

Is Lord Palmerston the Minister of ENGLAND or of RUSSIA?—and if not the Minister of RUSSIA, what sort of Minister would RUSSIA desire?

Before concluding this chapter on Circassia, I think it desirable to remind the inquiring reader of the results, in other parts of the Black Sea, acquired by Russia by the Treaty of Adrianople, and the course pursued by Lord Palmerston in regard to it.

It will be in the recollection of the reader that the war* of Russia against Turkey, declared in 1828, sprung out of the Treaty of 6th July for the “pacification of Greece,” quoted at the head of this chapter. It will be seen there that Russia renounces all “exclusive influence or commercial advantages or augmentation of territory,” and as if this was not strong enough, we find, by the dispatch of Count Nesselrode of 6th January, 1828, that “Russia, notwithstanding her being at war with the Porte, for motives independent of the Treaty of the 6th July, has not departed, and *will not depart, from the stipulations of that Act.*” It is surely impossible that language could be clearer, or guarantees stronger than this, but Russia concluded the war with the Porte, by forcing upon the vanquished Sultan the Treaty of Adrianople, by virtue of which she put forth the claim on Circassia, by way of fulfilling the stipulation of *not seeking “any augmentation of territory;”* and extorted from Turkey the command of the mouths of the

* That is, the *pretext* for the declaration of war was made to hinge on complications arising out of the Treaty.

Danube, by way of not seeking “*exclusive influence*,” and insisted on the introduction into the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia of fiscal regulations, which convulsed these provinces, and annihilated their commercial relations with England—turning over their trade to the adjoining Russian provinces, by way of not seeking any “*exclusive commercial advantages*!”

When this Treaty was signed, Lord Aberdeen was Secretary for Foreign Affairs in England, and in the due performance of his duty, protested against the monstrous imposture. LORD PALMERSTON HAS RECOGNISED THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE! Thus are we indebted to his Lordship for a transference to Russia of the Commerce of the *whole of the Black Sea*—such transference being at the expense of England, as much almost as it is at the expense of Turkey. The sacrifice by his Lordship of the Treaty with Austria, subsequently forced on the British Government, in reference to the commerce of the Danubian provinces, and that with the Sultan, is too long a subject to be entered upon here.

CHAPTER VIII.

PERSIA—CABUL—LAHORE.

“The integrity and independence of Persia is necessary to the security of India and of Europe, and any attempt to subvert the one is a blow struck at the other—an unequivocal act of hostility to England.”—*Sir John Macneill.*

THE commercial connection of Russia with Persia is of very ancient origin. The earliest authentic accounts which we possess of it date from about the 13th or 14th centuries, and we have reason to believe that the Commerce carried on at that time from Persia through Russia, was of great magnitude and value. But one of the most prominent parts of the scheme of aggrandisement laid down by Peter was, not alone to procure a monopoly of the Commerce of Persia to his Empire, but to effect its conquest, and add it to his dominions.* The extraordinary ability which he displayed in the means adopted for carrying his plan into execution by turning the internal commotions of the East to account, and at the same time to mislead the Courts of Europe as to his enterprise, furnishes probably the most remarkable portion of that Monarch's career.

For some years preceding 1722, the Kingdom of Persia had been a prey to the evils of internal commotion, wretched misgovernment, and external attack. Its relations with the Tributary Provinces of Candahar were of the most complicated description, and from one end of the Kingdom to the other, revolt and insurrection were raging. It was at this moment that Peter concentrated his whole forces on the Persian frontier, and marched to the attack! On the pretext of demanding reparation for the plunder of some of his

* “Pénétré de cette vérité que le Commerce de l'Inde assure par sa richesse l'empire du monde, il recommande la guerre éternelle avec la Perse pour pénétrer dans le Golfe Persique au centre de ce Commerce tant désiré.”—*8th Art. of Instructions of Peter to his Successors.*

Caravans on their passage from India, by the Tribes of the Usbecks, he invaded Persia ; and alleged to the Courts of Europe that he was proceeding to the assistance of the Persian King against his revolted subjects ! The entry of the Muscovite army was preceded by a proclamation which Peter caused to be distributed among the Persians, stating that “ his Imperial Majesty is arrived on the Persian frontiers with his Land and Sea forces, not with any intention to reduce some provinces of that kingdom to his obedience, but only to maintain the lawful possession of them on his throne,” &c. &c. The result, however, of this friendly campaign was, that Peter plundered the “ lawful possessor” of some of the most important parts of his kingdom, *i. e.* the Cities of Derbend and Baku, with all the countries bordering on the Caspian Sea ; as also the Provinces of Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Asterabad. The History of Persia since that time to the present has consisted almost exclusively of resistance to the assaults and encroachments of Russia, whose exertions for the prostration of that Kingdom have been applied with undeviating and unceasing determination. The last war declared by Russia against Persia was in 1826, on a dispute about the line of frontier, and was commenced as usual by the Emperor disclaiming all idea of ambition and aggrandisement. It was ended by the Treaty of Turcomanchai, in February, 1828, where the absence of “ ambition or aggrandisement” was shewn by Russia compelling the cession from Persia of the rich and most important Provinces of Erivan and Nukhchivan, the Fortresses of Erivan and Abbasabad, and the Russian frontiers being stretched beyond the Araxes ! Russia has seized a position in Persia which at once enables her to threaten and act with facility on Turkey, is now only valuable to her as a point whence she can make future aggressions, and by which she commands the route used for the passage of British Commerce Eastward.*

The designs of Russia on India have led the British Government to connect itself by diplomatic relations with Persia.†

* Sir John Macneill, *Progress of Russia in the East*.

† The relations of England with Persia were perhaps originally as

which, from its intermediate position, has the power of rendering an assault on India impossible, so long as it has strength sufficient to resist Russia. The enmity subsisting between Persia and Russia renders the former the ally and the friend of any nation which is hostile to Russia, and therefore the advances of Great Britain were received by Persia with enthusiasm as the guarantee of her independence against the aggression of her foe, while the alliance of England gave her a strength which at once constituted her the able and the willing barrier of the British dominions beyond the Indus. England entered into alliances offensive and defensive with Persia—furnished her with troops—disciplined her armies—granted her subsidies, and has kept up in that country a more efficient diplomatic establishment than in any other part of the world. A British military force has been long kept in Persia, at the disposal of the Shah for the purpose of adding to the strength of his Kingdom; the ablest Diplomats have been selected to represent Great Britain at his Court—the Independence of Persia, and the ascendancy of British influence there, has been considered a vital question for England.

On the other hand, the designs of Russia on India, are an idle dream as long as Persia is maintained in its strength, or as long as British influence is paramount there; for their success a footing for Russia in Persia is indispensable, which is impossible except by the expulsion of Great Britain—the destruction of the independence of Persia, and the ascendancy of Russian influence there is a paramount consideration in the policy of Russia. For the attainment of this end, exertions the most gigantic, and means of corruption unlimited, on the

much induced by the designs of France and of the Affghans on India as by those of Russia, and the alliance of Persia has been eminently advantageous to England in reference to each in their turn. The fact is, that Persia allies herself to any Nation which she finds to be *hostile to Russia*, for she knows that it is idle to fear the assault of any other European Nation on her Independence. It is long since England has ceased to fear anything from France in the East, and it is against Russia alone that her diplomatic system in Persia has been maintained.

part of the Russian Cabinet have for nearly a century and a half been employed, but they had failed—the influence of Great Britain could not be shaken ; as long as England refrained from co-operating with her foe, the efforts of Russia were powerless. On the accession of Lord Palmerston to power, in 1830, this was the state of the relations between England, Persia, and Russia.

NOW EVERY OBJECT OF ENGLAND IN PERSIA IS OVERTHROWN—EVERY EFFORT OF RUSSIA HAS TRIUMPHED ! Some of the ablest Ministers ever England sent to the East have seen the interests of their country in Persia annihilated—have seen themselves foiled in every instance by Russia—have denounced them to their chief, and requested instructions:—Lord Palmerston sent them instructions to *co-operate with Russia !* From 1836 to 1838, Mr. Macneill, the British Ambassador in Persia, watched and witnessed the progress of Russia in hostility to England, and found himself powerless to threaten or oppose, from the contradictory, vague, and unintelligible nature of his instructions. He strove with all the energy of an able and an honest man, to lay the danger before his chief, and to obtain authority to speak in the name of his country and protect her interests—Lord Palmerston first deprived him of the power of using the name of England in his communications to the Persian Court, kept him without instructions until an insult was experienced by one of his messengers—when his Lordship instantly instructed him, in prompt and decided language, to *break with the Court of Persia*, and return to England ! The British Envoy was kept in Persia to witness the triumph of Russia in overthrowing British influence, and establishing her own influence in its stead—to see the hand of Persia raised up by Russia in hostility to England, without a word of remonstrance or opposition by Lord Palmerston, and the moment a trivial incident occurs, he is ordered to leave the whole field open to Russia alone, and thus shews to the people of the East, as to the nations of Europe, that the might of England has been struck prostrate by Russia.

It might be thought that the overthrow of England in

Persia would have sufficed to excite enquiry into the means by which so disastrous a result was accomplished, but it would appear that such enquiries do not form part of a "sound conservative policy," nor are connected with the "triumph of liberal principles," for not a man in those Houses of *Legislature* (!) which profess to take care of the interests of the country, and indeed scarcely a man in the Empire, has been induced to bestow even a thought upon the subject. To analyse the process by which these *results* of Russia have been brought about is not my object here ; the detail of the whole villany would require many volumes, but I will mention a few circumstances, part of which I have found in the Papers presented to Parliament.

About the year 1833, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg and Lord Palmerston, enter on *negotiations together* as to the *choice of a candidate for the throne of Persia*, in the event of the death of the Shah—a most strange proceeding between two Foreign Governments with regard to the affairs of an independent Kingdom, and which of itself was the annihilation of its independence!

The Crown Prince of Persia having died, there was likely to be a disputed succession in consequence of there being two Princes having (according to Eastern ideas of succession) equally legitimate claims to the Throne. These were Mahommed Meerza, the son of the reigning Shah ; and the Prince of Schiraz, who was the eldest surviving brother of the Crown Prince. The Prince of Schiraz had been long noted for his affection and enthusiasm for England, and a warm partisan of everything that was English. At the moment of the death of the Crown Prince, Russia proposes that the new Crown Prince should be Mahommed Meerza, who was Governor of Azerbaijan, a district that had long been under the influence of Russia. Lord Palmerston, on this communication being made, informed the Russian Government that the interests of *England and Russia* in Persia were *the same* ; and "that it would be well if they could agree on the choice of some one candidate ;"

Mahommed Meerza was, in the meantime, previous to any communication with England, chosen successor, at the instigation and by the influence of Russia; and although a considerable time elapsed between this election and the death of the Shah, and there was time for letting it be seen that he was indebted to *Russia* for his elevation, Lord Palmerston took no decision on the election of the Russian candidate in opposition to the equally legitimate claims of the British candidate. On the death of the Shah, a struggle took place between the Prince of Schiraz and Mahommed Meerza for the Crown—it was a struggle between the opposing influences of Russia and England. The uncle of Mahommed Meerza took possession of the royal treasure, and assumed the royal title—the voice of the Persian people was in his favour, *because* he was favourable to England and hostile to Russia. In this crisis we look to the policy of the Minister who wielded the power of England: was a decision taken by Lord Palmerston—and what is that decision? Let the fact show. *Mahommed Meerza, the Russian Candidate, is proclaimed instantaneously by the British Ambassador—British money is distributed to his partisans—British officers commanded the force which placed him on the throne:—*LORD PALMERSTON PLACES THE TROOPS AND THE MONEY OF ENGLAND AT THE DISPOSAL OF RUSSIA FOR THE OVERTHROW OF BRITISH INFLUENCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN PERSIA! The British forces then direct the attack on the Prince of Schiraz, who, being strong chiefly because he was in the interests of England, became powerless when the British opposed him—he is captured and delivered over by those very forces into the power of the Russian Candidate, and the Persians, thunderstruck and in despair, see themselves delivered over by England the helpless victims of Russia. This revolution in Persia, effected by the power of England, if advantageous to British interests, must have been considered a splendid triumph by the Minister who planned and executed it;—Lord Palmerston whispers not a breath on the subject—claims no credit—

suppresses so important and extraordinary an event from the knowledge of the House of Commons—exults in no triumph ! *

* Whilst writing this, a curious and pregnant panegyric on Lord Palmerston has just come under my observation, written in a Ministerial newspaper. Probably it may have been the *modesty* of his Lordship in not claiming the thanks of the country for this *victory* in Persia, that actuated the writer of the following, which is too great a curiosity for the future historian to be deprived of ! “Long in office, used to its details, sometimes painfully tied to them, Lord Palmerston has never ceased to preserve that comprehensive view of every question which came before him, which, above all things, forms one of the most important qualifications of a Statesman. *Never boasting, but steadily advancing, he has made no great shew* ; but he has been guilty of no official blunder, of no Ministerial delinquency. He ever claimed and received the confidence of those above him ; and when he has gradually become himself the superior, he has merited and acquired the esteem, respect, and even the admiration of those by whom he is served. Without the false glitter which occasionally accompanies long service, his Lordship has gained a sound and honourable reputation. His career has been free from all the nonsense, and fuss, the “leather and prunella” of that of men who have been in office not even half his time ; and yet every month and every year seem to have more and more contributed to develop those talents for business—those powers of discrimination—those able and quiet, intrepid yet calm and deliberate methods which he has employed to separate the corn from the chaff—the sophistry from the truth—the alleged from the real—the villainous from the honest. There never was a man so much assailed by the Tory press, and with so little reason ; indeed it is not unusual, from that quarter, for those persons to receive the most abuse who the least deserve it ; and the more he has distinguished himself, or rather the more visible were the efforts and the abilities with which he was serving his country, the more was the black venom of the Tory prints poured out upon this devoted Minister ; at the same time that those prints did not perceive they were actually, through the dark veil of their malignity, informing those who were discriminating enough to see it, who and what Lord Palmerston was, and what he had effected, and was still effecting for the empire. Thousands—nay, hundreds of thousands, knew not who was Lord Palmerston at all till they saw his name in the Tory Papers, so humbly had his Lordship plodded through his weary and ill-repaid journey, and so injudiciously did party give the public a better knowledge of a distinguished individual, even by the virulence of their revilement.

“These are not the remarks of momentary enthusiasm, or of recently

The new Shah, as soon as secured on the throne by Great Britain, plans, conjointly with Russia, projects of *conquest in India!** All hopes of defending themselves from the pressure of Russia on the northern frontier are now annihilated in the minds of the Persians, for they see the power of Great Britain united to that of Russia against their independence; they must indemnify themselves by acquisitions Eastward, and, all fear of England being lost by seeing her the tool and subservient instrument of Russia even against herself, the Persians determine on reverting to the lost empire of Nadir Shah in British India—that dream being the price of the support of Russia to the elevation of Mahommed Meerza, and forming at once the dissolution of future ties with England, and the bond of connection with Russia! Thus has Russia, through the means of Lord Palmerston, succeeded in changing places with England in the East; she has succeeded in transferring British influence and British *material force* in Persia to herself, for purposes hostile to England—in deceiving Persia as to the strength and intentions of England*—in deceiving the British Nation

excited feeling; they come not from his Lordship's conduct to France, or his spirited settlement of the affairs of the East. We have seen the greater part of his Lordship's political life—we have carefully watched him, and we are confident we have not written a line of flattery, or a single syllable beyond what we believe sincerely to be the truth. Our only regret is, that there are not more Statesmen of the *same modest character and business habits*, as indefatigable in business, as clear and accurate in the plans they lay down, and as skilful in execution!"

* Of course the Persians not being able to comprehend the reasons why a nation so "enlightened" as England should voluntarily resign herself to her enemy, naturally conclude that it is because the might of England has fallen before Russia; and when any doubts arise in the minds of the Persian Rulers, the Russian Envoy exhibits the transactions in the British Legislature, and proves to them that when complaints are carried before it of plunder and piracy by Russia on British property and rights, British *Statesmen* (?) reply by saying that they are *desirous of not coming to a rupture with Russia!*—that they do everything in the interests of "PEACE!"—and the Persian resigns himself.

* See Parliamentary paper.—Dispatches from British Envoys, Mr.

as to the interests and intentions of Persia—in perplexing, confusing and alarming the Indian Government, so as to render a judgment impossible, and induce it into the commission of false steps—in exhibiting to the Courts of Europe the danger, the helplessness and the degradation of England!

The attack of the new Shah on Herat, under the auspices and direction of Russia, was the first act of gratitude shown to Great Britain for the part she took in placing him on the throne—an act which is considered as a measure of hostility against England by the Indian Government, by the Envoy in Persia, and by Lord Palmerston, who, however, deprives the Envoy of the power of arresting it, and informs him that the *Courts of England and Russia are “united!”* I have already made mention of the first rupture between Great Britain and Persia by the withdrawal of the British Minister from the Persian Court on the pretext—not so much of opposition to the hostile proceedings carried on jointly by Russia and Persia against England, as of the insult to the British Envoy’s Messenger.

When we contemplate the means employed, and the end attained by Lord Palmerston in Persia, it appears to me that if there be not a secret union between his Lordship and Russia, then must Russia be served by the hand of an Omnipotent and unknown Power. The Parliamentary papers on the affairs of Persia present us with one most striking peculiarity—while the language of Lord Palmerston is, through the negotiations with the Envoys, couched in a tone of hostility to Russia, the meaning really conveyed has, without an exception, gone to the fulfilment of her objects!

The immediate fruits of the establishment of Russian power in Persia are, the convulsion of Affghanistan, and the destruction of the independence of the Affghans. The territories lying between Persia and the British frontier are the principalities of Cabul and Candahar, inhabited by the Affghans, and were then ruled over by Dost Mahomed; and

Ellis and Mr. Macneill, denouncing the schemes of the new State as based on the conquest of Hindoostan—and which are admitted to be so by Lord Palmerston, who takes steps not to prevent but to further them!

the country of the Sikhs of which the capital is Lahore, and who were ruled over by Runjeet Singh.

The Affghans are the most warlike people in Central Asia, have for ages been the legitimate possessors of these territories, were in strict alliance with, and enthusiastically attached to England, and had rendered good service to Her on several occasions. The Sikhs are a tribe of wanderers whose occupation is plunder, and who never legitimately possessed any country of their own. Runjeet Singh who ruled them was simply a bandit Chief, who had been engaged in a continual struggle against the territories of the Affghans. His hostility to the British had been marked by proofs unequivocal since the commencement of his plundering career; his troops were disciplined by French officers, and his connection with St. Petersburg* had been traced at a time when he contemplated a hostile incursion beyond the British frontier; but his efforts in that direction were paralysed by the hostility of the Affghans. The Indian government, alarmed at the successful efforts of Russia in Persia, sent an Envoy into Central Asia to report on the dispositions of the Princes who held power there. The Envoy visited the court of Runjeet Singh, and then proceeded to that of Dost Mahomed, where he arrived at the critical moment when his territory was threatened on the North by the hostility of Persia and Russia united for the assault of India,† and assailed on the East by Runjeet Singh who had entered on a Treaty with the thrice expelled and traitorous ex-chief, Shah Shoojah, for the dismemberment of the Affghan dominions. Dost Mahomed, fully aware of the hostility of Russia, Persia, and Runjeet Singh to Great Britain, offered to place his whole power at the disposal of the Indian government for arresting the march of Russia, provided he received

* The similarity of religion between the Sikhs and the Russians is a powerful bond of union between them, and a source of discord with the Affghans.

† Of course that assault could only take place by the concurrence or the subjugation of the Affghans, whose territory lay between Persia and India.

promise of British protection against Runjeet Singh. Astounding as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that the British Envoy informed him that his government was the *ally of that robber*, and scornfully reproached him with the meanness of seeking British assistance! He wrote at the same time to the Indian government to inform it of the offers of Dost Mahomed. At this very time, a Russian Agent, Captain Vicovitch, also arrived at the Court of the Affghan chief, and openly offered him troops and money to assist him against Runjeet Singh, provided he would grant a passage through his territory for the *INVASION OF INDIA!* This offer Dost Mahomed rejected, communicated it to the British Envoy, and renewed his offers of support in frustration of it.* The British Ambassador in Persia at the same time communicates these things to Lord Palmerston. The renewed offer of Dost Mahomed being taken no notice of by the British government—the Envoy replying by impressing on his mind “*the uselessness of his seeking to contend with so potent a prince as the Maharajah Runjeet Singh;*”† that Prince is driven to accept the offer of alliance of Russia in self-defence against the union now of *England and Runjeet Singh* in hostility to him—and, what is the next scene in this unheard of drama? I can scarcely credit the evidence of my own senses while I detail it—so inexplicable, so incomprehensible is what followed that its truth seems incompatible with the sanity of the British nation; and nevertheless it is true, but yet I cannot believe but that, in future ages, this event will be set down as one of the fables of a “civilized” age;—that act is, *THE MARCH OF A BRITISH ARMY TO CABOOL, AND THE EXPULSION OF DOST MAHOMED*, followed by the shouts of the British people, and the exultation (feigned) of the British Minister!

* See Letters of Dost Mahomed written to the Indian Government, and also to the Emperor of Russia; they are to be found in the papers presented to Parliament by the India Board. Also the Letters written by Captain Burnes to the India Government, detailing the position and offers of Dost Mahomed.

† See Letter of Captain Burnes, of 5th October, 1837, in India papers.

To enable the reader to comprehend the meaning of this proceeding it is necessary that I remind him of the following points :—

1st.—The basis of the policy of England in Persia, during the whole of these events, as laid down by Lord Palmerston, was, the “ *Union of England and Russia*,” and the identity of their interests in Persia.

2nd.—The reiterated instructions of Lord Palmerston to the Envoys in Persia were to “ *act in concert with the Russian Envoy in Persia*.”*

3rd.—The alliance of Dost Mahomed against Russia is rejected, because the Indian Government is in alliance with Runjeet Singh, who is the enemy of England and the ally of Russia.

4th.—Notwithstanding this “UNION” of England with Russia, Lord Palmerston directs the march of a British army against Dost Mahomed, because he accepts the alliance of Russia, with whom England *remains “united,”*—against that Dost Mahomed whom England has thus driven into the alliance of Russia, England’s friend !

These are the incomprehensibilities, and the disasters which the united voices of the Legislators and people of this Nation are raised to applaud—to exult in, as national triumphs !

It is necessary to remind the reader, of the subsequent part enacted between Lord Palmerston and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg ? It is not unworthy of the rest. The Foreign Secretary demands an explanation from the Russian Cabinet of the open hostility of their Ambassador in Persia, and his agent in Cabul—he writes a letter to St. Petersburg to say he has no doubt they have acted *contrary to their instructions* ! The Russian Cabinet *agrees* in this view taken by the British Minister, and says they have acted contrary to their instructions. Thus, during a course of years, the Russian Ambassador in Persia succeeds in destroying the accumulated exertions of England in Central Asia of forty

* Refer to papers presented to Parliament by the Foreign Office.

years, destroys the independence of Persia and of the Affghans—raises them into Weapons of assault against British India—directs campaigns, and furnishes subsidies against England—costs England many millions sterling—ALL AGAINST HIS INSTRUCTIONS! Lord Palmerston expresses himself *perfectly satisfied*—withdraws British connection from Persia, and leaves Russia in the continuance of all her schemes of hostility—reaping all the fruits, unopposed or unnoticed, of the acts disavowed!

I will finish this chapter by reminding Statesmen and Politicians, of one other circumstance connected with this matter. The Papers presented to Parliament by Lord Palmerston are—ONE MASS OF FALSIFICATION. Transpositions, mutilations, misplacing of dates, and divisions of connected documents, render comprehension of the subject a matter of impossibility—without months of time passed in unravelment!

To the Duke of Wellington, the Marquis of Londonderry, Lord Clarendon, Joseph Hume, and every Member of both Houses of Parliament, I say, These papers have been presented to *you*—it is a duty incumbent on *you* to examine, re-arrange, and comprehend!

CHAPTER IX.

INTERVENTION.

“The ground upon which my Right Hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, has defended the doing of all that has been done, and the not doing of all that has been omitted, is the principle of NON-INTERFERENCE. That is to say, the principle that *every Nation has a right to manage its own internal affairs as it pleases*, so long as it injures not its neighbour; and that one Nation has no right to control, by force of arms, the will of another Nation in the choice of its Government or Ruler. * * * * To this principle I most cordially assent. It is sound, it ought to be sacred; and I trust that England will never be found to set the example of its violation.—*Lord Palmerston's Speech, 1st June, 1829.*”

THE examination of the question as to the secret union of Lord Palmerston with the Russian Cabinet, renders it necessary to say a few words on the principles which formed the basis of the Ministerial functions of his Lordship. It will be recollected that the long public life of the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was almost entirely passed in the service of the Party designated by the title of “Tory” or “Conservative,” which stated itself to entertain different *Principles* to the other Party called “Whig”—for the making up of which “Principles,” they have been in the habit of enumerating certain modes of conducting the Affairs of Government, some intelligible, others unintelligible. Among the principles which are intelligible, the chief, or perhaps, indeed, the only one is, that of “NON-INTERVENTION”—of which the signification is given with all the precision that words can be employed for, in the above extract from a speech of the present Noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

The extraordinary success of Russia in her projects of aggrandisement at the expense of England, since 1830, might be in some degree comprehensible, on the supposition that a Faction in England gave power to a Minister solely on condition that he would *never interfere, under any circumstances*, with Foreign States—not even to preserve British Rights and

Property from rapine. But, great as is the political ignorance of the people of England, there was not even an approach to such absurdity expressed on any occasion by any of the Factions which convulse the State; Lord Palmerston bound himself only not to “interfere in the *internal* concerns”—not “to control, by force of arms, the will of another Nation in the choice of its Government or Ruler,” and the same sense of duty, which ought to have compelled him to the fulfilment of this his solemn Contract to the Nation, was equally binding on him to enforce a similar neutrality on the part of all other Nations; and at the same time to protect the Rights of Great Britain in whatever Nation they might be assailed. Lord Palmerston was perfectly well aware that it was by this practice of Foreign Nations interfering with the concerns of their neighbours that Complications and Warfare arose, and that Warfare was contrary to the Interests of England;” therefore were the words “Non-intervention” “Peace,”—to which was added “Retrenchment,” emblazoned on his banner. Lord Palmerston also knew very well that there was one Nation to the interests of which Warfare in Europe was *not* contrary—which had invariably benefitted by the wars of Europe, and which constantly strove to excite dissensions among other States. His Lordship knew very well that INTERVENTION at any price* was as sacred a principle of Russian Policy as the CONTRARY was the principle of British Policy, and that this was for the express purpose of creating war; he was also perfectly well aware of the weakness of Russia, except in her superior Diplomatic Intelligence, and that she was entirely at the mercy of Great Britain whenever She chose to express her will. What, therefore, has Lord Palmerston done?—refrained from interfering himself with other States, and prevented Russia from interfering? Nothing of the kind; let the facts speak.

1st.—We have seen that on the accession of Lord Palmerston to Office, he found Russia in the act of illegal and outrageous interference in POLAND—that the year following,

*“Se mêler à tout prix, et par tous les moyens possibles, force ou ruse, de tous les démêlés de l’Europe.”—9th Art. of Plan of Peter the Great.

viz., in February, 1831, Russia had violated England's Commercial Rights throughout the whole Kingdom of Poland. In this case the British Minister not only did not interfere to prevent Russian interference, but he did not interfere to protect British Rights. Is this justified on the plea of "Non-intervention?" But, then, he *did* interfere in another direction—Persia had just been prostrated by Russia, and, in the war of Poland with Russia, saw a chance of recovering her Rights, her Liberty, and her stolen Provinces, by marching to the assistance of Poland—by ranging herself on the side of the JUST against the outrage of the UNJUST, and Lord Palmerston *interfered*—TO STOP THE MARCH OF THE PERSIAN ARMY TO ATTACK RUSSIA !*

2nd.—We have seen that the neutrality of CRACOW was violated, and that Lord Palmerston admitted it to be so ; that the Commercial Rights of England in Cracow were violated, and that Lord Palmerston knew it ; for, when pressed on the subject, he pleaded the *small amount* of merchandise sent there ! We have seen that he not only did not interfere to protect the neutrality of Cracow, but that he violated his own solemn promise to interfere—that *promise* having prevented his removal from Office.

3rd.—We have seen that he *did* interfere in GREECE as well in conjunction with France and Russia, as singly in affected opposition to Russia, and *after* the Conference in London had appointed an Independent Council of Regency to rule Greece, without any further interference of the Alliance. We have seen that Russia also continued to interfere in Greece after the Protocol signed in London by which they all bound themselves no longer to interfere, and that Lord Palmerston took no steps to prevent it. We have seen that on one occasion the Greek fleet was allowed to be destroyed by Russia (in Hydra), on the pretext that the Policy of Lord Palmerston was *non-interference*, but that, on every other occasion, when some act was to be performed necessary for destroying the

* This fact I ASSERT, and I challenge Lord Palmerston to the disproof. The witness-box ! the witness-box ! Let me call my witnesses from the British Mission in Persia — perhaps a little nearer !

Liberties of Greece, and working out the objects of Russia, the policy of the British Minister was *interference*, prompt and efficacious.

We have seen that the Commercial Rights of England in Greece were violated by the imposition of a restrictive Tariff on Imports, in imitation of that of Russia, and at the instigation of a Russian President, without any interference of Lord Palmerston to prevent it ; and we have seen not only that Lord Palmerston did not interfere to protect the property of British Bondholders in Greece, but that he actually transferred away £3,000,000 of British money in favour of Russia, and which had been used for Russian ends. We have seen that every Act of Lord Palmerston, as much of intervention as of non-intervention, in Greece, went to further the objects of Russia, to destroy the interests of England, and to annihilate the Liberty and the Independence of Greece.

4th.—We have seen that, in CIRCASSIA, Lord Palmerston not only did not interfere to prevent Russian interference but that he actually interfered to secure and ratify, in London, the objects which all Russia's interference could not realise ! We have seen that the British Minister interfered to transfer to Russia the first position in the world—the Caucasus—a position necessary to her only for the furtherance of objects hostile to England ; and that, too, in violation of the solemn promises of the Russian Cabinet, in violation of a Treaty signed by it, in violation of the Law of Nations and the Rights of Men—in violation of British Commercial Rights to an extent incalculable, and to the rapine of the property of British subjects ! We have seen that Lord Palmerston did not interfere to prevent Russia seizing the mouths of the Danube and destroying British Commerce by imposing her own Regulations on the Turkish Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia—destroying, at the same time, the independence of those provinces, and consequently dismembering the Turkish Empire ; but, on the contrary, we have seen that the British Minister went out of his way to recognise the Treaty of Adrianople (by virtue of which Russia claimed the right to do these things), which had been protested against by his

predecessor, Lord Aberdeen, and which had been declared to be illegal and non-valid by the first legal and legislative authorities in Great Britain.

5th.—We have seen that in PERSIA Lord Palmerston pursued the principle not of *non-intervention*, but of the reverse, in a degree as decided and diversified, as it was disastrous and unheard of. He not only entered on a secret compact with Russia in 1834* to interfere in the present and future internal affairs of Persia, but he actually did “control by force of (British) arms, the will of that Nation in the choice of its Ruler,” by placing a tool of Russia on the Persian throne, in opposition to the will of the Persian people, and for the prosecution of joint schemes with Russia against British India!

We have seen that an Army was sent by the Governor General of India to *interfere* in Cabul, although the papers presented to Parliament by the Directors of the East India Company reveal that the instructions of the Directors to the Governor General are—*not to interfere with any of the States West of the Indus, and to take no part in their quarrels*.† The instructions from Lord Palmerston to the Envoys in Persia exhibit a direct and unparalleled violation of the doctrine of “Non-intervention,” as well as of all known forms and customs in Diplomacy; they instruct the Envoys to negotiate with the Persian Court—not in reference to their Mission as Representatives of Great Britain, but to take, as the sole basis of their communications, the bearing of certain lines of Policy on the *internal concerns* of Persia!‡

* This compact was concealed from the House of Commons during several years, and until all the disastrous consequences *had taken place*.

† Did the orders for the march on Cabul come to Lord Auckland from the India Board or from Lord Palmerston? If from Lord Palmerston, Lord Auckland has rendered himself liable to impeachment, for it is the *Board of Control for Indian Affairs*, not the Foreign Secretary, that directs the Governors of India.

‡ There is a good deal of repetition contained in the last few pages, but I conceive this enumeration of things detailed in previous chapters to be beneficial, from the extreme importance of their bearing on the principle of “Non-intervention,” as of the subjects in themselves.

6th.—There has been “Intervention” in Holland and Belgium, Portugal and Spain—all in reference solely to the “Internal Affairs” of those Kingdoms, and for the unmixed purpose of “controlling by force of arms the will of these people in the choice of their Rulers.” There was no motive of British Rights or Interests either understood, supposed, or affected as conducing to this “interference” in these Kingdoms;—as far as these objects were concerned, it was a wanton and gratuitous infraction of the “principles” which formed the ground-work of the Ministry to which Lord Palmerston belonged. But although the mischief attendant on the fact of violation alone is necessarily great, as reversing the principle of action of the British Government, destroying confidence in its professions, incurring the danger which the “principle” is intended to prevent, and deceiving the British people, yet, in an examination of the acts as they occurred, it is necessary for the impartial Politician to ascertain whether there be nothing lying behind such unusual transactions which may bear injuriously on the Interests of his Country, independently of the general consideration. In the case of the Dutch-Belgian question, a dispute broke out between the King of the Netherlands and some of his subjects, involving no infraction of British Rights or Privileges as in the cases of Poland and Cracow. The Interests of Great Britain were in no wise menaced, nor her safety in the slightest degree compromised; whether the Belgians or the Dutch were successful, the strength of the Victor would not be dangerous to Europe—and yet, without a shadow of a pretext, Lord Palmerston violates his “sacred” principle by entering on an intervention with Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia to settle the dispute between the King and his subjects! British Fleets are set to capture the Dutch Merchant Ships, and French troops are marched to bombard Antwerp, by the instructions of a Congress of Foreigners sitting in London, for the purpose of “preserving the Peace of Europe”! Non-intervention is laid down by the British Government as the basis of its Policy, because a contrary course is apt to lead to war—as soon as an opportunity presents itself, the British Minister enters on a gratuitous and

incomprehensible policy of interference, and after years of turmoil, outrage, bloodshed and loss, claims the thanks of the British people, because he “has settled the Affairs of Holland and Belgium *without disturbing the Peace of Europe!*” The course of this “settling” was attended with fierce Contention and absorbing Interest in the public mind both in France and England; whole *tons* of idle and absurd discussion were flung forth by the Press of Europe every week about the dispute, tending to perplex the mind and draw away attention from matters of real interest—Phantoms and Non-entities were substituted for Realities; Law, Order, and the practice of Governments were set at defiance, and *Russia was realising advantages in the East greater than half a Century had sufficed to bring her before!* Russia alone profited by the Hollando-Belgic “intervention,” and, accordingly, she exerted her utmost to prolong and complicate it, while securing the favour of a party in England which had opposed her projects of Eastern conquest, by pretending to act as Protector of “Legitimacy,” and “Conservative principles.” The Russian Cabinet joins with England in certain proposals which it agrees to sign, and then throws obstacles in the way of a termination, by privately using all its efforts to counteract them—this is denounced to the Conference by the Dutch Court, and the “Non-intervention” Minister claims an increase of credit for not allowing it to disturb the Peace of Europe! The result of this “settling” is, to bring the hatred and contempt both of Holland and Belgium on Great Britain—to prepare the former for the Alliance of Russia, and make the latter a virtual Province of France. But a more important use than that is made of it by Russia and Lord Palmerston; at the same period the Sultan claimed the protection of England against his Vassal who was supported at St. Petersburg, and Lord Palmerston rejected his assistance on the plea that the Naval Forces of England were engaged in interference on the coasts of Holland and Portugal—Russia forced her traitor-protection on the Sultan, encamped on the Bosphorus, and gained the triumph of Unkiar-Skelessi! The Patriot is forced to bite his lips in silence—what can he say,

or think, or do, for his country's safety? England and France are raging like wild beasts about "Legitimate" and "Liberal" *principles*, while material interests, as well as Faith, Honor, Justice and Law are unknown, unseen, unfelt!

7th. A dispute broke out in SPAIN about the order of succession in the Royal Family—a subject purely internal; no British Interest was affected, or was pretended to be involved. Lord Palmerston instantly proposed an INTERVENTION to "settle" the question, and invited France and Portugal to enter on a Treaty for arranging the Internal Affairs of Spain! A Minister, with the "sacred" Non-intervention principle for his motto, proposes, draws up, and executes the Quadruple Treaty for arranging the Domestic Affairs of Spain. Who benefits by this Treaty?—Russia, and Russia alone. The insane struggle of "principles" is kept up, increased, and complicated throughout Europe. The attention of the people of England and France is absorbed—the section of them (temporarily) represented by Lord Palmerston is madly eager to establish "an enlightened Government, based on Liberal Institutions" in Spain—the other section fancies that Minister is striking a blow at "Conservative" principles, and is as eager in endeavouring to thwart what they think are his measures—Russia, Austria, and Prussia form a counter-league with this party in England and France, and while Massacre and Bloodshed devastate Spain and make Humanity turn pale, Europe is split into two hostile leagues, at the head of each of which is one of the two Powers which state themselves to be "united to maintain the Peace of the World!"*

Meantime, the game of Russia in the East goes on, and she is engaged in looking after Realities, while we are absorbed in the pursuit of Incomprehensibilities. But a triumph in the West is also gained by her. A Minister of France, friendly to England, and hostile to Russia, had been forced into Power by the sympathies of the French people; finding France engaged to England by the Quadruple Treaty to

* Declaration of Lord Durham at St. Petersburg, in 1836.

interfere by military means in Spain, M. THIERS conceives that it is part of the duty of a Minister to *fulfil* the engagements of his Nation. Lord Palmerston no sooner finds M. Thiers, the partisan of the English Alliance, in office, than he requires the fulfilment of his Quadruple Treaty—requires the *armed intervention* of France to co-operate with English troops and ships into Spain. Russia had arranged beforehand with the French Court, which was devoted to her, that there should be *no* armed intervention; and LORD PALMERSTON KNEW THIS! M. Thiers insisted on keeping faith with England, and the Court insisted that he should *not* do so—a ministerial crisis came on, and the friend of England was expelled from Power in France, because he would not break faith with England. Thus did Russia and Lord Palmerston, by concert, lay a plan for convulsing the Peninsula, disturbing Europe, degrading England, and expelling her friends and the enemies of Russia from the Councils of France.

Is it said that British Interests required the Intervention in Spain? Let us examine. It is true that British Interests were involved by the Catastrophe in the Peninsula, and I shall explain *how* they were affected.

The Commerce of Spain had long been at the lowest ebb, and the poverty and misery of the people a bye-word on the earth. A grinding tyranny had dried up the roots of Production and Industry, by the Central Power having imposed ruinous taxes on the buying and selling of all articles of Merchandise—the consequence was, a scarcity of the articles—thus constituting Poverty. Slavery and Despotism were, of course, the lot of the Spaniards; for where there is no control over local affairs, nor check on the Central Power, Tyranny is the natural and invariable result. To interfere with the freedom of a man's actions—to prevent him purchasing what he requires, and selling what he has to sell, without a restraint—without the permission of the minion of the Central Power to whom he must pay an enormous premium for doing so, is to make him a slave; this is Tyranny, and begets Abjectness, Poverty, and Crime. This may be

almost said to have been the invention of Spain, and bitterly has she reaped the fruits of it.

But in one portion of Spain, the remains of other times had lingered—the *thing* Liberty existed, and there was no disputing about the word,—nor factions, nor poverty. In the BASQUE PROVINCES, the freedom was retained which Europe had lost—the blasting breath of Modern Legislation had not yet dried up the fountains of Prosperity, nor impiously interfered between the inhabitants and their enjoyment of the gifts placed by Providence within the reach of every man. The simplicity of mind, the superiority in point of virtue, honesty, intelligence, and the greater prosperity and happiness of the Basques, over the other inhabitants of Spain, can only be appreciated by those who have lived among both. In the Basque provinces there existed the municipal institutions of ancient days—no Central Government could interfere with their Rights nor corrupt their Magistrates, for they were elected by themselves. They *collected their own taxes*, and managed all their own local Affairs. The consequence was, that they interposed no shackles on purchasing or selling, but collected taxes in money—the only legitimate way. The importation of Merchandise into these provinces was free from restrictions of any description, and thus, along an immense and most productive and trading frontier, a valuable Commerce was carried on by those who brought the manufactured articles of Great Britain to the traders in the Basque Country. The Commerce which was excluded from every other part of Spain, was freely admitted into these provinces in virtue of the right which had been guaranteed to them from every epoch in the Spanish history. The Government introduced at the change of succession in the Royal Family of Spain resolved to crush this freedom—to annihilate these rights—to blast this prosperity, and the Basques, who knew the difference between Liberty and Slavery, rose in a pious warfare for their freedom—it was this that made them call in a Pretender, and would they had found a better man than Don Carlos! This was the warfare which the intervention of Lord Palmerston was intended to exasperate and pro-

long—this was the expiring remnant of European freedom which the Liberals of England thronged to the Peninsula to overthrow, and for such monstrous iniquity did they expend their treasure, their blood, and their character, in Spain, as they had previously done in Greece, for similar objects, and with similar results !

The result of Lord Palmerston's intervention in Spain, as regards the material Interests of England, has been, not a defence of any Interests of England, but a direct *attack on the Interests of England*, for it has ended in the exclusion of British Commerce by the extension of the Spanish prohibitory Tariff to the Basque Provinces ! It has also been attended by the loss of a vast sum of British Money to British Bondholders, sent out to destroy British Interests. The result, in a political point of view has been, the destruction of the freedom and prosperity of a large body of people on the pretext of furthering Liberty, and the engendering of jealousy and hatred of the British Name in the greatest part of the Peninsula. In short, the Minister and People of England went out to Spain to fight against the admission of their *own Commerce*—to annihilate *their own Commercial Privileges*, and, strange to say, this was the work of that section of the People of this Country which upheld the doctrine that it was a foolish and unnecessary *expense* to keep Fleets even for the *protection* of Commerce !

* * * * *

From the examination of those portions of the career of Lord Palmerston which I have gone over in the preceding pages, it appears that the course pursued by the Noble Lord has been *systematic*—that, in every instance, East, West, North, and South, his Policy has been subversive of the Interests of England, and in furtherance of the Designs of Russia. It has appeared that there has been cast in his way opposition from each and every party in the State—from his own partisans—from the Faction opposed to the Government, on Conservative principles—from the Faction opposed to it on Ultra Liberal principles, and that he has continued to work out the designs of Russia against England, in spite of that opposition. It has appeared that, in numberless instances,

he has violated the Law of Nations—violated his own solemn promises—violated the Constitutional Law of England—trampled on the Rights of his Countrymen—presented Papers to Parliament, arranged in an order of systematic and laboured misrepresentation, mutilation, and falseness in accounts—that he has exposed himself to a danger no English Minister ever did, in the annals of our History, and that in every act the *result* was the same—the transference of British interests to Russia! We have seen that he was called to office because the Party which ruled the State resolved on ceasing to interfere in the internal concerns of other Nations, and chose him because he exhibited a power of comprehension, and a force and clearness in expression, condemnatory of the practice of “intervention,” greater than any other Member of the Legislature—that the basis of his Policy in taking Office, solemnly avowed was, NON-INTERVENTION—and yet that nearly every act of his Policy has been a violation of his principle. We have seen that in every case where he has *not* interfered, the interests of Russia have triumphed, and those of England been sacrificed or plundered—that in every case where he *has* interfered, his intervention has been, not to protect British Interests, but to attack British Interests—not to do nothing, but to do *something*, very decided and obvious, viz., to advance the projects of Russia. We have seen that he has incurred an enormous expense to England, that he has voted away her Money, and used her Troops and Ships in external Warfare—that these Movements and this Money have, with a regularity constant and invariable, been used in acts of service to Russia and hostility to England. We have seen that he has used the Phantoms, the Follies, and the Ignorance of the People of the Nation whose Resources he wielded—and that the result of their employment has been the acquisition of *Realities* by Russia. We have seen that the Money, Rights, Interests, and Safety of England have been bartered away in every region of the World to Russia, on the constant pretence of opposition to her views, and in defiance of the danger of detection; and what conclusion can any rational man arrive at, but that there is a SECRET CONCERT

BETWEEN THIS MINISTER AND THE CABINET OF ST. PETERSBURGH? I declare my total inability to reject the evidence which the career of Lord Palmerston presents—I cannot regard him as the Minister of England, but as the Minister of Russia; or rather as the Agent of Russia and England united for the prostration of the British Power, and the transference of British Wealth and Greatness—and through Great Britain, those of the East and West, to the future Sovereign of Europe and of Asia. It will be said that there are two ways of telling a story, and that I have presented a partial view of the case—it is a view which I should rejoice if I may be able to change. I have viewed the Policy pursued by England abroad with the eye of an Englishman, and been astounded at its course; I witnessed the sacrifice, the degradation, and the danger to England arising from it, and was filled with amazement and with despair; I considered it my duty to trace the inexplicable events I saw to their source—I entered on an investigation of the acts of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with a mind strongly biassed in his favour; all my predilections were on his side—the result is, an impossibility of escape from the fearful conviction that he is guilty of the crime of betraying his country. To what solution can we fly? Are all these things done *by mistake*? But are State Papers falsified by mistake—by system, and that system always tending to one and the same end? It will be said that Lord Palmerston has often been accused of Treason, and that he has not deigned to make any reply—but is that a proof of his innocence? Is that a reason for not examining his acts? Of course he will not reply as long as the Nation refuses to investigate, for his reply would induce investigation; and, besides, if there *be* guilt, when there is a universal indifference, it is attended with no disgrace—no punishment. But there is a system of resistance to Russia carried on by private individuals who have seen the danger and pointed to the guilt of the Minister—these individuals have made efforts to incite all classes of the Nation to examine the position of their Country, and *investigate* the acts of the Man who wields her Power. Has

Lord Palmerston been inactive, unobservant? Far from it ;—while no public reply has been given to the facts explained, or the revelations made, and while the Government Press has systematically refrained both from opposition and advocacy, secret efforts, connected and systematic, have been directed against the men whose sole object and exertions were to urge to *investigation*. I have myself traced, and can prove, the most determined, though secret, efforts made to check investigation, and throw distrust on the individuals suspected of directing the attention of their fellow-citizens to it ; and this, not in one part, but in many parts of the country. I have repeatedly anticipated these tactics, and constantly seen them brought to bear with all the regularity of a system—a system of *espionage* is, in fact, kept up for the purpose of crushing INVESTIGATION ! Why this silence, coupled with this fear ?

I have said in a previous chapter that the Policy of Lord Palmerston has received the sanction of the Majority of the Nation—that he has received a greater degree of support than any Foreign Minister has during a number of years. This is perfectly true, and I presume this will be taken, by the majority of those who read these pages, for a proof sufficient to justify a refraining from the trouble of investigation ? But does this alter any of the acts of Lord Palmerston ? does it controvert any of my statements ? Can public opinion, supposing it to be unanimous, subtract one *tittle* from the evidence, or add one *iota* to the proof ? Most assuredly not. Have we not seen that One Minister has led the whole Nation, as much his political foes as his own partisans, into acts at variance with their declared sentiments, and on every occasion without exception ? Have we not seen that Lord Palmerston was chosen Minister because the predominant Party in the State resolved on pursuing a certain line of Policy—that the Minister pursued a line the very opposite ; and that the Party adopted that line ? Have we not seen that the Party which he served, on repeated occasions objected to the course Lord Palmerston seemed to be pursuing, and insisted on his taking a contrary one—that his Lordship yielded and promised obedience—that he falsified his promises,

and that no Member of the Legislature, or man in the Nation, could understand his actions or arrest his Treason? Have we not seen that the might of England has been used to destroy the power of England, and that no man in the Nation knew, or cared to know, or would bestow a thought when it was pointed out? Have we not seen that, although we are a Commercial Nation, and that our Resources have been used in various parts of the World for the destruction of our Rights and Privileges, yet that not a man in the Nation has opposed it—nay, that they have almost always exulted in it, as illustrating some Phantom that haunted their imagination? Have we not seen that we have an Empire in the East, of surpassing value, and that although a hostile Power has advanced upon that Empire and compelled us to wage a War in its defence, yet that our Minister has directed our military vengeance *against a Friend*, and, in the admitted knowledge of the quarter whence the hostility arose, continued *united with our Foe*, and that the people sent forth one unanimous shout of—exultation at the National *Triumph*? Have we not also seen that while every act of Disgrace, of Wrong, and of Plunder by a Nation whose physical power was weak and contemptible, has been suffered by our Minister on the plea of not endangering the *Peace of Europe*, that that Minister has excited the rage and the hostility of the most warlike Nation on the Earth, on a plea which is a violation of his own principle of Policy—in itself false and mischievous; and on the pretext of serving the “Interests of Humanity,” and “giving additional security to the Peace of Europe”? That this act has elicited the applause of his partisans, *because they are his partisans*—of his opponents, because they conceive that the prevailing Phantom in the French mind is a different kind of phantom to their own, and therefore that it is good to be at variance with them—of many of the Neutrals because they see the others agree to applaud!

I have mentioned at the beginning of this work the extreme difficulty there must be for Foreign Courts to detect the crime of Treason in a Minister of Great Britain, and consequently the danger that must accrue, as well to

themselves as to England, from an undetected concert of Two powerful Nations, under the disguise of systematic opposition. Any one acquainted with the routine of Diplomatic Life will at once see this difficulty.

Sir Frederick Lamb was one of the ablest and most upright men in the Diplomatic Service of Great Britain. He represented this country at the Court of Vienna. At that Court, the concert of Lord Palmerston with Russia was a matter of notoriety—the hostility of Sir F. Lamb to Russia active and decided. The Austrian Minister offered peculiar advantages to England, in exchange for her Alliance against the aggressive projects of Russia, and the Ambassador pressed them on the British Minister. The Commercial Treaty with Austria of 1838 was lauded as one of the most important pieces of Statesmanship of the time:—it was *annihilated by Lord Palmerston*—clauses introduced which rendered it an instrument for transferring the Commerce of the Austro-Turkish Provinces to RUSSIA—the efforts of Sir F. Lamb were *frustrated and reversed*—and he was rewarded WITH A PEERAGE!

Mr. Mac Gregor exhibited great ability and honesty in the negotiations connected with the Austrian Treaty—was then sent out to Naples on a most important Mission—succeeded in a manner beyond every expectation;—his efforts in both instances were reversed by Lord Palmerston, and turned into disaster and loss to England—himself disgraced by the disavowal of his acts, on a plea which was false in Law, Fact, and Policy—and the overthrown Negotiator was rewarded by the SECRETARYSHIP OF THE BOARD OF TRADE!

The Envoy to Lahore and Cabul, Lieutenant Burnes, who played so admirable a part for Russia in Central Asia, and one so disastrous for England, was speedily found designated by the title of *Sir* Alexander Burnes!

Mr. Macneill, who had devoted many years of his life to the exposure of danger to England from the intrigues of Russia in the East, was sent to Persia to counteract them. The failure of his efforts was signal, entire, avowed—he was

recalled, and has since been silent, under the weight of Honours heaped on him by his complacent Chief!

What is the other side of the picture?

Sir Stratford Canning exhibited an intelligence and an honesty which could not be overcome—he was one of the few Englishmen who comprehended the game of Russia in Turkey and Greece—he was not to be silenced. Lord Palmerston sent him as Ambassador to St. Petersburg—where he was *rejected by the Emperor!* An event new in the annals of the world, that an Emperor of Russia shall choose the Minister to be sent by England. Lord Palmerston ratifies the outrage—and Sir Stratford Canning is sacrificed, without a voice being raised up in England—without one Englishman exhibiting even a consciousness of the outrage!

Mr. Urquhart is sent to Constantinople. Mr. Urquhart was a man who had thrown more obstacles in the way of the designs of Russia against England than all Statesmen put together for half a century. He had proved himself incorrupt—incorruptible, and had devoted himself, without reference to personal consequences, whatsoever they might be, to the service of his Country—he had resolved to sacrifice Riches, Position, and Life, in her cause. His exertions are *overthrown—his character maligned—spies set upon his conduct, and hired libellers engaged to do him injury!* He is recalled from his post on a plea which is false—he brings his accusers to answer for their conduct before a public Tribunal, and they (Ministers of the British Crown) fly from a Court of Justice, which they evade by a subterfuge!

We have seen that the Secretary of Legation of the British Embassy in Greece, and two Members of the Greek Regency, horror-struck at the game played by the British Resident, against England and in favour of Russia, proclaimed the truth to Lord Palmerston—that they have been forcibly *expelled, degraded, condemned without being heard—their proofs not noticed!*

With examples such as these (and they are only a few of the many similar) before their eyes, how can we expect that

any of the Courts of Europe are to resist the joint action of the Russian Cabinet and the British Minister !

With such an uninterrupted series of acts as I have described, can there be any doubt of the guilt of the man who wields the destinies of England—do you trust such a man with the guidance of your Affairs—the protection of your Interests—the choice of your Wars—the formation of your Alliances? Will he not continue to place you in hostility with your Friends, and to keep you in union with your Foes? Is it that you cannot or you will not see that, with such means in his possession, he holds a perfect mastery over the measures and the Ministers of the Courts of Europe—that he can compromise, deceive, and betray the Ministers and the People who are your friends, and turn them over for protection or revenge, into the arms of your Enemy, against you?

CHAPTER X.

FRANCE—THE TREATY OF THE 15TH OF JULY.

“ My Mission would have been successful if only on this account, that I have convinced the Emperor that *all his efforts to break the English and French Alliance* are in vain.”—*Declaration of Lord Durham on his return from the Embassy to St. Petersburg.*

IN the preceding Chapters I conceive that I have adduced evidence, if not entirely conclusive, certainly of the strongest description, showing that the Policy of Russia is, in its ultimate object, and necessarily in its present operations, at direct variance with the interests of England, and incompatible with the continuance of the British power; that the Regions of the East are the principal field on which the struggle rages, and of which the dominion by Russia, will be the decisive blow against England; that the possession of Constantinople is the chief and indispensable object for acquirement by Russia, as much for itself, as for the means of action which its occupation would supply for realising the scheme of Russian Policy, viz., the Empire of the East and West. I conceive it is sufficiently obvious that, in the estimation of the Russian Cabinet, the rupture of amicable relations between England and France is an event necessary to the consummation of Russian designs—that it is a *vital object to be gained by the Russian Cabinet*. I conceive, likewise, that I have established the Policy of England, under Lord Palmerston, to have tended systematically to the carrying out of the objects of Russia, and to the destruction of the Interests of England—that the only inference which can be drawn from the acts of that Minister is, that he is in secret concert with the Russian Cabinet; and that there is no check upon his conduct in consequence of the universal apathy of the British people.

In such a state of things as this, it must be obvious that

the only obstacle remaining to the completion of Russian designs in the East was, the union of England and France,—a union existing because the two people knew that the occupation of Constantinople, or the preponderating influence of Russia in Turkey, would be equally injurious to them both. For the ten years ending with July 1840, this union existed, and seemed so firm as to be incapable of being disturbed, for, the sympathies of the two people, and their material interests, were bound together with equal closeness. This indispensable necessity for Russia, and disaster for England, has been suddenly and most effectively brought about, to the amazement of every man in the two kingdoms.

Let us glance at the position in which France stood relatively to England prior to the Treaty of the 15th of July.

In France there were two political parties, of which the Leaders or Representatives alternately swayed the Councils of the Kingdom. One of these parties professed itself attached to those European Governments called “despotic Governments,” in preference to those called “Constitutional Governments,” and was therefore disposed to look for support in the Cabinet of St. Petersburg as antagonistic to that of London. The supporters of this party were not numerous in France, although, by the favour of the French Court, it had a powerful hold on the Government. Finding little favour at home, it relied more on its exertions abroad, and thought it saw the interests of France in the establishments of Colonies, and in the acquisition of Foreign possessions. This party, in fact, adopted a course of Foreign Policy of a nature similar to that pursued by Russia, and its proceedings were marked by an equal disregard to, and equally flagrant violation of, British Commercial Rights, as of the Rights of Nations, and the Laws of Humanity. This aggressive Policy being incompatible with the Interests of England, could not, of course, be pursued without injuring England, and thus the intentions alone of this party, were its political sympathies out of the question, placed it in a position of hostility to England—which hostility being founded on a line of Policy, was necessarily systematic ; but the enmity was in acts,

not in words, for, had it not been disguised, the opposition of England, as also of the majority of the people of France would have intervened to effect its overthrow. The Policy of this party, which, for distinction's sake, we may designate the "Court Party," has been marked by a systematic origination of—or ardent support of, outrage on the Rights of Great Britain, while keeping up the delusion of the Anglo-French Alliance. We have the destruction of British Rights, and insult to the British Flag, in two Regions of Africa, and the same in two Regions of America, to testify to the *friendliness* of the Court Party towards England. As long as these marks of real, solid hostility were being carried on, we have found Lord Palmerston not breaking up the French Alliance, but actually himself justifying and assisting in the most outrageous violations of International Law and Commercial Rights, that it is possible for one Nation to commit against another!*

The other political party in France, which comprised the vast majority of the French people, had sympathies and political tendencies precisely the opposite of the "Court Party." This party, which we may distinguish by the title of the "National Party," entertained a general distrust, and perhaps aversion, to what they called "Despotic" Governments, and were enamoured of Constitutional Forms, and Representative Systems—it was attracted to England by the sympathy manifested on this side of the Channel to that movement which placed the present French Monarch on the Throne, and the Anglo-French Alliance was cemented by the enthusiastic feelings of an overwhelming majority of the two Nations. The "National Party" was in a continual conflict of ideas

* The first International Authorities on the Continent have condemned as Illegal the French Blockades of Mexico and Buenos Ayres—Dr. Lushington and Sir William Follett have pronounced them Illegal, and a French Court of Law confirmed this opinion; Lord Palmerston declared them valid before the French Government had even ventured to proclaim them! The French aggressions in Senegal have been pronounced equally Illegal by the same British Legal Authorities.

with the Court Party, and frequently upbraided it with pursuing a course of Policy which was selfish and bad, as tending to weaken the English Alliance.* The Leaders of the National Party were M. Thiers, Odillon Barrot, and many of the first men of France ; their Policy was more intent on the Internal Improvement of France, and on the arrangement of home affairs, and on “ Principles,” as they called them, than on External Affairs. They were not desirous of pursuing schemes of Foreign Conquest, and the chief basis of their Foreign Policy was, that the designs of Russia only were to be feared, and that they were to be restrained by the Union of France and England, whom they regarded as having interests identical. Their reliance on the Friendship of England arose as much in their minds from the idea of the identity of the material interests of the two Countries, as from that of the similarity of the “ Principles” of the two People, nor was it in the power of the “ Court Party,” aided by the whole weight of the Support of Russia, to shake these feelings of mutual Sympathy. Never was an Alliance between two Nations founded on a more solid Basis—that of mutual Interests and Sympathies. As the Ministry to which Lord Palmerston belonged professed an identity of feeling with the National Party of France, the Confidence of the two unsuspecting people in each other knew no bounds.

But I think it will be beneficial to hear M. Thiers himself on the Sentiments his Party entertained of External Policy as connected with England. In the Chamber of Deputies, on 13th January, 1840, during a Debate on the Affairs of the East, M. Thiers spoke as follows :—

“ Upon what is the Active Policy based ? Upon the idea that Russia has Projects of Partition of Turkey, and that it is the interest of France to come to an understanding with her ; but, in my opinion, this Policy is impracticable. The Projects of Russia are not immediate, and there is no coming to an understanding with her,” &c. “ In this state of our Affairs, with whom then was it our duty to have allied our-

* See Speeches of M. Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies.

selves—with whom were we to have an Understanding? WITH ENGLAND AND ONLY WITH ENGLAND. In the still pending Question of Principles in Europe, England is your Mutual Ally. In fact, what Nation is interested in preventing Russia from obtaining Possession of Constantinople? Is it not England? With this Object, therefore, England naturally became, and must remain, our Ally. When France is united with England, we can raise our Joint Standard in every part of the World, having inscribed on it the Motto, ‘ Moderate Liberty and Universal Peace.’ ”

The celebrated speech from which the above are extracts, was delivered while M. Thiers was in Opposition, and in six weeks from that time the overwhelming feeling of the French Nation urged him, into the position of *Secretary for Foreign Affairs* and *President of the Council*—in spite of the powerfully-exerted resistance of an unwilling Court! This is a circumstance pregnant with reflection for every man in England who would wish to understand the relations of his country with France. It must be recollected that on the previous occasion of M. Thiers being in power as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he was indebted to Lord Palmerston for expulsion on the Spanish Intervention Question, and because he thought it his duty to keep faith with England. But now, on the 1st March, 1840, this friend of England is again Ruler of France, with the voice of the French people in his favour—and that, too, with his public declaration of adhesion to England in the question which, more than all other questions put together, affected the interest of England—the preservation of Constantinople from Russia. What better fortune could England desire? What greater misfortune could Russia have to deplore? The curtain is again drawn by the great Necromancer of the age—Lord Palmerston flings down a Treaty for the “ preservation of Peace,” turns in an instant England’s triumph into disaster, Russia’s misfortune into joy and gladness, and shouts “ success!” The enemies of England in France brighten up and echo back the sound, while the partisans of Russia in England clasp his Lordship in

their arms, and exult in his return to a "Conservative Policy!"*

As I have described at the commencement of this work, the bitterest hostility is suddenly aroused in France against England; and M. Thiers and the partisans of the English Alliance are not only overthrown but humiliated, deceived and utterly prostrated by England herself under the charge, and by the sole management of, Lord Palmerston.

It is important for us to understand how this object of the Policy of Russia was effected—and effected, too, so thoroughly, so unexpectedly, at a time when the links between England and France were drawn together more closely than at any period since the Revolution of 1830. But first of all we must take a review, in our minds, of all the preceding career of Lord Palmerston—of the manner in which he has served Russia both by British Arms and British Diplomacy—we must recall all the evidence of his secret concert with the Russian Cabinet.

Why did Lord Palmerston sign the Treaty of the 15th July, and what are the circumstances which attended it and occasioned it?

What pressing and imperious necessity required its signature without notification to France?—what haste required its execution before the ratifications were exchanged, and before the French Government or the British Nation had received a copy of the Treaty?

Did Lord Palmerston know that the sudden signing of a Treaty on which France was in negotiation with the British Court was calculated to drive France into hostility or enmity; and what were the benefits derivable from its execution, to compensate for the hostility of that Nation?

It is the duty of every Englishman to put these questions to himself, and to examine circumstances and events till he is

* Refer to the Speech of the Marquis of Londonderry in Debate in the House of Lords 11th August, 1840, on the Treaty of 15th July, quoted in the Note on Page 17.

able to answer them satisfactorily to his own mind, for it is by the adequacy of the acts of the Minister to the motives assigned and in existence,—of the possible advantages to be acquired, to the obvious and certain disadvantages involved, that we are chiefly to judge as to whether the Treaty of the 15th July be a corroboration of the guilt, or a weakening of the evidence on which as yet should rest the conviction of the guilt, of the British Minister.

In answer to the first question, it has simply to be said that Lord Palmerston signed the Treaty “in the interest of consolidating the Peace of Europe,” and to serve the “interests of Humanity,” by putting a stop to the rule of Mehemet Ali in a certain portion of the Provinces he had been appointed by the Sultan to govern—Syria.* By reference to the text of the Treaty itself—to the speeches of Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons when pressed for his reasons for concluding it—by reference to all the organs of the Press (prior to the speech of M. Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies) under the influence of his Lordship, we find no other reason whatever alleged for signing the Treaty of 15th July, and we are as a matter of necessity to conclude that there *were* no other reasons for that measure. It will be asked how the withdrawal of Syria from the authority of Mehemet Ali could conduce to the “preservation of the Peace of Europe,” and I answer in the meaning attached to it by Lord Palmerston, that the Turkish Empire, being necessary for preserving the Balance of Power, ought to be maintained as an Independent State, and should be kept so strong and powerful in itself as to be capable of resisting attempts which any other Nation might make to take possession of the Sultan’s Dominions—that if the Turkish Empire were to be allowed to lose its strength, its weakness would form a temptation to some European Nation to endeavour to absorb it, and that as such attempt would necessarily call for the resistance of the remaining European Nations, a war would break out—that

* See the Treaty of July, given at length in a Note of Appendix, No. 4, and also Speech of Lord Palmerston 6th August, 1840.

the occupation of Syria by Mehemet Ali, the Vassal of the Sultan, was a temptation to his Highness to throw off his allegiance to his Sovereign, which would occasion such weakness of the Empire as to induce this danger, and, therefore, that the prevention of this double contingency was necessary for "giving additional security to the Peace of Europe."

The circumstances connected with the Question of Mehemet Ali are very briefly told. We have seen that the grand object of Russia is to be possessed of Constantinople and the Ottoman dominions. She had already produced a schism in that Empire by exciting an insurrection in Greece, and severing it from Turkey—she then continued the progress of Turkish prostration by producing a schism in the remaining part of the Sultan's Dominions, and found an easy means in the ambitious and unprincipled Pasha of Egypt, whom she secretly urged to, and supported in, Rebellion, while offering her services to the Sovereign to "protect" him against the Vassal! The sympathy and assistance of Europe were contrived to be obtained for the Rebel, and European Officers disciplined his Army, while European artillery was furnished him in abundance; the troops of the Vassal were soon found to be superior to those of the Sovereign, and, at the instigation of Russian intrigue at the Court of both one and the other, they were urged to the conflict. In every battle the Sultan was defeated, his armies dispirited, and his resources exhausted—in 1833 the victorious Rebel advanced towards Constantinople, and the Sultan called in the assistance of his Ally England, to protect him at once from the assault of his Vassal whom he knew to be supported by Russia, and from the "protection" of the Emperor who was *forcing* his assistance on the Turk! It was at this time that Lord Palmerston was exercising the principle of "Non-intervention" in Holland and Portugal, and *refused* to interfere at the request of the Porte. The triumph of Russia was complete, for the Sultan, abandoned to his "Protector," was constrained to permit the encampment of the Muscovites on the Bosphorus, and to procure their withdrawal by conceding the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which closed the Dardanelles to

all ships of War except Russian, and was universally considered so disastrous to the interests of Europe, that Lord Palmerston himself was compelled to join France in protesting against it—which protest was afterwards rendered virtually nugatory by his Lordship. After this, Lord Palmerston confirmed the Pasha in the possession of the Province he had thus procured the Government of by a successful Rebellion—recognised him as an Independent Power by sending a Consul to reside at his Court, who negotiated *direct* between London and Alexandria,—and the political Party in England represented by his Lordship espoused the cause of Mehemet Ali with enthusiasm, unchecked, and apparently assisted by the might of the British Government. The Diplomatic Agents sent by Lord Palmerston to Egypt and Syria preached up the doctrine of the coming downfall of the Sultan, and the necessity of supporting the power of Mehemet Ali—the influence of the whole weight of Great Britain was exerted in his favour. For some years the Pasha was constantly getting stronger, and the Sultan constantly getting weaker, while a course of “negotiations” was being carried on with Alexandria by Lord Palmerston, of that extraordinary nature which it has been his Lordship’s exclusive merit to introduce into Diplomacy! An analysis of the Papers presented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary respecting Egypt reveals the same peculiarities as those respecting Persia and India which we have already adverted to, viz., an *ostensible* line of opposition to the aggrandisement of the Pasha, with a careful and systematic withholding of authority from the Consul at Alexandria to interpose the desire of England that it should be discontinued! In fact, the instructions sent by Lord Palmerston present a series of Deceptions and of Fraud, and were the means of encouraging the Pasha in his designs on the Rights of the Sultan, under the guise of opposing them. In the mean time, the utmost efforts of the British and Russian Embassies at Constantinople are exerted to urge the Sultan to collect the last army his prostrated Empire can furnish, and under promise of assistance, to march once more to the attack of the superior Army of

Mehemet Ali, commanded by the first General of the East flushed with a life-time of success;—the calculated result is brought to pass; the Army of the Sultan is routed, dispersed, annihilated at Nezib; the Ottoman fleet betrayed into the hands of the Rebels, at the very moment the noble and energetic Mahmoud dies! Thus is the power of the Legitimate Ruler of the Turkish Empire brought into that state which Russia has been working to produce for a Century, viz., utter prostration, yet no assistance is given by the Allies as promised—they write a Collective Note (27th July, 1839) binding the young Sultan not to come to any terms with his Vassal, but to leave the arrangement of the differences *to them*.* This was the grand object aimed at by Russia—only to get England, France, Austria and Russia *to enter on a Treaty with her* for the arrangement of the Affairs of the Sultan! *this* was the triumph she aimed at—now her game was secure.

In the mean time, the victorious Pasha retired triumphant from effecting the overthrow of the power of his Sovereign—no further resistance could be offered by the Head of the Turkish Empire to any aggression which might be committed against him—his Strength had been finally exhausted under the repeated Assaults of England and France in the Affairs of Greece—of Russia everywhere—and of Mehemet Ali in

* *Collective Note from the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia.*

The undersigned have this morning received instructions from their respective Governments, in virtue of which they have the honour to inform the Sublime Porte, that agreement between the Five Powers upon the Eastern Question is insured, and to invite the Porte to suspend any final determination without their concurrence, awaiting the result of the interest which those Powers feel for the Porte.

(Signed)

BARON ROUSSIN.
COUNT DE KÖNIGSMARCK.
BARON DE STURMER.
PONSONBY.
A. BOUTENOFF.

Constantinople, July 27, 1839.

Egypt—the only Strength now remaining to the Ottoman Empire was that which was lodged within the hands of the Pasha—in Egypt and Syria was now concentrated the might of Turkey :—what was *then* the Policy of Russia? is it not too obvious to be repeated? does it require any “enlightenment” to know how the final Prostration of that Empire was to be effected? Was it not *now* the DESTRUCTION OF THE POWER OF MEHEMET ALI? But there were other objects to be gained by her in a Treaty of 15th July besides this, and equally important ones; these lead us to a consideration of the other Questions which I have placed as requiring an explanation.

The Treaty of 15th July was a Measure by which England bound herself to carry into execution this object of Russia, viz., the Prostration of the power of Mehemet Ali, and this object has been gained by her conjointly with that of the disruption of the Anglo-French Alliance. We must examine the Circumstances connected with these two apparently dissimilar Events.

It is to be borne in mind, that it is as much for the political Interests (rightly understood) of France as of England, that Turkey should be strong, or, in the common phraseology of the day, that “the Independence and Integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be preserved,” because the Possession of that Empire by Russia would confer on the Czar a power which would be dangerous—as well to France as to England. It is to be recollected that the relations of France with the Sultans have always been very intimate, and perhaps older than those of any other European Power—that they have subsisted with very slight interruptions up to the last few years. But when Great Britain added India to her Possessions, she became more directly connected than France with the Sultans of Turkey, as also with Persia and Affghanistan, because the acquisition of the same Dominions was aimed at by RUSSIA—a Power whose Geographical position gave her Territorial Advantages in the East, infinitely greater than what were possessed by all the rest of Europe put together, and by this very Circumstance excluded all Danger to Eng-

land, in India, from the Ambition of France. The Maritime power of England being greater than that of France or of Russia, and the designs of France and Russia on India being incompatible with each other, were circumstances which secured the Eastern Empire of England, without requiring almost any other Policy than that of leaving everything alone. Under these circumstances, the only danger to England could arise from Constantinople and the Dardanelles being possessed by Russia, because such an Acquisition would entail the absorption of Turkey by that Power, would exclude the action of Europe on the East, and would place the Tribes and Nations lying between Constantinople and India at the mercy of the Government of Russia. But such a Position attained by Russia would not only destroy the Influence of France in the Levant, but it would be dangerous to her power in the West, for Russia would thus attain the object of her whole Policy, viz., the Commerce and Dominion of the East and West, and become too powerful for the present distribution of the European Kingdoms.

In this manner the destruction of the Eastern Empire of Great Britain would be fatal to the position of France as a leading Power in Europe, and this depends on the exclusion of Russia from Constantinople,—thus the Interests of France and England are the same, and compel them into a resistance to the designs of Russia. With this position of Russia the ideas of Leibnitz and of Napoleon, upon Egypt and India, are Dangers no longer in Existence—are Phantoms which may flit before the brains of Dreamers, and be held out as baits by Russian Deceivers to French Enthusiasts, but are as impracticable as a French Dominion in the Moon. Accordingly the French have long given up any idea of competing with the power of England in the East, and were content to exclude Constantinople from Russia, of which England was considered as the natural and more immediate Guardian, as her position in India brought it home to her very doors. This was the Policy proclaimed by M. Thiers and caught by him from the prevailing tone of the French Mind—these were the considerations which gave rise to it,

although neither M. Thiers or his Partisans were in the habit of detailing them, if indeed they were altogether conscious of the Source whence they sprung. Independently of the political Interests which France had in maintaining the Ottoman Empire as a Power capable of resisting Russia, she had extensive and most important commercial Interests with Turkey. The Commerce between France and the Levant was valuable and increasing—Alexandria and the coast of Syria was the most important part in the East to France—a commercial Interest grew up to her in that part of Turkey greater than remained to her at Constantinople. Then, the patriotic and national portion of Frenchmen saw with Grief and Amazement the Influence of England in the East prostituted, as we have described, to further the Dominion of Russia—they saw blow after blow struck by England against Persia and Turkey in favour of Russia—they saw Russia brought nearer and nearer to Constantinople—they saw the prostration of the power of the Sultans who were placed under the “Protection” of Russia, and all this done by the countenance and even assistance of England. M. Thiers and the French People saw the whole strength of the Ottoman Empire reduced to that which was in the Hands of Mehmet Ali, and saw the Party in England which supported the Government, espouse his Cause systematically against the Sultan,—they saw that the Emissaries sent by that Government into Syria dwelt on nothing but the coming downfall of Constantinople, and on the strength and “civilization” of Mehmet Ali’s Government, which they looked upon as the only salvation of the Turkish Empire*—they even saw semi-official Publications of the British Government state that they “had no hope in the Regeneration or real Improvement of Turkey, and should be glad to see her Territories occupied by any other European Power,”† and they naturally considered Constantinople to be lost or abandoned by England;—

* The chief Mission of Dr. Bowring throughout Europe was to preach this Doctrine, and the Supporters of Lord Palmerston at home echoed their sentiments.

† Macaulph’s Commercial Dictionary, Article on the Turkish Treaty.

was it a wonder that the French patronage of Mehemet Ali became habitual? Was it surprising that France looked on the growing and now grown strength of Egypt and Syria, with a young and vigorous Government, as the only practicable Stay of the Ottoman Power? Are we to blame France for preserving or extending her commercial relations with that Power—then, are we to be indignant that France should keep up a friendly Alliance with Mehemet Ali, when England showed her the example, or rather, should we not be astonished if she were able to avoid it?

This was the state of the relations between France, England, Russia, the Sultan, and Mehemet Ali, when the Note of the 27th of July, 1839, was signed, for adjusting the dispute between the Sovereign and his Vassal, and soon after the negotiations commenced, viz., on the 1st of March, 1840, M. Thiers, the friend of England, came into power in France. Lord Palmerston was perfectly well aware of the sentiments of M. Thiers, and of the feelings of the people of France respecting Egypt and Syria—M. Thiers was, of course, not aware, nor was it likely he could suspect the “liberal” Minister of England, of being in secret concert with Russia for the furtherance of designs against France and against England. What was easier than to disagree with the French Minister on the propositions for settling this dispute? The *object of Russia* was, the DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE, as we have seen, and the Question of the Pasha was *the pretext*. To bring this object about, it was necessary for Lord Palmerston to change entirely his understood Policy and Principles, because *they* were in conformity with those of M. Thiers, and accordingly we find this is done. Lord Palmerston makes propositions to the French Minister which he knows that neither that Minister’s already decidedly expressed opinions, his principles, nor the feelings of the people of France could by any possibility permit him to adopt. The Proposals and Counter-Proposals between the British and French Ministers are perfectly immaterial to be discussed—it would be idle to waste time upon them. As might be expected from the whole previous career of Lord Palmerston, and the

object desired by Russia, each proposal of M. Thiers is objected to by his Lordship; and during the (feigned) Negotiation, no means are left untried to insult and alienate France. Reasons, the most frivolous and false are given for rejecting the proposals of France; and the honour and dignity of that Country receive a deep and gratuitous insult in the person of its Ambassador.* A Pretext was wanting to enter upon a measure to which the French could not be a party, and thus to alienate France from England—what did Lord Palmerston do? how did he find the Pretext? He brought a story from Constantinople to the effect that France was endeavouring to bring about a reconciliation between the Sultan and his Vassal; he accused France of the heinous *crime* of wishing to let a Nation settle its own internal Disputes without that “Intervention” of other States which was contrary to his own professed Policy as to the constitutional practice of Great Britain! He represented this to be a breach of faith on the part of France—as being contrary to the Note of the 27th of July, 1839, which bound her in common with England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, to take the Settlement of the Dispute *out of the hands* of the only party who was interested in the affair—the Sultan; and this offence (!) of France was urged as a chief motive for excluding her from the Treaty of July 15th. But the accusation

* “At the latter end of June the State of Affairs stood thus:—Every attempt at arrangement proposed by France or England had failed. News arrived of an attempt at direct arrangement between Alexandria and Constantinople. No one can deny but this was in formal contradiction to the Note of the 27th of July, which said to the Porte, ‘Do not arrange directly with the Pasha, we take upon ourselves the Settlement of the Affair.’ This was known in London in the month of June. It was believed, but without good grounds, and in spite of my most formal and persevering protestations, that this attempt was brought about by France; it was believed that France, abandoning the Policy of the 27th of July, had endeavoured to create for herself in the East an isolated Policy, an isolated Success. I said, *I repeated Officially and Privately, that this idea was False, but I was NOT BELIEVED—* (sensation). From this arose an obstinate error, which has exercised a great influence on events.”—*Speech of M. Guizot in the Chamber of Peers, 18th of November, 1840.*

against France (accusation?) was a direct and gratuitous falsehood. M. Guizot, the Ambassador of France—the Depositary of the power of that Nation at the Court of London, “repeated, officially and privately, that it was false, and he was NOT BELIEVED!” That is to say, the King, Court, and People of France were given the lie direct by the British Minister, who *acted* on the assumption of the falseness of France! This alone was an act of hostility committed by the Minister of England against France.

It is quite unnecessary to enter into detail on the particulars of that series of fraud by which Lord Palmerston succeeded in coming to a disagreement with France, and in accumulating proofs of his own *good management* and the *bad faith* of France! It is sufficient to say, that in accordance with the systematically laid plan of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, Lord Palmerston *finished* by coming to a decision, with Russia, for the regulation of the internal condition of Turkey, incompatible with the acceptance of France—in defiance of her representations, and that, too, by an *acceptance of the proposals of the RUSSIAN MINISTER!* The Treaty of 15th July was signed without the knowledge of France—was signed in opposition to the known wishes and expressed opinion of the Minister of France, and as France was a party to that Convention for the settlement of the Affairs of the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, on which the Powers “*were agreed,*” the act was necessarily one of hostility to France. The course of the negotiations shews M. Thiers to have acted with the sincerest desire of conciliating the friendship of England—they shew him to have made great sacrifices, and disposed to make yet greater sacrifices of his own opinions to the views propounded by Lord Palmerston, who was at last obliged to come abruptly to a conclusion,* for fear of the failure of his object (a rupture with France), when M. Thiers was naturally and justly expecting a fresh proposal. But the Treaty, thus abruptly concluded without the knowledge of France,

* See the declaration of M. Guizot in his Speech the Chamber of Deputies.

was also carried into execution with a degree of abruptness and of secrecy unheard of in the annals of international Relations. The circumstances connected with this part of the measure are most important, and deserving of peculiar consideration in the examination of the position of the British Minister. The Treaty of 15th July was signed, and the circumstance made known through the casual medium of a Newspaper. The moment it was known, its intended effect in producing the rupture of the Anglo-French Alliance was developed in a manner too decided to be mistaken—there was seen a sudden reversal of the whole external Policy of England, and an overthrow of the wishes of nine-tenths of the People of the two Nations ;—the Representatives of the People naturally desired to understand the cause whence this extraordinary change sprung, that they might judge of its propriety or necessity, and they were informed by Lord Palmerston that they could not be made acquainted with a thing which had no existence*—that a Treaty certainly was signed, but that as it was not valid until the ratifications were exchanged, they could not be made acquainted with its contents. Such an answer would lead any one to suppose that the measure in contemplation was not one which was requisite to be carried out with any degree of haste—especially as Parliament was informed, at the same time, that as soon as the Convention was signed, there would be no objection to lay it upon the table. The feeling exhibited by that part of the House of Commons which formed the party to which the Ministers belonged was intense against any measure which should alienate France from the Alliance of England, and it was evident that had any measure of such a nature been known to Parliament, its over-

* “Gentlemen opposite are, of course, aware that a Treaty is not in force until the ratifications are exchanged.”—*Extract from a Speech of Lord Palmerston in House of Commons, 19th April, 1839.*

But when Russia's indispensable object of the destruction of the Turkish Empire was likely to be arrested by the intervention of a British Parliament, Lord Palmerston not only finds that a Treaty may “be in force,” but actually puts it half in execution before the “ratifications are exchanged !”

throw, with that of the Minister proposing it, would have been certain—how did Lord Palmerston carry his plans of hostility to France into execution? Of course, he found the means of baffling the Parliament and the Nation in this as in all other previous instances. While he concealed from Parliament the nature of his Acts, *on the plea that they were non-existent until the exchange of ratifications*, and misrepresented their tendency by assurances that they were contrary to the designs of Russia, and would not be objected to by France;* he had actually provided by a secret Protocol in the Convention, that it was to be carried into execution *without the formality of waiting* for the exchange of ratifications, and had, even previously to that, taken measures for carrying it into effect *by force!* Thus, without the knowledge of England, without the knowledge of France, (and in opposition to his own colleagues,) did Lord Palmerston engage the British Forces in a war on the Coast of Syria for the purpose of settling, by violence, an internal dispute in the Ottoman Empire—that act exciting the alarm of Europe by the arming of a million of men in France to resist it. It will be thought some very urgent circumstances, or the apprehension of some instant danger greater than that of the hostility of France, must have given rise to this breathless haste?—Nothing of the kind. There are no circumstances either mentioned or implied which require any haste, even supposing the measures in themselves to be necessary—which they are not. The reason assigned in the secret Protocol for executing the Treaty before it was ratified is a deliberate insult to any man possessed of the slenderest particle of common sense; it is as follows:—

“The said Plenipotentiaries being profoundly penetrated with the Conviction, that looking at the actual State of Things in Syria (a ‘State of Things’ which had existed for about eight years) the Interests of Humanity (!) and the grave considerations of European Policy (!) which constitute the

* See Speech of Lord Palmerston in House of Commons, 6th August, 1840.

object of the common solicitude of the Powers signing the said Convention of this day, *imperiously require the prevention as much as possible of any delay* in the accomplishment of the *Pacification* which the said transaction is destined to attain, &c., agree that the preliminary Measures mentioned in Article II. of the said Convention shall be put in execution at once, and without waiting for the exchange of Ratifications”!

What, then, are the “actual State of Things in Syria” and the “Interests of Humanity,” which require the arming of Europe to be *settled* in the instantaneous manner laid down in the Russian Treaty? Simply, that *Mehemet Ali governed Syria*, as he had been appointed by the Sultan to do, and as he had been assisted by Lord Palmerston during many years to do—such Government of Mehemet being considered by half the People in England, and more than half the People in France, as superior to any which Syria had experienced for ages; that the levying of Troops by the conscription in Syria was considered by the exterminators of the Poles and the Circassians, as calling for suppression (in the “Interests of Humanity”) even at the price of a Convulsion in Europe! After Eight Years of patronage, Russia and Lord Palmerston agree upon driving Mehemet Ali out of Syria by force, and call upon M. Thiers to accede to their views. M. Thiers replies, that probably Mehemet Ali will not accede to the Proposals of the Allies, and if not, that *he* cannot agree to any Treaty for coercing him, because he considers that Coercion would be more likely to disturb than to preserve the Peace of Europe, besides being destructive of the interests of the Ottoman Empire by the overthrow of its only remaining Strength. In this view the Court of Vienna coincides, and was, indeed, the first to proclaim the danger of coercion,* but the threat of a Revolutionary Movement in its Italian Provinces by Lord Palmerston,† was found sufficient for terrifying Prince Metternich out of adherence

* See Reply of M. Thiers to Lord Palmerston.

† Refer to the Pamphlet just published in London on the Sulphur Monopoly, by which it appears Lord Palmerston conjured the Demon of Revolution in Sicily, and brought a French Fleet to Naples.

to France, and compelling him to join the Quadruple Alliance. M. Thiers, however, in his extreme desire to do what he thinks will be agreeable to England, uses all his influence at Alexandria to induce Mehemet Ali to consent to the mode of settlement proposed by Lord Palmerston, which was the result of his loyal and sincere feeling of Friendship towards his British Ally, for, being entirely without suspicion of the secret Concert between Lord Palmerston and Russia, M. Thiers naturally conceived that the object of the British Minister's solicitude about Syria was—the attainment of that which he professed to desire, instead of being, as it in reality was, a pretext for quarrelling with him, and effecting a Rupture with France! But Lord Palmerston (Russia) was not to be foiled by M. Thiers' extra good intentions towards England, and so he founded on this very act of good Faith, the accusation against M. Thiers of trying to negotiate with the Pasha separately from the other Powers, and, to prevent the attempts of the unfortunate French Minister from succeeding in rendering a pretext for a Rupture on this question impossible, Lord Palmerston (Russia) thought it best to conclude a Treaty at once, without giving Notice to France—indeed, the first Notice the French Cabinet received of the Treaty was, *the orders to the British Fleet to carry it into execution by force!* The outrageousness of the deception practised on France was an unequivocal act of Hostility which could not be submitted to without her degradation in the eyes of the World; accordingly, the cry of indignation was echoed from one end of the country to the other, and M. Thiers was compelled to separate from the rest of Europe. This forced hostility of France placed her in the unnatural position of the Ally of the Pasha of Egypt against Europe, and the expectation to the Pasha, consequent on the position of France, induced a Resistance by him to the coercion of the Allies which never would have been thought of except for such reliance.* The

* It is perfectly obvious from the Treaty that the support of France to the Pasha (or the idea of it in his mind) was a Measure prepared and calculated on by Russia in framing it, for *she* knew perfectly well the futility of supposing that he would resist singlehanded the whole of Europe to drive him out of Syria. Russia knew the East, and knew

hostility of France, the attempts of M. Thiers to prevent a final Rupture with England, and the foolish course pursued by that Minister, must all have been foreseen and calculated on by the Authors of the Treaty, for they were all equally necessary for its successful execution. What are the Benefits to be derived from its execution? Is the Ottoman Empire strengthened? Are the "Interests of Humanity" served? Are there any "additional Guarantees of the Peace of Europe"? The reverse of all these is the object gained by the Treaty. The Ottoman Empire has been convulsed and disorganised—Insurrection and Anarchy fomented—external and internal Warfare brought to desolate the Home of the Peaceful, and blast the Strength, and the Spirit of the only part of that Empire in which strength and spirit were preserved. Are these the Elements of *strength* to an Empire? Is this the method of serving the *Interests of Humanity*? Are the Excitement, the Confusion, the Terror, and the ARMING of all Europe, the "*additional Guarantee of the Peace of Europe*" which Lord Palmerston was in such breathless haste to bring about? Yes: all these Effects will be received, and exulted in by that Faction (which has disgraced itself for ten years by a virulent abuse of Lord Palmerston for the *wrong reasons*) which fancies it sees in something it calls "Conservative Principles" the material Interests of its Country, because it will consider that Lord Palmerston has allied England with "despotic" Governments, and insulted a "constitutional" Government. This mass of Mischief and of Crime will be defended by another Faction because Lord Palmerston *professes* "liberal Principles," and came into power with "NON-INTERVENTION" written on his Escutcheon!

the Pasha too well to suppose he would be guilty of any such madness; but yet the chief part of the Treaty consists of warlike provisions for meeting Resistance in all its possible forms; England and Austria were to send a Fleet to coerce him on the coast, and Constantinople is to be occupied by Russian Troops in case he marched against the Sultan! The defenders of Lord Palmerston ridicule the idea of the danger of Mehemet marching on Constantinople. Why was it anticipated and provided against in the Treaty? M. Thiers stopped him from doing it.

It will be feebly opposed by a small Section of a third Faction, for Reasons which will be unintelligible to themselves or to any one else—and to ENGLAND will result the most fearful consequences which she has experienced since she was a Nation.

Before closing this chapter, it is important to draw attention to the means by which Russia has already realised, by the Treaty of the 15th July, a measure of success more triumphant than what her most sanguine expectations perhaps held out to her.

The end desired by Russia was to be attained by more roads than one, in the negotiations about Syria. The prostration of Turkey, and the closing of the Dardanelles, are events which may be accomplished either by the sudden outbreak of an European and Eastern War; or by the disposal of gradual disorganizing influences, and the arrangement of Alliances so as to bring them about in a manner too gradual to be perceived, and too effectual to be resisted. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg occupies its whole attention in preparing Events calculated for attaining a desired object, but as it cannot foresee or direct with certainty the precise winding and turning of every detail, in a fixed order, it anticipates and prepares the modes of action to be adopted for each of the probable or possible variations in the march of events, so as to bring them to bear, by what channel soever, on the object in view.

The process of gradual disorganization is the Policy employed by Russia, and not departed from except in very urgent circumstances, and only on very sure grounds. The declaration of War against Turkey, in 1828, was a great risk to run, and would have been done several years before* could she have seen her way clearly in preventing the *Veto* of England,

* The pressing necessity for this War to Russia was, her alarm at the reforms of the Sultan Mahmoud, whom she watched with agony in his course. The Despatches from St. Petersburg at this period reveal the perfect appreciation by Russia of the rapid progress of the regeneration of the Turkish Empire, while she was convincing Europe of its rapid decay—a sort of decay which she *found it necessary to put a stop to*, if Turkey were to be prevented from arriving at a pitch of power which, alone, would have overmatched her!

but the skilful combination of Events, prepared previously, brought her a perfect success in paralysing the resistance of Europe, or rather in securing the co-operation of Europe, in her objects. By the Treaty of the 15th July, 1840, I conceive Russia scarcely hoped to be able, as she has done, to realise her object without an immediate convulsion, but also that she saw her way to success even by a War in Europe,—accordingly we find Russia the only Power prepared for War at the moment of the signing of the Treaty. But, at the same time, I conceive that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg calculated on the possibility of making the immense stride which she has done by the Treaty of July, without an *immediate* struggle between England and France, although the immediate objects she found necessary to be carried out, rendered a resort to that Treaty indispensable, even at the imminent risk of the lesser measure of success of the two, viz., a General War in Europe. The objects of Russia being the “protectorate” of Constantinople, the convulsion and destruction of the power of resistance of the Turkish Empire, and the neutralization of the power of resistance of France and England (and, of course, through them, of the rest of Europe), she calculated the means at her disposal for realising them, and made preparations accordingly. She had already, as we have seen, succeeded in annihilating the power, or turning into subservient instruments, all those portions of the Ottoman Empire reaching from the northern frontier to the Taurus, including Greece, Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, the whole *coasts* of the Black Sea, Constantinople* and Asiatic Turkey, as far as Syria; but as a great portion of this had been accomplished by means of Mehemet Ali in Egypt and Syria, a powerful means of resistance which was *Turkish*, still remained in this Region, to be displayed when necessary,

* Although the Capital was brought completely under the influence of Russia by Diplomatic means, yet any attempt of Russia to make a formal occupation of it, and to close the Dardanelles, would have been an impossibility, and but a frustration of her designs as long as a National spirit and power of resistance remained in *any* portion of the Ottoman Dominions.

against Russian designs, and it was impossible that Russia could effect the destruction of this power (even had she the physical means and a pretext) without arousing the resistance of France, and perhaps *even of England*, notwithstanding her incapacity to comprehend anything, and the devotion of her policy to Russia by collusion with her Foreign Minister. But it was an *indispensable* necessity to Russia to effect this destruction of Power in Egypt and Syria, and to bring about the neutralization of the resistance of England and France—both the one and the other could be done only by means of the co-operation of England, and it was requisite that the co-operation should be secret! A difficulty which, under any other circumstances, would have been insurmountable, because a measure of the most perfect facility where Russia had the disguised support of England against herself and against France. If England were to take upon herself the gratuitous task of destroying the Turkish Power in Egypt and Syria, she would fulfil both intentions of Russia at once, for, by the act, she not only would be placing herself in a position of hostility to France, but would also effect the destruction of the Turkish strength for the Emperor,—the hostility of France furnishing the pretext for effectually realising that destruction, by the inducement it would hold out for the Pasha to resist.

The putting forward of *England* to execute this extraordinary service tended also to the effect of turning away suspicion from *Russia*, while it produced the withering idea in Turkey that England was united with the mortal Foe of the Mussulmans for its destruction. The Union of the Sultan with Russia made him hateful in the eyes of the Ottoman population, and the fact of his having placed his Empire under the orders of Foreign Powers, made him the Violator of his Religious Faith, which tended to make the Turks look on Mehemet Ali as the only support of their Country and their Religion. The resistance of France to the designs of Russia and England, and her consequent union with Mehemet Ali tended to drive the Vassal on Constantinople for the defence of the Turkish Empire,—which was the pretext

provided by Russia in the Treaty, for protecting both it and the Dardanelles *by occupation*. The resistance of France to the destruction of the Turkish Power also involved a collision with England, for it was hardly to be hoped by Russia that her object could be gained without a War. But M. Thiers most agreeably disappointed the Russian Cabinet in this, for, in his sincere desire to keep Peace with England, and in his unsuspecting reliance on the good faith of the British People, he refrained from protesting in the name of Law, Honor, and Justice, against the monstrous crime of the British Minister, and contented himself with *arming France* against what he called any “eventualities,”—the fact is, that M. Thiers was continually expecting that the act of Lord Palmerston would be repudiated, and he himself overthrown by the indignant voice of the British People, and thus, that neither the destruction of the Turkish Empire nor the rupture of the Anglo-French Alliance would take place; he was, therefore, unwilling to make a firm and resolute Protest against the Treaty, lest he should be doing away with the chance of Peace with England!

At length, on the 15th of September, viz., two months after the signature of the Treaty of July, and after acts had taken place in execution of it, Lord Palmerston condescends to communicate it to the French Court. This is soon followed by the intelligence of the bombardment of Beyrout, which increases the bewilderment of M. Thiers so much that he resolves on *increasing the French Army to 900,000 Men*; while he writes a Note to Lord Palmerston (as we have seen in the first chapter) of the 8th October, in which he *accepts the Treaty and ratifies the Act!* The situation of M. Thiers is now most deplorable, for he has lost the opportunity and with it the right of protesting against the Treaty, and he can only, after this, resist any Act in execution of it, by going to War with all Europe, which is irrevocably committed to it; but on calculating the chances of France in a War, he finds Russia with an Army of 200,000 Men ready to pour into Asia Minor, and a Fleet in the Baltic alone equal to the disposable Fleet of France, which Lord Palmerston announces the departure of for the Mediterranean. Another disastrous

result of his conduct now developes itself; the irresolution which he has displayed, and the outrages and insults of England which he has failed to avert, arouses the Spirit of the French People almost to madness, and they demand immediate War. They can see no success but in a War of "Principles," or Propagandism as they call it, and threaten to march to the Rhine and excite the Revolutionary passions of "Young Germany"—which fills the German Courts with alarm, and rivets them to the Alliance of Russia and England against France. The States of the German Confederation quietly fill up the skeleton of that immense Military Organization which was cut out by Russia during the Negotiations about the *Prussian Commercial League*, and M. Thiers finds the heart of Europe bristling with bayonets, in support of England and Russia against the power of France !

The maritime Force of the Allies on the coast of Syria being greater than France can as yet send against them, M. Thiers finds himself utterly helpless ; he cannot now send a force to defend Mehemet Ali in Syria, and Mehemet Ali cannot leave himself unprotected in Syria and Egypt to march on Constantinople for want of the assistance of France, so M. Thiers takes refuge in the *hope* that negotiations may last out till the Spring, and he prevents the Pasha from crossing the Taurus on the plea that France will be in a position to negotiate for him at that time. But Russia (Lord Palmerston) knows her work too well to postpone the destruction of the Turkish Power till France is ready (and *perhaps* England by the fall of Lord Palmerston) to prevent it—so the Army of Ibrahim is attacked—St. Jean d'Acre destroyed—and the progress of Insurrection matured.

The situation of M. Thiers at home becomes as grave as that of France from without, for by this time his conduct has brought his country to the verge of a popular outbreak, and the King, seeing in any War which might be at present undertaken, only a War of a description which would involve the destruction of his Throne, intrigues against his Minister on the plea of maintaining Peace, and the darkest accusations are spread abroad by the Court Press against the devoted M. Thiers ! Thus is the

overthrow for the second time, brought about, of the Friend of England in France—that overthrow being effected by the cruellest perfidy perhaps recorded in the annals of History, of a British Minister committed against him.

But the fall of M. Thiers this time has been attended with consequences which will be felt in all their importance as the progress of future events shall make themselves known to us. It has been brought about by taking advantage of his confidence in, and friendship towards England, by treachery of the deepest dye, combined with the profoundest skill on the part of an Ally unsuspected by him, in collusion with a hostile Cabinet, and by the assistance of his own Sovereign. The sentiments of the British People have, by this agency, been rallied against him—the French National Party, which he represented, been infuriated against him—the French Republican Party united with the Royalist Party in opposition to him—the French Court, furnished with the means of rejecting him, (after taking advantage of his errors,) for purposes hostile to the Interests and Liberties of France. Thus M. Thiers finds himself deceived, betrayed, humiliated, trampled upon by that people for whom he had sacrificed so much—ridiculed, insulted and calumniated by a Nation which it was his pride to be allied with, and he is expelled from power with the feelings of irritation and vengeance against his deceivers, which is naturally consequent on the treachery and ingratitude of a friend in whom one has confided. The universal feeling of France is exasperated against England, and the enthusiasm of 1830 is reversed. The ancient hatred of England springs to life in the French National Party, and, with it are revived, the projects of ambition hostile to British interests, which had been absorbed by the Alliance of “Principles.” The Chambers meet, but a Russo-Court Ministry is in Power, and M. Thiers has to stand on his defence before France, England and Europe. What can a man say who has been deceived, betrayed and made the victim of his own errors? Are we to expect that he will confess his faults and say that he has been made a fool of?

The man capable of doing this would not have been so served. We find, therefore, that the defence made by M. Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies is the most lamentable exhibition in his very lamentable career—he cannot appeal to his predilections for England as the cause of his successful betrayal, for the Anglo-feeling of France has been turned into hatred—he throws himself on the new modification of ideas of his party; talks of French “instincts” in regard to Egypt, and similar unintelligible absurdity which he never thought of before. His partisans avow the intention of taking temporary possession of the Balearic Islands, if constrained to do so in self-defence against the hostility of the Four Powers in their continuance of the acts of Piracy which they were pursuing on the Coast of Syria.—And this furnishes to the partisans of Russia and Lord Palmerston in England as through Europe, a theme for declaiming on the dishonesty of the Thiers Ministry—a handle for decrying the unprincipled and dangerous nature of her Government—a reason for lauding the policy of Lord Palmerston as having seen through and frustrated the designs of France.*

* It is not my intention to follow the course of events further than the fall of M. Thiers, for it is superfluous—the work of Russia is already finished so perfectly by the accession of M. Guizot, that another phase of her policy has now to be traced; but, to show the determination of still further exasperating the French mind against England, and of keeping in the ground the seeds of future complications, I refer the reader to the Note of M. Thiers of 8th October, in which he accedes to the terms which Lord Palmerston gave to understand were to be guaranteed to the Pasha in case of submission; and to the reply of Lord Palmerston of the 2d November. In this reply Lord Palmerston says, in reference to the limits within which it may be necessary to confine the delegated authority of Mehemet Ali, “Her Majesty’s Government conceives that, whatever may be the opinions entertained on this point by *Foreign Powers*, such opinions can only serve to regulate the advice which those Powers may tender to the Sultan, or to determine the extent of the *assistance* which they may be disposed to afford him; but that it *rests with the Sultan*, as Sovereign of the Turkish Empire, to decide which of his subjects shall be appointed by him to govern particular portions of his own Dominions, and that no Foreign Power has a right to control the Sultan in the discretionary exercise of one

In this melancholy sketch we see that Lord Palmerston has carried out the objects of Russia *so far*, without a general War, for which at the same time preparations have been made, and the pretexts accumulated in a manner that leaves that Power nothing to desire. It will be evident, however, that had France resisted the acts of Piracy committed by England in Syria, as might have been expected, and a War ensued between them, the game of Russia would have been assured more speedily, though at greater risk of failure than it has been; for, the assistance of France would have left Mehemet Ali at liberty to march on the Capital, which in such case would have been occupied by Russia and the Dardanelles closed, in accordance of the Treaty of July, at the same time that the struggle would have crippled, if not mutually destroyed, the British and French Fleets; and the passage of a Russian Fleet from the Baltic and the Black Seas would have suddenly constituted the Czar of Muscovy the preponderating, or indeed *the sole maritime Power in the Mediter-*

of the inherent and essential attributes of independent Sovereignty!" Then why did "Foreign Powers" take this "inherent and essential attribute of Independent Sovereignty" out of the hands of the Sultan by the Note of the 27th July? Why did Lord Palmerston find fault with M. Thiers for trying to advise this "independent Sovereign" in his dispute with his Vassal? How came Lord Palmerston, who was only an "Auxiliary" of the Sultan, to send a British fleet to blockade Alexandria? When questioned as to why he had not taken similar proceedings in Spain, what reply did he give? I will quote it.

"I have not to tell hon. and learned Gentlemen that the right of blockade is altogether a *belligerent right*—a right which can only be exercised by *principals* in a war, and not by those who act merely as *assistants*: and I have already stated over and over again, until I thought I had fairly tired the House by repeating it, that in this war we are *auxiliaries*, and not *principals*. Under such circumstances, the law of nations prevents us from instituting a blockade; and the law of England forbids it. Were we to stop a neutral vessel, we should have to answer for it to the Country to which the vessel belonged. Were we to seize a British merchant vessel, its owner would have a clear ground of action at law against the Captain of the seizing vessel."—*Speech of Lord Palmerston, House of Commons, April 19, 1837.*

By the doctrine of Lord Palmerston, therefore, explicitly laid down, the French had a right to treat the Blockade as non-existent, and if the

anean ! While England and France should be exhausting themselves in a prolonged struggle in Europe, what would Russia say to a British Minister who should request her to evacuate Constantinople, and renounce her long-cherished designs on Turkey ? The veil would then be rent, and no more *smooth phrases* or *protestations of Friendship* would henceforward come from St. Petersburg. The Eagle's wings would gradually be seen to expand, and we should begin to understand the Title of CZAR !

Before proceeding to consider the prospective results which may be expected from the events we have been detailing, it is appropriate here to call to mind the strangeness of Lord Palmerston breaking with France and allying himself with Russia in this question of Turkey. If he be not in secret concert with Russia, how are we to understand this act ? Lord Palmerston was perfectly well aware, has always admitted, and still admits the designs of Russia on Turkey, and that such designs are dangerous to England's power in the East ; he has detected Russian Agents travelling through Central Asia and India, urging the Tribes and People bordering on British Possessions to rise against England, and even to open a road for Russian troops to India ; he has detected, or rather the Envoys to Persia have forced on his attention so strongly as to render it impossible to be concealed from the Public, the circumstance of Russia pursuing joint schemes with Persia of hostility to England ; he has even been driven—that is to say, he *alleges* that he has been driven, by the too clearly hostile intentions of Russia, to send expensive and dangerous warlike expeditions into Asia, and yet it is with *France* that he disagrees, and with *Russia* that he fraternises for the strengthening of Turkey, in a Treaty which stipulates for the occupation of the Dardanelles by Russian Troops in

British fleet (not the Turkish) had captured a French vessel, the Admiral would have violated the Law of Nations and the Law of England—would have been guilty of an act of *Piracy*. It was in speaking of this note that the *Morning Post* remarked, “ We confess that we read the note of 2d Nov. with the exultation natural to somewhat earnest Conservatives, in beholding the triumph of their Principles ! ” Thinking People !

a certain case which measures are also taking to bring about ! And this, too, on the heels of a declaration by the Prime Minister of France that he considers the mainstay of French Policy to be a Union with England for preserving the strength of the Ottoman Empire, and protecting Constantinople from Russia !

Will it be said that Lord Palmerston is satisfied with the *good faith* of Russia ?

Has not Lord Palmerston *admitted* that Russia showed *bad* faith in Poland, Cracow, Greece, Spain, Persia, Cabul, and endless places besides ? And yet he never came to a Rupture with Russia, but now he gives her in charge the Key of the British Power in the East ! Will Lord Palmerston be justified for coming to the Rupture with France on the plea that M. Thiers had designs hostile to England ?—but then all the acts of hostility committed by France against England (and they are many) have been not only submitted to by Lord Palmerston, but they have been furthered, assisted, justified, when not actually originated by him ; witness the Blockades of Mexico and Buenos Ayres—the Tariff of 1835, shutting out the Commerce of England from several hundred miles of valuable African Coast in the Mediterranean—the aggressions and destruction of British Commerce in Senegal. Was this the way to secure the respect of France to British Rights and Interests ? What, then, is the plea which Lord Palmerston has to adduce for coming to a Rupture with France ? It is not that France has injured or shewn a desire to injure England—not that France has officiously intermeddled in the affairs of any other Country, but because France will not enter on a measure for destroying the only remaining strength in Turkey, and convulsing the Turkish Empire ! It is because France will not “interfere in the internal concerns of a Foreign State,” nor consent to assist in “controlling, by force, another People in the choice of its Ruler or Government.” It is because France will not consent to assist Lord Palmerston in committing that which is a violation of the Law of Nations, and of the constitutional Law of England as laid down by himself for his rule of conduct ! It is because France will not willingly consent to the com-

mission, by Lord Palmerston, of an Act of Piracy on an unoffending People. It is, in short, because France will not assist Lord Palmerston to turn over Turkey, bound hand and foot, into the arms of the Northern Autocrat, as he did Poland, and stipulate for the completion of the Act by the public Law of Europe !

Perhaps the admirers of a "liberal" and "pacific" Government may find out that Lord Palmerston knew he was bringing on War, and that his Lordship considered it politic to exhibit to Europe the brilliant "successes" which England was capable of achieving, and thus extend her Influence in all the Regions of the World ? But when the material interests, and the National Honour of England are uprooted and trampled down in all the Regions of the World—in Poland, Cracow, Greece, South America, Africa, Circassia, Turkey, Persia, Cabul, North America,—her incomparable Minister accepts and seals the Infamy on the plea that England is not strong enough to go to War, and his partisans applaud his "Prudence" in not risking it for the mere protection of British Property, Rights, and Character ! Those who believed in the truth of Lord Palmerston's former scruples about War, whether they accounted for them on the plea of his ignorance of British power, or his cowardice or his incapacity, are now surely furnished with a sufficient proof of his *Knowledge* of British Strength—of his *Courage* in invoking and braving Danger—of his *Skill* in wielding the resources of his country to combat and overwhelm it ?

CHAPTER XI.

PRESENT RESULTS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE
TREATY OF 15th JULY—RUSSO-FRENCH ALLIANCE.

“SIRE, France must ascend as soon as possible to the rank from which the Treaties of Vienna have pulled her down, and when she has re-assumed her dignity, she will become an Ally more useful and more honorable to your Majesty.”—*French Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Emperor.*

“France and Russia being agreed, and understanding each other at every point, will always secure the tranquillity of Europe, and will compel the Powers of the Continent to do that which they shall desire,” (*“et forceront les autres Puissances du Continent à vouloir ce qu’elles voudront.”*)—*Reply of the Emperor of Russia to the Minister of France.*

IN our examination of the question of the secret concert between Lord Palmerston and the Russo-Greek Cabinet, we have proceeded through many a shifting scene until we have reached to the execution of the Treaty of the 15th of July. We have taken a view of the circumstances which have attended, and the motives which have been assigned for entering on that Treaty—what do we find to be the results? So far as events have yet carried us, we find there has resulted,—the convulsion and destruction of the power of Turkey—the violation by a British Minister of Faith, Law, Honour, and consequent degradation of England—the neutralization of the power of Austria, and her subserviency to Russia—the humiliation of the friends of England in France—rupture of the Anglo-French Alliance,—and peaceful Europe turned into a camp—the Protectorate of Constantinople by Russia and closing of the Dardanelles to England stipulated by the public Law of Europe. We find too, that these results have been brought about by the positive and active doings of Lord Palmerston, on the plea that he was counteracting the projects of Russia, and carrying out the true objects meant but not rightly understood, by France.* After such a triumph

* See Lord Palmerston’s Speech in House of Commons, 6th of August, 1831, and his Note of 31st of August, to M. Thiers.

as this to the Policy of Russia, that Power has nothing farther to fear. Russia is now tranquil on two accounts—She is Mistress of Turkey; and is assured that there is no fear of the awakening of England, for she judges, and judges rightly, that if England cannot be awakened to consciousness of that which passes before the eyes of her People by events so plain and so striking as those we have been rehearsing, she will *never* be roused by Danger however near, or be able to comprehend transactions however simple. But Russia has obtained a position in advance even of these—*she has become Mistress of France!*

Is it to be conceived, by any man who has read the History of Muscovy and of Russia, that that Power will fail in taking advantage of the Passions, the Errors and the Ignorance of France, in the same degree as she has taken advantage of those of England and every Nation on the Continent? The man who entertains this opinion must first have ascertained the fact that at the moment when Russia found the steadily-pursued objects of four Centuries within her reach and assured, she had suddenly formed the determination to—renounce them!

One of the phases (perhaps the most important phase) of the prospective operation of the Treaty of July, is to be looked for in the change of relations which it has produced between England and France. An appreciation of the probable Tendency and of the Dangers to be guarded against from the future Policy of France, requires a consideration of the Nature of the Relationship between England and France.

When we turn our thoughts backward to a period very little longer than the lifetime of a man, we find France engaged in an inveterate struggle against what she called British aggrandisement. We find France urging upon the Courts of Europe the danger to be apprehended from the increasing power of Great Britain, and even compiling Maps to exhibit the frightful Effects of British *rapacity!* And Britain has realised (as far as extension of Empire goes) every prediction of the Statesmen of France; she has not only realised these predictions, but—more important still—the

progress of her aggrandisement has been almost invariably at the expense of France. Every step by which England has risen to Greatness has been resisted by France, whose efforts have been, in every instance, unavailing. The brightest Jewel in the British Crown—INDIA, of which the possession has, from the remotest ages, made Empires great in their turn, has been wrested from France, and the French occupants expelled by British power. England became Sovereign of India because, adopting the intentions and succeeding to the ideas of France, she was capable of driving her away from the Territory of the Mogul. In the West Indies the struggle between England and France was more deadly, and ended with still more striking disasters to the French Name. In North America, the British struggle with France ended by the expulsion of that haughty Power from the American Hemisphere, and the inheritance of Canada to her Conqueror. Was it not with France that England had to contend in that struggle which ended in the loss of the Colonies now the United States? Does not England now retain Possessions almost within sight of the shores of each Country, in which the English Language is scarcely yet introduced? Did not England drive the French out of Spain, and establish her own Influence there as a counterpoise to that of France? But where is the spot in the wide World on which England has not been the Antagonist of France, and where France has not been obliged to retire before her Prowess or her superior Influence?

At the Peace of 1815, after every object of the Policy of France had been frustrated by means of England, and England alone, the successors of Louis XIV. and of Napoleon found the French Empire and its dependencies to occupy a Surface of 183,000 square Miles, with a Population of 32,000,000; while England possessed a Surface of 4,470,000 square Miles, with a Population of 142,000,000! Is any man to suppose that these things do not rankle in the minds of Frenchmen? Will any man acquainted with the French mind, and who has mixed in French Society, say that he has not witnessed their habitual effects? In France, the spirit of

Nationality is a chord which is easily struck, and the melancholy confusion of thought about "Principles," and the mental anarchy which is co-existent with it, renders it a task of very easy accomplishment to make it flow in a direction which may not be in accordance either with the dictates of Justice, or with the true interests of her People. There is an important distinction between the action of *Party* spirit in England and in France—or at least a modification of its action, which must not be lost sight of. Although in England, the contests of the opposed Factions which divide the State hinge solely on the miserable disputes which arise out of domestic forms and never soar to matters of National Policy, yet in the party dissensions of France, National Policy enters largely as an element. This admixture in the discord forms a most important distinction between the dissensions of France and those of England—offering to the men who know how to guide and direct it, the means of effecting signal and powerful changes in the impulse of a National Mind. It is not to be expected but that the Results of the Peace of 1815 would have proved a source of hatred in the people of France against England, and that no opportunity would have been neglected which might present itself, for recovering that position or compensating themselves for that influence which they had lost. It is not to be expected but that Russia, whose science of Government consists in making the Passions of Mankind and the conflicting interests of Nations, turn to the working out of her grand object, would endeavour to take advantage of the National bias of France. The opportunity which presented itself for the success of both these objects was so tempting as to be irresistible—it lay in the apathy and ignorance of England to her Interests, her Rights, and her Position. Hence France of the Restoration and Russia, marched hand in hand together in violating the Rights of England,—the former sent Armies to upset British influence in Spain, and formed projects for establishing a Bourbon Dynasty in South America, while the latter was bringing Persia, the Caucasus and Turkey under her control. Will the Reader now turn to the Motto at the head of this

chapter, and reflect carefully on the communications between the French Minister under the Restoration, and the Russian Court:—if he cannot understand their signification by the Events then in action in Europe, it is not any *words* that will bring it home to his mind! It is ENGLAND that is the Antagonist of Russia—it is *England* with whose Interests and National existence the designs of Russia are incompatible—it is *England* Mistress of the East, whose dominion must cease as soon as Russia possesses the Dardanelles;—what cares Russia for *any* aggrandisement of France provided *she* possesses the Key of Europe and of Asia? The conquest of Africa and South America by France would be cheerfully agreed to by Russia if France would leave *her* Constantinople—and, the neutralization of the resistance of England would be effectually brought about by such projects of France, because they would place her in hostility to England; the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, therefore, continues, in addressing his Chief at Paris, “if circumstances compel the Emperor to make War upon Turkey, *il sait très-bien ce qui peut nous convenir!*” Is it a matter hard of belief, after this, that on the outbreak of the Revolution of 1830, Prince Polignac showed documents to prove the support of Russia to France in the formation of a Colonial Empire hostile to the rights and interests of England, in exchange for the assistance of France to Russia in *absorbing the Ottoman Empire?*

But the Revolution of July descended like a Torrent, and swept away every vestige of the existing order of things in France,—the Protocols and Treaties of Prince Polignac and Russia were buried under the Ruins of the Restoration—the voice of the People of England stepped in between France and her Russian Alliance—the enthusiasm of France was echoed back from every village in England, and the two People became suddenly bound in a firm Alliance of “Principles!” A new impulse was given to the People of France, and their hostile recollections of England were absorbed in the majority of the Nation, by the mutual sympathies which they now felt. Thus a “National Party” sprung up, which

saw that not only were the two Countries united by Principles, but that their material interests were identical ; and this Party adopted the opinion of Napoleon—that the possession of Constantinople by Russia would destroy the independence of Europe. The Court party, however, as we have already explained, saw their rise to power on the support of a Foreign Cabinet, and the interests of France in the possession of an extended Colonial Empire ; but they were constrained to wear the mask of the “ English Alliance” while they were violating her Rights and destroying her Commerce in four portions of the World at once. Of course the same causes existed under the Dynasty of Louis Philippe as under the Restoration for inducing the Policy of France into a line of hostility to England, viz.—the indifference of the English People to their own interests,* and the active agency of Russia. Accordingly we find the Cabinet of the new Monarch pursuing all the schemes of the preceding one, viz. in Algiers, South America, Senegal, &c. under the direct encouragement of *Russia*, and assisted by—*Lord Palmerston* ! We find the Minister in France who was the least favorable to these schemes, and who did the most to discourage them—who was the avowed partisan of England, and the declared opponent of the approach of Russia to Constantinople, M. THIERS, detested by the Court—personally disliked by the Monarch ! But then, we find that M. Thiers was the favorite Minister of the People, and that the majority of the People were in favor of the English Alliance—an influence which could not be resisted by the Court. What then is to be done ? Although Russia can easily gain a Court, it is not so easy to gain a People. With such a disposition between the French and British people, and with a Minister like M. Thiers in Office, the advance of Russian policy is impossible:—that disposition must be reversed—that Minister must be overthrown—*Behold the service performed by—LORD PALMERSTON* !

* In the relationship between States, the circumstance of one Nation being unable or unwilling to protect herself from the aggressions of a Neighbour or Neighbours, has invariably been found to give rise to aggression—hence opportunities become *causes*.

Never surely was an Alliance so effectually broken up, Not only were the Friends of England betrayed, humiliated trampled upon, but the very means of their destruction were found in their Friendship for England ! The result is, of course, a violent and sudden reversal of the Enthusiasm of July, and those who were the Friends of England become the bitterest Enemies of all. The current of the National Mind of France is changed, and can we doubt the direction it will henceforth take ? Is the animosity of a great and a rival People to be aroused, and end without any Results ? Can a man insult and domineer over his fellow without entailing any consequences ? And is it not the same with Nations ? To say it is not, is to read the History of the World in an inverse sense.

To those who reflect upon the position in which France, England, and Russia stand in the World, it will be obvious that France must be the Ally of the one or of the other. If she ceases to retain the Friendship of the one she will necessarily form an intimacy with the other :—but if she be cast off and spurned away by the one she confided in, how much more firmly will she unite herself with the remaining one, especially if that remaining one be the Foe of her Insulter ?

The People of France linger after the Possessions she has lost, and there is a strong National feeling to shake off what they call the Trammels of 1815. This same National Feeling makes the French People long for an extension of Dominion and a Colonial Empire ; but the most powerful of the Political Parties of France were restrained by two causes—respect for the English Alliance, and the dread of a Russian occupation of Constantinople.* We have seen that France

* For, no assistance or countenance would be given by Russia to French Encroachment without the “ understanding ” about the Dardanelles, and without the assistance of Russia, the schemes of France in Hostility to England would be impracticable. The extension of France, by destroying the Independence of Minor States, could not be effected without depriving England of important commercial Rights as of Allies still more important to her, for the British Power is founded on the protection which she extends to countries that are attacked by powerful

has just been emancipated from both of these restraints, and some of the most eminent of her Statesmen have made her National Council-Hall ring with exultation that she has been set free from the Treaties of 1815, and all her engagements with England! Have not the men who resisted the attempt of Russia to destroy the power of Turkey been overthrown in consequence of that resistance, and their place at the French Council-Board taken by those who resigned themselves to that Disaster, and accepted the yet *greater* Disaster of a Treaty which gives Russia the Protectorate of Constantinople—the right of closing the Dardanelles? Can we entertain any doubt of “France and Russia being agreed,” and that, “understanding each other on every point, they will compel the other Powers of the Continent to *wish that which they shall wish?*”

Is England prepared to see France and Russia acting in concert for the furtherance of designs which would be the downfall of the British Greatness—is she prepared to allow herself to be shut out of the East, and be menaced by the joint hostility of Russia and France if she dares to resist it—is she prepared to witness the destruction of the independence of the Republics of South America, the annihilation of her commercial Rights along the finest shores of Africa, and be menaced by the joint resistance of Russia, France, and the United States* if she interferes to prevent

Neighbours, and the Protection of her own Interests demands that she should afford this support, for her Relations are with all Countries. France can, therefore, hope for Assistance in her Extension only from Russia, because England would be pulling away the Pillars of her own Greatness if she even permitted—much less assisted the Progress of French Aggrandisement.

* Why has Lord Palmerston kept open the question of the Maine Boundary with the United States, when the King of Holland decided and settled it in 1831? The Analysis of the Parliamentary Papers relative to this question, reveal a deeper infamy—a more complicated and systematic train of Fraud, than any other of the Papers presented by Lord Palmerston, except those on the Affairs of Central Asia. By a process of Fraud more extraordinary than anything in the annals of Ministerial treachery, Lord Palmerston has succeeded in securing the

it? Is England content that Russia should be Mistress of France by the power which she holds of ministering to her Passions and her Ambition—and does she think that the Russo-Greek Cabinet will not use her new Ally against her? Alas! Napoleon is dead, and *no Statesman* is left remaining in France. Is England content that Russia should dominate in Sweden, Poland, Greece, Turkey, Persia, Cabul, Lahore—and that the man who has secured these “triumphs,” these “glorious successes” for her, should suddenly, and alone, burst the bands that knit her to France, and cast that Nation at the Feet of the once petty Czar of Muscovy? Does England accept these acts of her Minister? Yes; ere these leaves are before the public, Parliament will have met, and the Representatives of an “enlightened” people will have stamped them with the approval of England as triumphs of “conservative Principles,” and evidences of the “increased Civilization” of the Age! The Historian of 1851 will have strange events to Chronicle.

rejection at Washington of an award which settled the most important question, at that day, in which England had been entangled, and has thereby placed in his own hands the means of exciting the hostility of the United States with as much ease, and more certainty than he has done with France. Let England be threatened with a continental War, and Lord Palmerston's Russian Policy be resisted by his Colleagues—and we shall see how he will triumph by setting fire to the hostile pile prepared in North America; probably the silent threat may be sufficient!

CHAPTER XII.

TREATIES FOR THE PACIFICATION OF THE NORTH.

IN the preceding pages we have been tracing the Causes and Effects, as speculating on the probable prospective Consequences of the Treaties for the "Pacification of the *East*," and I conceive it will facilitate the appreciation of these points, to make a few remarks on the means used by the Muscovite Power at the commencement of the last Century, for securing to herself the dominion of the Northern portion of Europe. Little more than a Century ago, there were "Negotiations," "Mediations," "Alliances" and "Counter-Alliances," "Convulsions, Wars, Rebellions, and, in short, Treaties, for the "Pacification of the North!" It will be useful for us to recollect how these "complications" were called into existence, to trace their operation, and to observe carefully what was their *Result*. There will be doubtless many worthy Members of our Legislature who will feel themselves shocked at the idea of Russia being capable of coming to an "*Understanding*" with France, for the pursuance of designs of rapine against England, for considerations to be repaid by Russia to France by way of compensation! One class of our Politicians will find such conduct incompatible with the "conservative Principles" of the Head of the Holy Alliance, and another will say that the high state of "Civilization" and "Liberalism" in France will prevent the possibility of such a connection. Others, relying on the "good Faith" of the Emperor, will feel indignant that such imputations should be made against our *Ally*! Let us take a glance at what has been actually done, that we may the better be able to judge of what may be done again, and how far we are to wrap ourselves up in general Propositions, instead of taking precautions against the occurrence of circumstances to be apprehended.

My Readers will be aware that prior to the year 1700 the present Empire of Russia consisted of a mere Province, scarcely to be designated a Kingdom, called Muscovy, of which the Capital was Moscow, and was scarcely known to Europe. The Sea-port was one in the frozen Regions of the White Sea, only Archangel, so that it may be said to have been entirely an Inland Country—neither the Baltic, the Euxine, or the Caspian, were open to Russia, and yet the Czars of Muscovy harboured the seemingly chimerical idea of securing the succession of the Roman Empire! But one man arose, whose mighty Genius showed his Nation of savages the means that were necessary for realising the conceptions of two Centuries before. The exertions that had been unceasingly making by the Muscovites to obtain an outlet by the Black Sea were unavailing, for Azoff and Taganrog were in possession of the Turks, and *they* were able to distinguish their Enemies from their Friends. The Turks saw that the Muscovites desired to steal part of their Territories, and they therefore considered them their Enemies; so they resisted them and drove them back. Peter saw that an outlet by the *Baltic* was an indispensable necessity for the furtherance of Russian greatness, and the consolidation of Russian power, as well as for securing a foreign Commerce by opening an outlet to Europe, and connecting it with the East. In addition to these advantages, the possession of a Port on the Baltic was a means of connecting Russia with Europe, and of acting, by means of and through that connection, on the Eastern Countries—which could not be done *direct*, in consequence of the correct appreciation by those Nations of the real designs of the Muscovite Power; therefore, Peter the Great devoted his Energies to the acquisition of a portion of the Sea coast of the Baltic, and the skill with which he combined the means of action for effecting this in particular, with the general Policy necessary for the success of Russian designs as a whole, exhibits the transcendant superiority of his Genius over any Statesman of modern or perhaps ancient times.

With his plans laid down in his own Mind, Peter set out

on a tour to Europe. for the purpose of making himself acquainted with the ground on which he had to work, and preparing the means of his future action. In the year 1697 he began his journey with a splendid Embassy, and the first place he came to was Riga, the Chief Town, and the Key to the whole of Livonia. At that time, not only Livonia, but Finland, Ingria, Estonia, and Carelia, formed a part of the Kingdom of Sweden, which was the most powerful State in the North, and occupied a first-rate position in the world, as well Naval and Military, as Commercial.* In the Suite of the Czar of Muscovy were the most skilful Generals and Engineers which he had been able to attract from Europe into his service. Their duty was to scrutinise minutely the Positions, Advantages, Fortifications, &c., of the various places which Peter perceived would be the theatre of his future struggles, for, his Scheme of Rapine being matured, to ascertain these points was mere routine detail. The Governor of Riga was very polite to the Embassy, but he declined to show the Fortifications to Peter, who said to his confidants, Prince Menzikoff and M. Le Fort, that “*he should see the day when he should be able to refuse the same thing to the King of Sweden himself!*”

The designs of Peter in the Baltic were as incompatible with the interests and existence of Swedish Greatness as his designs (now pursuing) on Constantinople, Persia, &c., are incompatible with those of Great Britain—it was *impossible* that Russia and Sweden could be aught but Enemies as long as these designs existed, and Peter, knowing this, made up his mind for the struggle, and devoted himself to the work of accumulating the means of assault. The wresting from Sweden of her most valuable Coasts and Provinces by the Ruler of an inland State not in possession of a single Ship, was a work not to be effected without the assistance of other Nations, and we shall see how Peter found this.

From Riga the Czar proceeded to Königsberg in the Dominions of the King of Prussia, who was then only Elector

* The spot on which stands St. Petersburg was then Swedish ground.

Brandenburgh. No means were spared by the Embassy for securing favor at the Court of the Elector, and a firm alliance and friendship was cemented between it and the Muscovite Sovereign. From Königsberg Peter sent an Embassy to the Court of Vienna to make propositions about the War against the Turks and Tartars, which he was then carrying on, and he received powerful assistance from the Elector of Brandenburgh as well in the furtherance of this Embassy as in military assistance. The Turks being at that time in habitual hostility with Austria (as also with Poland) the Czar pursued the ordinary course of Russian Policy—that of securing the aid of one Nation against the other, while concealing his real designs under an adroit use of such words as “Barbarism,” “Infidels,” &c. The miserable state of anarchy in which Poland was plunged at this period, and its position in reference to several of the other States of Europe, made that Kingdom the chief and most important engine by which Peter found means to neutralise the hostility of some Courts, to secure the favor of others, and to excite and prolong Convulsion and Warfare in Europe. It was whilst at Königsberg that the Czar received, by express, the intelligence that a struggle was taking place in Poland for the succession to the Crown of that Kingdom—that Augustus the Elector of Saxony was proposed by one party, and the Prince of Conti by another, and that the latter aspirant was supported by the influence of the Court of France. At this period the French were in strict alliance with the Sultan, and were likely to turn their powerful arms against the Muscovites if they pushed their aggressions on Turkey; and if they had succeeded in giving a King to Poland there was little doubt but an invasion of Muscovy would have been the result, for the enmity both of Poland and Turkey was by this time aroused against that State in consequence of its aggressions and outrages on their territories. Peter instantly saw this position of things and as instantly saw the means of turning it to his advantage. With the quickness of thought*

† He had, no doubt, foreseen and prepared for the contingency.

he sent instructions to his Ambassador in Poland to maintain what he called the "Right of Election;" that is to say, to support the partisans of the Elector of Saxony, for which he offered the use of 60,000 troops in Poland, by way of securing the independence of that Kingdom! He did not confine his interference to *promises* however, for he at the same time ordered his troops in the Ukraine to advance into the Polish Province of Lithuania—which he was not long in *appropriating to himself*! By this interposition Peter not only introduced the Russian troops into Poland, and thus furnished a pretext for the after complications and disputes in Europe, but paralysed the resistance, at once, of France, of Turkey, and of Poland itself to Russian designs, while he secured the active co-operation of the joint power of Saxony and Poland in the person of Augustus (to whom he had secured a Kingdom) against Sweden, whose territories he was only waiting for such opportunity to seize upon!

The Czar, continuing his Journey, proceeded to Dantzic, Hamburgh, and thence to Holland, where he worked as a carpenter—dressed himself in the garb of a workman, and made himself at once master of the arts which he intended to teach his Subjects, of the habit of mind of all classes of people, and of the affections of the Dutch Court. From Holland he passed over to England where he employed his time in a similar manner, and secured the Alliance of the British Court.

About this time (in 1697) the Czar heard of the death of the King of Sweden, and that he was succeeded by his Son, Charles XII., a Boy not Eighteen Years of Age. As it was now the moment to strike the meditated blow against Sweden, Peter lost no time in proceeding to Vienna, where he was received with great pomp by the Emperor of Austria, and the bond of Alliance knit between them as closely as possible. Thence he proceeded to the Court of King Augustus in Poland, where he concerted measures for his projects on Sweden—having relieved himself, for this purpose, from the dangerous War the Sultan was waging against him, by the *mediation of the King of England* at Constan-

tinople. The character of Peter's Diplomacy was exhibited in a striking manner by the position in which he placed himself prior to the letting loose of his project of rapine on Sweden. The very day after the Ratification of a twenty Years' Truce which he got the British Ambassador at Constantinople to bring about for him with the Sultan, this Muscovite Ruler, in conjunction with Poland and Denmark, declared War against Sweden, whose King was a boy, and whose Court had not given the slightest shadow of provocation! The most ardent of Peter's admirers do not deny that the object was simply to stretch the Muscovite Territory to the Baltic Sea by the seizure of a portion of that which belonged to Sweden—is it surprising that Treaties were soon found necessary for the *Pacification of the North*?* The Czar had, however, internal disturbances to put down, as well as warlike preparations to complete, which he had no sooner done than he marched with 100,000 men to the Swedish Frontier—whilst there were three Muscovite Ambassadors at Stockholm treating of Peace! a degree of perfidy which it is not in the power of language to characterise.

Peter attacked the Town of Narva in October, 1700, because, by making himself master of it, he could have easily opened a passage to the Baltic, while the King of Poland besieged Riga: and although they were signally defeated by the valour of the young Monarch, Charles XII., we are familiar with the indomitable energy and untiring obstinacy which the Muscovite displayed, until he finally succeeded in stealing from Sweden the whole of Ingria, Estonia, Livonia, Carelia, and Finland.

It is not my intention to follow the history of the War between Russia and Poland against Sweden; we are aware of the pretext Peter made of this to keep his troops in Poland, in violation of the faith of solemn Promises and Treaties, as in defiance of Europe—turning them into a band of Robbers

* At that time—or rather soon after the commencement of Peter's War against Sweden, the term "Treaty for the Pacification of the North" was as common as the phrase now used, "Treaty for the Pacification of the East!"

of the people whom they had come “to protect.” It is essential to bear in mind the circumstance that the War against Sweden lasted for eighteen Years, and was marked by a degree of inveteracy, greater perhaps than any War in the annals of History. The wrongs inflicted on Sweden by Russia, and the cruel perfidy exercised towards Charles XII., raised in the bosom of that Monarch and his subjects, a depth of hatred to Peter and Russia which forms one of the chief characteristics of the History of the period, and if there be any case in which it would be thought an *impossibility* for two Nations to reconcile their differences, and enter on Treaties and “Negotiations” together for pursuing jointly schemes of aggression on neighbouring States, that case might certainly have been supposed to be Russia and Sweden. But what was the result? History proves to us the folly of relying on the antipathies of Nations to each other as a guarantee for their not amalgamating when they may find a common interest in despoiling their Neighbours by each other’s support. The history of the Negotiations between Peter and the Court of Sweden towards the termination of their desperate Struggle throws a valuable light on the mode of action pursued by Russia, the process by which she arrays Nations against each other by alternately inflaming their Passions and allaying their Fears, the Policy by which she originates complications and excites convulsions amongst Nations at peace—always ending by keeping her own foot on the Foreign soil where she has planted it.

After seventeen years of the most obstinate struggle in the annals of Warfare, between Peter and Charles, the Czar only redoubled his determination to retain possession of the Baltic coast belonging to Sweden, and Charles seemed equally bent on preventing the dismemberment of his Kingdom, but both parties were in a state of prostration by the prolonged War—Sweden desirous of peace with her formidable opponent, and Russia, desirous not only of peace, but also alarmed at the uneasiness manifested by the Courts of Europe which she thought might at length resolve on concluding *in reality* the pacification of the North, and in that case would infallibly have insisted on the retirement of the Muscovites from at least a part of the stolen

territory. In these circumstances, Peter bethought him of a method of settling the question according to the true principles of *conservative* Policy, and with that deference to the interests of his Ally at the British Court which the Russo-Greek Cabinet has since made a point of following up! He knew the feelings long entertained in Sweden of the compact and beautiful a Kingdom that might be made by the cession of Norway, which seemed more fitted by geographical position for a union with *herself* than with *Denmark* to which at that time it belonged—and the wily Czar resolved to utilise this idea! He sent an Ambassador, Baron Gortz, to Stockholm to propose to Charles a peace between Russia and Sweden—that all the Swedish Coasts for which he originally undertook the war should be definitively ceded to Russia—and that in compensation for this, Russia was to assist Sweden in *taking possession of Norway!* But it was perfectly well known to Russia that the other States of Europe would not permit an *alliance* such as this between two Powers, and especially England, whose existence depended on a preservation of the balance of Power, and on her maintenance of international Justice; therefore it fell to the Diplomatic Genius of Peter to neutralise this general resistance—which he prepared for in the following manner.

Poland was to be silenced by the exertions of the joint power of Russia and Sweden for placing Stanislaus on the Throne of that Kingdom.

Prussia was to be drawn into the arrangement by the Czar, who was to offer his mediation to that Court in a dispute it had with the King of Sweden; it was to be induced to restore Stettin and a part of Pomerania to Sweden, and in return for this, Russia and Sweden were to “act in concert to procure to the King of Prussia another equivalent to their convenience, which shall cost Sweden nothing!”*

The King of England was to be compelled to restore Bremen and Verden to Sweden, and to be threatened in

* This was evidently to be at the expense of Poland, which subsequent events but too clearly shew—although no mention seems to have been made of the quarter whence the compensation to Prussia was to come, in the Papers which have been discovered.

Hanover, but the choicest part of this Muscovite Scheme was, the means to be adopted for neutralising the resistance of England. This was no less than an Alliance with the Jacobins to support the pretensions of Prince Charles to the Crown of England, and thus to excite Rebellion, Convulsion, and Anarchy throughout the Kingdom ! Whilst Peter was in Holland, a discovery was made in London, about the month of April 1717, of an intrigue which was being matured between Baron Gortz who was in Holland, and Count Gyllembough the Envoy Extraordinary from Sweden, who was in London, tending to excite a Rebellion in England, and introduce the Pretender there. Count Gyllembough was arrested in London, and Baron Gortz was arrested in Holland at the request of the British Court—all their Letters and Papers were seized and laid before Parliament, from which it appeared that they had planned a descent from Sweden in Scotland with 14,000 Troops, Artillery ; and arms for 12,000 more ! Peter seemed to have taken every precaution to prevent his own compromise in case of discovery, but in the Papers seized there were passages relating to his Physician Dr. Arskine, of a nature too obvious to make the connection doubtful, and so the Czar considered it necessary to send, through his Ambassador at London, a Dispatch to the British Court, disclaiming any privity to what he calls “ the conspiracy which the Swedish Ministers had carried on against your Majesty and Government, to excite among your subjects a Rebellion that was to be supported by Swedish troops.” He, of course, disavowed the acts of his Physician according to the ordinary routine of Russian Policy—declaring him to have no authority from him to meddle with State affairs at all, and stating that as he was aware of the Physician’s connections lying among the Jacobite party in England,* and that some of his relations had been engaged in the late Rebellion, he had *expressly forbidden him to hold any communication with them !* This Russian Dispatch is a very remarkable document, replete with the profoundest craft,

* The Court of Peter at this time was swarmed with Jacobites.

and will amply repay the reader for perusal, but it is too long to be quoted here, so I content myself by referring those who are curious to see it, to the Histories of Russia, and the State Papers of the time. It is dated the 12th of March 1717, is addressed to Mr. Stanhope to be laid before the King of England, and is signed by M. Wesselowski, the Secretary to the Russian Embassy in London. The Note was answered by Mr Stanhope on the part of the King of England, in a Note dated Whitehall, 20th of March 1717, and as a part of the Russian Note related to the Affairs of Hanover, M. Wesselowski received a separate Note from the Chancery of Hanover, dated the 31st of March, 1717. All these remarkable documents ought to be read and studied by every one who would desire an insight into the matters connected with the Treaties for the pacification of the North.

In this very extraordinary transaction there does not appear any conclusive evidence for supposing that the Swedish Court was really a party to these intrigues of its Ambassador, or whether Count Gyllembough was a dupe of the creatures of the Czar, and depassed his instructions,—or possibly even himself a creature of the Czar. This is a good deal involved in mystery, as also what the real intentions of the Swedish Court might have been, but what is certain is, that the Ambassador *was* detected in a correspondence with the functionaries of Russia — that the Letters of *these Functionaries* contained Plans for exciting Rebellion in England—that, by this means, the Court of Sweden was committed, in the eyes of the British Cabinet and of Parliament, as intriguing against the safety of the State, and thereby placed in a position of hostility, instead of retaining the continuance and procuring the Support of England, as it was on the point of doing, against the injustice of Russia. Whether that part of it which related to the proposed descent from Sweden in Scotland was invented for the purpose of being denounced by Peter in order to excite England against Charles XII, and thus show him the hopelessness of resistance, becomes a question—for it is certain this *result of it* was most favourable to Russian plans, and the Note of

M. Wesselowski, of the 2nd March, 1717, bears strong internal evidence of this being the object of the Russian Court. In that Note, Peter lays the perfidy and treason of the Swedish Monarch before the British Government, in the most vivid light he is able, and dwells on the Conspiracy of the Swedish Ambassador with an emphasis altogether unwarranted by the nature of the communication; not only that, but he uses every artifice to excite England against Sweden, in a variety of ways!

Soon after this, Baron Gortz was set at liberty, and after having an interview with the Swedish Resident at Zutphen, he was admitted, with great privacy, to an audience with the Czar and his Ministers at Loo. He was then dispatched to the Court of Sweden with fresh proposals, and the Czar engaged to suspend all operations for three months. At the close of 1717, M. Weber, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, expressed to the Russian Cabinet the extreme uneasiness felt by the British Court, at the interview thus privately held between the Czar and Baron Gortz, at Loo. The Russian Ministers first boldly denied that *there had been any interview*, but proof of it being in possession of the English Resident, they were afterwards compelled to confess it!*

* Extract from Mottley's History of Peter the Great—a Panygerist of that Monarch.

"The Czar's Ministers boldly denied that there had been an interview at Loo; but a little time after they were obliged to own it. The late Duke of Ormond was come at this time to Mittau in Courland, and had with him Mr. Jernegan, an English Roman Catholic; his Design was not only to negotiate a Marriage between the Princess Anna Petrowna, one of the Czar's Daughters, and the Pretender, but also to go over to Sweden to persuade Charles XII. to make peace with the Czar, and to turn his thoughts on setting the Pretender on the Throne of Great Britain; but the Proposal of the Marriage was one way to frustrate this last part of their Scheme, for Baron Gortz had long intended the Lady here spoken of for the Duke of Holstein, who afterwards married her.

"Mr. Jernegan was sent to Sweden to obtain leave from his Swedish Majesty, that the Duke of Ormond might go thither as the Pretender's Minister. Jernegan had orders to apply to Baron Gortz, which he did

It seems that Baron Gortz was still not successful in his Embassy to Charles, for that Monarch could not bear the thought of acceding to the Russian demands of such extensive dismemberment of his Territory. The Czar held inexorably to the retention of Ingria, Carelia, and Revel with Estonia, and Riga with Livonia; also part of Finland—terms which were intolerable to every Swede, but Peter did not give up the hope of yet prevailing on his enemy to accede to them for the *compensations* he was prepared to offer him, especially now where he had excited the Court of Great Britain against him, as also that of Denmark, by *denouncing to them the perfidious Schemes entertained by him*; as also neutralized the resistance of Prussia by his able Diplomacy! The Czar, therefore, caused to be prepared, under his own superintendence, by his Ministers, M. Oesterman and Baron Gortz, a set of proposals laid down in a regular plan, with which he dispatched the Baron for the third time to the Court of Charles, who arrived just at the time when that Monarch was killed at Frederickstall, viz., in November, 1718. This accident not only put a stop to the Negotiations, but to it is the World indebted for a knowledge of the exact plans of the Czar, and an authentic account of this piece of perfidy and crime. The Baron not having heard of the death of Charles, was on his way to seek him at the Siege of Frederickshall, and was arrested by the Swedish Officers. Gortz had drawn upon himself the hatred of the Swedish People by the perfidious part he had played, and the pernicious advice he had given to their Monarch, and fell a sacrifice to their resentment. He was condemned

accordingly; but the Answer he brought to the Duke was, that the King of Sweden had great reasons for not admitting him; he was soon after sent away from Mittau, and his Confidant, Jernegan left to manage the Business at Petersburg, with all possible Secrecy—never going out but at Night, nor seeing the Czar's Ministers but in Disguise. And while Measures were taking privately for a Congress at Abo, to which the Czar's Plenipotentiaries were invited by Baron Gortz, his Czarish Majesty set out for Moscow, where he had not been for Eight Years before."

to the scaffold, where he was beheaded by the common Hangman—several persons who were in his confidence, were also arrested—all his Papers were seized and published, and I now lay before my Readers the Plan he had brought from Peter, to propose to the Swedish King, which is perfect in itself, and so admirable a specimen of Russian Policy as to require no remarks to illustrate. These Documents are given word for word as they were found among the Papers of the Baron, after his tragical death.

PLAN CONCERTED BETWEEN BARON GORTZ AND M. OSTERMANN, THE CZAR'S SECOND PLENIPOTENTIARY FOR PEACE BETWEEN THAT PRINCE AND THE KING OF SWEDEN.

“1st.—The Czar promises and takes upon himself to see the Treaty of *Alt-Ranstadt* executed according to its literal sense, so that the Republic of Poland shall make no farther difficulty to acknowledge, for the future, Stanislaus for their lawful King, and to receive him in that quality.* To this end, the Czar shall send next Spring into Poland, an Army of eighty thousand men at least. His Swedish Majesty, to second this project, shall go over to Germany at the same time with a numerous Army, which shall act in concert with that of the Czar in the same view ; and in case any Power should concern itself with the Affairs of Poland, and endeavour to hinder the re-establishing of the Peace of *Alt-Ranstadt*, their Swedish and Czarish Majesties engage not to lay down their Arms before King Stanislaus be actually replaced on the Throne of Poland: they engage to maintain him upon it with all their forces, and to preserve the Republic of Poland in the quiet and entire liberty of choosing their Kings. (!)

“2nd.—His Czarish Majesty offers his mediation between his Swedish Majesty and the King of Prussia, for

* It will be recollected by the reader acquainted with the History of Poland, that the main pretext of Peter for prolonging the War in that Country was to prevent the Execution of the Treaty of *Alt-Ranstadt*, and to preserve Augustus on the Throne instead of Stanislaus !

re-establishing good intelligence between those two Princes ; in consequence whereof, his said Czarish Majesty will employ all means for accommodating, in a friendly manner, the differences relating to Stettin, and the Territories possessed in Pomerania, as also relating to the demolishing of Wismar. But if the King of Prussia should refuse to give the King of Sweden reasonable satisfaction for Stettin and its District, the two contracting Parties shall act in concert to procure to the King of Prussia *another equivalent* to his convenience, *which shall cost Sweden nothing*. In return, the King of Prussia shall be obliged to restore to the Crown of Sweden, Stettin, and that part of Pomerania which did belong to it, to become Guarantee of the Treaty to be made between that Crown and the Czar, and to conclude with them a Defensive Alliance, pursuant to the plan formed on this subject.

“ And this Alliance with Prussia shall be concluded to the mutual satisfaction of the Parties, two months after the exchange of the Ratifications of the Treaty between Sweden and Muscovy.

“ 3rd.—The Czar not only thinks it just, that for the considerable Countries and Provinces which the *King of Sweden yields up to him*, he should have convenient satisfaction, and *an equivalent elsewhere* ; but he even obliges himself to procure them to him ; and in case the King of Sweden thinks an equivalent on the side of *Norway convenient for him*, the Czar will undertake, by force of arms the Execution of this Project.

“ If the King of Sweden will pass over into Germany with a Body of forty thousand men, the Czar shall join to it twenty or twenty-five thousand men of the Army which he shall have in Poland ; he shall maintain them at his own expense, and they shall act under the King of Sweden’s orders, for executing the Plan which he shall have formed.

“ If any other Powers should pretend to oppose it, the Czar engages to act against them with all his Forces ; stipulating, however, that the equivalent which the King of Sweden shall *take from Denmark*, shall not consist of any Country *on this side of the Baltic*.

“ The operations at Sea shall be made in concert between

the two Contracting Powers, and the Czar promises to join all his Naval Forces with those of Sweden.

“ 4th.—The Czar promises and engages to act with all his Troops to compel the King of England, as Elector, not only to restore Bremen and Verden to the King of Sweden, but also to give him due satisfaction for the Damages he has sustained ; and if it happens that the Crown of England should oppose this, the two Contracting Powers promise to unite all their Forces against it, and not to lay down their Arms, till that Restitution and Satisfaction be really obtained from Hanover.

“ However, in case the King of Sweden should choose, before the Exchange of the Ratifications, to excuse the Czar from this Obligation, his Czarish Majesty promises and takes upon himself to dispose the Duke of Mecklenburgh to yield up voluntarily and for ever to the King and Crown of Sweden, the Duchy of Mecklenburgh and its Dependencies, *for a proper equivalent, which the Czar promises to procure for that Duke ;* and as such equivalent cannot be found but on the side of Poland, the King of Sweden shall engage to assist in getting it.*

“ And in this case the Agreements about the Successions of Families, which are subsisting between the Houses of Prussia and Mecklenburgh, shall take place with respect to the equivalent to be given to the Duke of that name.

5th.—Farther, the two Contracting Parties shall invite other Powers to enter into this Treaty of Alliance, and they shall maintain between themselves good Friendship, Confidence, and Neighbourhood.

* The Partition of Poland was cut out pretty early ! This is the sort of service rendered by Russia to Poland which she was pretending to defend during so many years from Sweden. I wonder whether this should be denominated “ safe conservative Policy,” or “ sound Political Economy ? ”

“ CONDITIONS CONCERTED BETWEEN BARON GORTZ, AND
M. OSTERMAN, THE CZAR’S PLENIPOTENTIARY, FOR
ATTAINING PEACE.

“ 1st.—There shall be a perpetual Peace and Alliance between the two Crowns.

“ 2nd.—General Friendship.

“ 3rd.—For establishing a more strict Friendship and Confidence, the two contracting Powers agree to exchange certain Territories and Countries, and to settle a new Frontier between their Dominions.

“ 4th,—The Czar promises to restore to Sweden the Great Duchy of Finland, and all that depends on it.

“ 5th.—The Province of Carelia, except what shall be dismembered from it.

“ 6th.—The Powers shall settle a new Frontier for the future.

N.B. This Barrier, is, indeed, not specified in the Project; but a geographical Map was joined to it, in which is seen a Line drawn from Wybourngh to the White Sea, passing by the Lakes of Ladoga and Onega, and the Countries on this side of that Line, were to be yielded up for ever to Sweden.

“ 7th.—And whereas the Czar promises to procure to the King and the Crown of Sweden, what shall be for his convenience in another part, and to indemnify him entirely, his Swedish Majesty yields to the Czar and to the Crown of Russia for ever, &c.”

N.B. Baron Gortz has not mentioned those cessions in the project, referring them to the pleasure and decision of the King of Sweden; but it is evident, by the line above mentioned, that they were to consist of part of Carelia, all Esthonia, Livonia, and Ingria

BARON GORTZ’S PLAN OF EXECUTION.

“ Whereas, it is stipulated in the Treaty with the Czar,

that the Peace with Prussia shall be concluded in some manner or other; *Prussia must necessarily be engaged in this Plan.*

“1st.—Immediately after the conclusion of the Peace, the King of Sweden, the Czar, and the King of Prussia, shall endeavour to bring together as much Shipping as is necessary for transporting Forty Thousand men, and those Ships shall be in Sweden before the Winter, that they may be put in a condition to serve for transporting those forces as soon as the Sea shall be open.

“2nd.—In the meantime, the Czar shall keep in readiness the Men of War stipulated by the Auxiliary Treaty, to the end they may be able to join the Swedish Fleet as soon as the Sea shall be open.

“3rd.—Likewise, the Czar shall take care, that the body of Auxiliary forces, from Twenty to Twenty-five Thousand men, designed for Mecklenburgh be actually there before the arrival of the Transports from Sweden.

“4th.—When all these Forces shall have joined on the other side, the body of Russians shall march directly to the Country of Luneburg, with whom the King of Sweden shall cause 6000 Hessians to join, and shall endeavour to get also some Troops from the neighbouring Princes.

“5th.—But the King of Sweden shall go with his Army into Holstein and Jutland, and remain there; *partly to try whether Denmark, by this step only, may be induced to yield to Peace*; and partly to be at hand to support the body of Russians, in case succour should come to the Hanoverians.

“6th.—The two Fleets shall keep together all the year, and endeavour to stop the passage of the Belts, to the end the Danish Troops in Holstein and Jutland may not return into Zealand, nor any be sent from thence into Holstein; and for the rest, they shall do all that is possible to keep the Danish Fleet shut up, and to cut off all communication with Denmark from abroad.

“7th.—In the meantime, the Czar shall remain with an

Army of at least 60,000 men in Poland, *without declaring his true intentions.* (!)—On the contrary, under his mediation a *Treaty shall be set on foot* between the King of Sweden and King Augustus; and that *negotiation shall be spun out* till the affair with Hanover and Denmark be ended. Then that of Poland shall be jointly undertaken in favour of Stanislaus.

“8th.—As for what relates to England, the two Parties take their measures *to disable the Court from engaging the Nation in any proceedings contrary to these Schemes:** the like shall be done with respect to Holland.

“9th.—The King of Prussia shall also draw together his Troops on that side which shall be judged most convenient for the Common Cause.”

What a notable evidence of the soundness of “conservative Policy,” is contained in the Muscovite Plans above quoted! Had the accident of the death of Charles XII., and the seizure of the Russian Ambassador, not occurred to give this production to the light, any one who might have been bold enough to venture an opinion on the then Policy of the Russian Cabinet would have been denounced as an Impostor—as Count Nesselrode would now be denounced for an Impostor, or a Madman, were he to declare the projects his Cabinet is engaged upon!

The Embassy of Baron Gortz was broken up by the death of Charles, but the history of this period is filled with the Treaties set on foot in Europe for the Pacification of the North. There were then, as now, *Quadruple Treaties*, and the Russian Cabinet manifested at the different Courts of Europe a desire for Peace and Harmony in the Baltic, quite refreshing to all those who had the “interests of Humanity” at heart! But by this time the unjust expeditions into which Russia had induced Charles, especially the invasion of Norway, were so adroitly handled by the innumerable

* How admirably Peter understood the effect of internal dissensions, and their action on external Policy!

Agents and Diplomats which the Muscovite Cabinet at that early period employed everywhere, raised so much odium against him that many Sovereigns began to argue that it was almost as well for Russia to be possessed of the Eastern Coasts of the Baltic as for Sweden to retain them. Certainly the ardour in favour of Sweden was much damped by the proceedings of Charles to obtain the "*equivalents*!" However, the Swedish Court rejected with scorn the proposals which Gortz brought to the deceased Monarch, and Peter, after some more vain endeavours to bring it into adherence to them, sent his Troops to ravage the Coasts of Sweden. The History of the Devastation by the Russians in Sweden at this time is amongst the most appalling instances of brutality, ancient or modern; but still the Swedes would not yield, for they now again rejected the terms which were brought to them by M. Ostermann. They requested the Mediation of England, which was accepted by the British Government, and a British Fleet appearing off the Swedish Coast the Russians retired. The Court of Great Britain having intimated its objection to the rapine by Russia of the Swedish Provinces claimed by Peter,* its Mediation was rejected by that Sovereign, who offered to accept the Mediation of France with whose Court he had in the meantime formed an Alliance. At the same time he sent another expedition to ravage the Coasts of Sweden by way of inducing them to negotiate, and, having a perfect appreciation of the action of internal dissensions in England, the Czar endeavoured to throw obstacles in the way of the Policy pursued by the British Court, by publishing as widely as possible an inflammatory Ordinance tending to excite the National Spirit of England against the Ministry!†

* See Appendix, Note V., for a Note of the Earl of Stanhope to the Russian Ambassador in reply to one from that Functionary, dated 25th December, 1719.

† The Ordinance of Peter was as follows, dated in 1721:—

“ It is notorious in what an unjust and disobliging manner our Re-

The "Conferences" were at length put an end to by the submission of Sweden to the theft by Russia of those Provinces, for the acquisition of which she had convulsed Europe for 20 years, and a Treaty was signed in 1721 by which Russia became Mistress of Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, part of Carelia and part of Finland—thus stealing a footing in Europe for the prosecution of further aggressions, dismembering the Kingdom of Sweden, and committing atrocities unheard of before in the History of the World—disturbing, tormenting and demoralising various peaceable Kingdoms, and introducing into the Policy of European Nations the practice of habitual Interference, Injustice, Outrage, and Rapine !

Is this sketch of a slight portion of the history of the Treaties for the Pacification of the *North* not a warning to England of the danger she incurs by the new Treaties for the Pacification of the East—of which we have treated in the preceding part of this volume ? Do we flatter ourselves that the Russo-Greek Cabinet has paused, or renounced her course of Policy, or altered her means of Action ? Let those who know the History of Russian aggrandisement since that time answer this Question. Oh ! but we are now to trust to the "Conservative Policy" of the Holy Alliance, and we appeal to the "Magnanimity," and "Moderation," and "Benevolence," shown by the Emperor ALEXANDER, of glorious Memory ?

sident was sent back from the Court of Great Britain, which being so great and sensible an affront, it would naturally have engaged us to have made reprisals according to the customs of other Princes, but that we saw very plainly that this was done without any regard to the *Interest of England*, and only in favour of that of *Hanover*, for which the Ministers of Great Britain not only neglect the Friendship of Foreign Powers, but even spare not their *own Country* in what most nearly and sensibly concerns it.

"It is for this reason that we are unwilling that any damage should accrue from thence to the English Nation, who had no share in this unjust proceeding ; and therefore we allow all security to that Nation, and full Power to trade to all parts of our Dominions."

How admirably the Muscovite understood the method to be adopted to excite a clamour against the Ministers who thwarted him !

These phrases are very common in the mouths of Englishmen, who talk of the “moderate” Policy of that Prince, and give it as a Guarantee of Russian “good Faith!” Of course they do not recollect the proceedings of the Russian Cabinet during the Reign of that Prince. How did Alexander show his good Faith? After the Treaty of Tilsit, he marched into Austria, on pretext of assisting the Emperor Francis against Napoleon, and directly afterwards joined in assaulting Austria—receiving as an “Equivalent,” Austrian Galicia! He went into the North of Germany to assist the prostrated Prussian King—he was immediately overthrown and bribed into receiving the “Equivalent” of a goodly share of his Prussian Majesty’s Dominions! After this, he proposed to his Relative the King of Sweden, that *he* should follow the example of Russian treachery, and declare War against England—in Violation of his Engagements. The Swede refused to break Faith and what did the magnanimous Alexander?—Pursue a “conservative Policy?” Yes: by fomenting a Rebellion in Sweden, and exciting the People to throw off their Allegiance to their Sovereign! He bribed the Soldiery—invaded Sweden—joined with an infamous Faction of Rebels and Traitors against their Sovereign—procured the deposition of Gustavus—and ended by—what? by completing the Scheme of Robbery cut out by Peter in the North, viz., *by taking possession of those Bulwarks of the Baltic, the remaining part of Finland, of Bothnia, and the Isle of Aland!*

This, and the Affairs of Poland, Cracow, Turkey, and Persia, give us, indeed, as satisfactory guarantees of the change in Russian Policy, as of the preservation of the PEACE of Europe!

The Scene is now shifted from the North to the East—for Riga, Livonia, Ingria, Finland, read Constantinople, Greece, Turkey, Persia, India; for Sweden read England;—and depend upon the “good Faith” of a Russo-French Alliance, while the organ of the Minister we have forced upon the French Nation replies to the urgent suggestions of

Russo-French partisans calling for “*Equivalents*” at the expense of England—“*Ce sont-là des Questions de l’Avenir!*”*

* The Court organ, *Journal des Débats*, under the inspiration of M. Guizot, thus replies to the famous speech of M. Mauguin, in which he calls on France to ally herself with Russia against England, and to deliver up Constantinople to Russia for the purpose of inflicting Vengeance on England:—

“Le moment n’est pas venu d’apprécier les conclusions de M. Mauguin. Il a proposé un changement d’Alliance; ce sont-là des questions de l’avenir. Mais nous reconnaissons avec plaisir que d’un bout à l’autre ce brillant orateur a été *habile, savant, logique dans l’argumentation, et parfaitement convenable dans la forme.*” Décembre, 1840.

A P P E N D I X.

NOTE I.

PLAN OF EXTERNAL POLICY LAID DOWN BY PETER THE GREAT.

THE Plan of Peter for the subjugation of the World is given at length in a Work published in Paris in 1812, entitled "*Des progrès de la puissance Russe.*" It is contained in a Work of Sir William Eton, long a resident in Turkey and Russia, called the "Picture of the Turkish Empire," and I give an extract from it in the following fourteen Articles. I copy this extract from the admirable work of M. Fourcade entitled "Notice sur la question d'Orient," which cannot be too strongly urged on the attention of every man who would understand the relation of Europe to the Eastern Nations and to Russia. I consider this publication of M. Fourcade one of the most remarkable of the time.

1.—Peter counselled that no means should be neglected for giving to the Russian Nation the Forms and Usages of Europeans, and for obtaining in furtherance of this end the assistance of all the Courts, and especially of the Literary and Scientific men of Europe, whether on considerations of Interest, through the philanthropic principles of Modern Philosophy, or by any other means which might be considered more efficacious.

2.—To extend ourselves by every possible means, in the North, towards the Baltic; and in the South, towards Persia, the Black Sea and Constantinople.

3.—To pursue a system of Perpetual War, in order to habituate the Nation to Arms.

4.—To maintain the jealousy of England against Sweden and Denmark, in order to subjugate the one by means of the other.

5.—To flatter and caress Austria for the purpose of engaging her

to drive the Turks out of Europe, and, under pretext of assisting her, to advance by the Black Sea to Constantinople.

6.—To excite and sustain Anarchy in Poland—to raise up Factions and maintain discord in that country—to cause the election of Kings most suitable for the furtherance of the Policy of Russia, and, by these means, to weaken, partition and subjugate that Nation.

7.—To favor England in her Commerce, to the end that we may obtain her support in securing Dominion of the Baltic and Black Seas—measures indispensable for success.

8.—Intimately convinced of this truth, that the Commerce of India assures by its Riches the Empire of the World, he (Peter) counsels unceasing War with Persia for the purpose of penetrating to the Persian Gulph—the centre of this commerce so much coveted.

9.—To mix ourselves up, at any price and by every possible means, force or stratagem, in all the complications of Europe.

10.—To flatter Austria unceasingly, and to realise against her, by stealth, enemies who shall gradually deprive her of her strength.

11.—To choose Wives from among the Princely Families of Germany, to secure Allies there.

12.—To make use of the influence of Religion on the schismatic Greeks dispersed through Turkey, in Poland and Austria; to attach them to us by all possible means; to declare ourselves their Protector, for the purpose of assuring to ourselves, by this title, supremacy over all these Religious Sects, as the most efficacious means of subduing Poland, Turkey, and Austria.

13.—Then will be the time to strike the grand blow; propose secretly to France and to Austria the partition of the World, from which a deadly War between these two Powers will arise.

14.—It is during the fury of this War that Russia, marching slowly her regular Army towards the Rhine where she will have so many Allies, will throw, by the Baltic and the Bosphorus, clouds of undisciplined Barbarians into Italy, France, and Spain, to lay waste these Countries, &c."

With what slight modification Russia has pursued the Maxims here laid down?

NOTF II.

PRIVILEGES OF THE BASQUES.

Extracts from a Speech of Lord Palmerston on the Affairs of Spain, in the Debate of House of Commons, 19th April, 1837.

“ ——— But that War, what was its Origin? Why did the Insurgents, as the honourable and learned Gentleman terms them, take up Arms? Was it because their Privileges were invaded? No such thing. They took Arms for Carlos and Despotism, against Isabella and Constitutional Government. * * * * Those Privileges were great and valuable so long as the rest of Spain was subject to arbitrary Government and a despotic King. So long as neither Justice nor Law were to be had in Spain, then the exemptions of the Basques were an approach to constitutional freedom. But when the whole of Spain is governed, as I trust it will be, by a free constitution, with independent and impartial Tribunals, by equal Laws properly administered, and by a responsible Executive; then the Basques will find it far more to their advantage to be incorporated with the rest of the Spanish Nation, than to be shut out in a corner of the Land, from those benefits which their countrymen enjoy. (!)

“ But what were those privileges of the Basques? No man will pretend that *exemption from Custom-houses on the Coast, was a real advantage to them*; because they themselves have frequently petitioned to be relieved from that privilege, and to be allowed to be placed, in that respect, on the same footing with the rest of their countrymen. (!) The great privilege which they enjoyed, was the possession of local self-government, through those municipalities by which they managed their own affairs. And what are we to think of the consistency of those gentlemen, who, while on the one hand they are endeavouring to deprive their own countrymen of those corporations to which they are so firmly attached, on the other hand stand up and entreat us not to interfere with the municipal corporations of the poor Basques—that invaluable legacy bequeathed to them from their remotest ancestry! I beg, sir, that we may hear no

more of this affected compassion for the Basques fighting for their privileges. The poor Basques are made the victims of persons who have other ends in view than the welfare of Biscay ; and whose real object is to establish arbitrary government in Spain. The war which is carried on in the Basque provinces is not a war between the modern institutions of Spain, and the ancient institutions of Biscay. It is there, and upon that contracted scene, that is to be decided by issue of battle that great contest between the opposing and conflicting principles of government—arbitrary government, on the one hand, and constitutional government on the other—which is going on all over Europe ; but which, fortunately for mankind, is waged in other countries with argument instead of arms, so that the peaceful occupations of the people are not disturbed thereby. I trust that in all other countries that contest will still continue to be thus peacefully carried on ; and that no violence of party, on the one side or the other, may disturb the tranquillity of Europe. But that is the real question at issue, and those who endeavour to limit us to the privileges of the Basques, give an imperfect and unjust representation of the true nature of the struggle.”

NOTE III.

RUSSO-FRENCH ALLIANCE.

At the commencement of the crisis produced by the Treaty of 15th July, I was in the habit of expressing my conviction that it would result either in War between England and France, when Russia would pounce upon Constantinople; or in a Russo-French Alliance, which would be more disastrous still. Of course this latter opinion was looked upon as the Phantom of a heated brain! Whilst writing what is in the context, the Russo-French Alliance has become the theme of discussion everywhere, and has been advocated by the ablest Members of the Chamber of Deputies. The French Press has teemed and yet teems with speculations on the necessity of accepting with fervour the offer of Russia of an Alliance—against England! The organs of the French Court are in ecstasies. On the first announcement from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg as to the “*understanding*” which it was necessary to enter on with France, the Court Paper, the *Presse*, has the following:—

“We are enabled to confirm the above details.* It is not in written despatches only that the Russian Government shows its desire of being on friendly terms with France. M. de Barante, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, congratulates himself on the amicable and unusually kind reception he had experienced for some time back from the Emperor Nicholas. It is evident that *Russia forms no illusion respecting her present relations with England, and seeks but a good opportunity for breaking them off.* Should this rupture take

* Viz. a paragraph from the *Courier Français* as follows:—

“A despatch from Count Nesselrode to M. de Pahlen had been officially communicated to M. Guizot. It is said to be very amicable towards France. It is twelve years since the two Governments have exchanged such evident preliminaries of a coalition.”

place, it would be a most important event that would place England precisely in the position in which she placed us by the London Treaty. We believe that it depends at present on the skill of the French Government to take, in this respect, *a striking and durable revenge.*"

"But France would be wrong to suppose that the Russian Cabinet entertained for an instant the idea of injuring in the least the high influence she so justly possesses in the world. This influence is necessary to the balance of Europe, and Russia, far from seeking to lessen it, would be ready to *assist France in maintaining it*, if France could feel any serious anxiety on the subject."

"Such, we are assured, is the spirit of the Despatch in question. It comprises all that we have said of the dispositions of Russia, and of her real interests in the present situation of Europe. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg has for a long time yielded to the empire of delicate circumstances; but it could not be ignorant, and we are persuaded that at bottom it always was of opinion, that the Alliance of France was for it a first-rate necessity, and that sooner or later it would have to enter into the path it at present seems decided to follow."

"We do not advise the French Government to give itself up *blindly* to the *advances of Russia*, but we recommend it to study attentively and seriously the new situation in which it is placed (!) Without doubt, on learning the proceedings of Museovite Policy Lord Palmerston will moderate the pride with which he has hitherto enjoyed his victory, and will return to his former attentions (!) That France, which has been represented so lowered, will perceive that it has, in reality, remained the *Umpire of Europe*, and that it is in her power to *resume all her influence on the destinies of Nations*. But her Government must employ tact, prudence, and address. It must, above all, employ resolution to get out of the false and fatal trammels with which *M. Thiers has clogged our Policy*, and in which the Opposition is endeavouring to detain us. By means of the Continent, the malevolence (*mauvais vouloir*) of England may be rendered impotent for ever."

The Court Organ, the *Journal des Débats*, of 5th January, contains a remarkable and evidently official article on the Policy of France. It commences by proving the valuelessness of the Question of Egypt, &c. to France, and states that the "glorious recollections of the Expedition to Egypt shall not lead them astray respecting the *reasonable direction* which, in case of need, their *projects of aggrandisement should assume*" !

The article then quotes the tables which shew the enormous Colonial Empire of England and Russia, and the small extent of France, which it states to be *twenty-three times less than England*, and continues—"There are certain enlightened minds that *find France too small*, and are uneasy at the enormous disproportion existing between her and her two most formidable rivals, Russia and England, with respect to territory and population. We know all the compensation for such an inferiority, arising from geographical situation, unity of legislation, and homogeneity of language and race; but it is, nevertheless, understood that, in the presence of the daily encroachments of her two rivals, *France might busy herself with aggrandisement in her turn, and put an end to a disproportion, which, though little menacing at present, may become so hereafter.*"

The antagonist of the Court Organs, the Liberal paper *Le Commerce* advocates a Russian Alliance against England with all the heat of enthusiasm! It publishes a reprint of the Speech of M. Mauguin in the Chamber of Deputies on the necessity of the Russo-French Alliance. This speech of M. Mauguin is a document of the most remarkable kind. It is remarkable for the ability displayed in it; but this is not the point of importance. It is the nature of the sentiments on the Policy of England expressed by M. Mauguin, which are so pure a specimen of that peculiar doctrine used by Russian Diplomats for infusing into the minds of French Politicians of the "*Liberal*" class as to form one of the greatest Diplomatic curiosities I have met with! On reading the speech I recognised with much edification my own experience of what we should call the "*cramming*" of M. Mauguin, for having been in the habit of passing among Russians for a Frenchman of the "*Liberal*" school, I was invariably endeavoured to be impressed with the same views of what British Policy was! M. Mauguin impresses his audience with the wonderful craft and selfishness of British Policy—that in England nothing of what is called "*principles*" stands between the people and their *material interests*—that everything is with us a question of interest, and that we only use the "*principles*" of other Nations as a means by which to work out our ends! Hence he deduces the necessity of France forming no Alliance with us, either of "*principles*" or anything else, but of forming an Alliance with Russia, which is the true Ally of France, and whose interests are identical with her's. He combats M. Thiers' Policy for hindering the Army of Ibrahim from marching on Constantinople, and said if he had been Minister he would have urged him on the Capital, *that*

Russia might have taken possession of it, for then England would get her deserts !

Alas ! would it were true what M. Manguin says of the British people. He is describing the Englishmen of another time—the Englishmen of the days of Shakspeare, and Essex, and Raleigh, and Drake, and Frobisher, and Chatham.

NOTE IV.

Convention between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, for the Pacification of the Levant, Signed at London, July 15, 1840.

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD.

HIS Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reason of the hostile proceedings of Mehemet Ali, Pacha of Egypt,—difficulties which threaten with danger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of the Sultan's throne,—Their said Majesties, moved by the sincere friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan ; animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe ; faithful to the engagement which they contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by their Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th of July, 1839 ; and desirous, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which would be occasioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pacha of Egypt and the subjects of the Sultan ; Their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have resolved, for the aforesaid purposes, to conclude together a Convention, and they have therefore named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, a Member of Parliament, and her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Neumann, Commander of the Order of Leopold of Austria, decorated with the Cross for Civil Merit,

Commander of the Orders of the Tower and Sword of Portugal, of the Southern Cross of Brazil, Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class of Russia, His Aulick Councillor, and His Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty ;

His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Sieur Henry William, Baron de Bulow, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle of the First Class of Prussia, Grand Cross of the Orders of Leopold of Austria, and of the Guelphs of Hanover, Knight Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Stanislaus of the Second Class, and of St. Wladimir of the Fourth Class of Russia, Commander of the Order of the Falcon of Saxe-Weimar, His Chamberlain, actual Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty ;

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Sieur Philip, Baron de Brunow, Knight of the Order of St. Anne of the First Class, of St. Stanislaus of the First Class, of St. Wladimir of the Third, Commander of the Order of St. Stephen of Hungary, Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle, and of St. John of Jerusalem, His Privy Councillor, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannick Majesty ;

And His Majesty the Most Noble, Most Powerful, and Most Magnificent Sultan Abdul Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, Chekib Effendi, decorated with the Nichan Iftihar of the First Class, Beylikdgi of the Imperial Divan, Honorary Councillor of the Department for Foreign Affairs, His Ambassador Extraordinary to Her Britannick Majesty ;

Who, having reciprocally communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following Articles :—

ARTICLE I.

His Highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, as to the conditions of the arrangement which it is the intention of His Highness to grant to Mehemet Ali, conditions which are specified in the Separate Act hereunto annexed ; Their Majesties engage to act in perfect accord, and to unite their efforts in order to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to that arrangement ; each of the High Contracting Parties reserving to itself to co-operate for that purpose, according to the means of action which each may have at its disposal.

ARTICLE II.

If the Pacha of Egypt should refuse to accept the above-mentioned arrangement, which will be communicated to him by the Sultan, with the concurrence of Their aforesaid Majesties ; Their Majesties engage to take, at the request of the Sultan, measures concerted and settled between Them, in order to carry that arrangement into effect. In the meanwhile, the Sultan having requested his said Allies to unite with him in order to assist him to cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the transport of troops, horses, arms, and warlike stores of all kinds, from the one province to the other ; Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately to that effect, the necessary orders to their naval Commanders in the Mediterranean. Their said Majesties further engage that the naval Commanders of their squadrons shall, according to the means at their command, afford, in the name of the Alliance, all the support and assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan who may manifest their fidelity and allegiance to their Sovereign.

ARTICLE III.

If Mehemet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of the arrangement above mentioned, should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their Representatives at Constantinople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request of that Sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne by means of a co-operation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the Capital of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression.

It is further agreed, that the forces which, in virtue of such concert, may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain so employed as long as their presence shall be required by the Sultan ; and when His Highness shall deem their presence no longer necessary, the said forces shall simultaneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean, respectively.

ARTICLE IV.

It is, however, expressly understood, that the co-operation mentioned in the preceding Article, and destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman Capital, under the temporary safeguard of the High Contracting Parties against all aggression of Mehemet Ali, shall be considered only as a measure of exception adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above mentioned; but it is agreed that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has in all times been prohibited for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting the contingency above mentioned, it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire; and as long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above-mentioned principle.

ARTICLE V.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of two months, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty.

(L. S.) PALMERSTON.

(L. S.) CHEKIB.

(L. S.) NEUMANN.

(L. S.) BULOW.

(L. S.) BRUNOW.

SEPARATE ACT annexed to the Convention concluded at London on the 15th of July, 1840, between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, on the one part, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, on the other.

HIS Highness the Sultan intends to grant, and to cause to be notified to Mehemet Ali, the conditions of the arrangement hereinafter detailed :—

SECTION 1.

His Highness promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalie of Egypt; and His Highness promises, moreover, to grant to Mehemet Ali, for his life, with the title of Pasha of Acre, and with the command of the Fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, the limits of which shall be determined by the following line of demarcation :—

This line, beginning at Cape Ras-el-Nakhora, on the coast of the Mediterranean, shall extend direct from thence as far as the mouth of the River Seizaban, at the northern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias; it shall pass along the western shore of that Lake; it shall follow the right bank of the River Jordan, and the western shore of the Dead Sea; from thence it shall extend straight to the Red Sea, which it shall strike at the northern point of the Gulf of Akaba; and from thence it shall follow the western shore of the Gulf of Akaba, and the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, as far as Suez.

The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto the condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space of ten days after communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent of His Highness; and that Mehemet Ali shall, at the same time, place in the hands of that agent the necessary instructions to the Commanders of his sea and land forces, to withdraw immediately from Arabia, and from all the Holy cities which are therein situated; from the Island of Candia; from the district of Adana; and from all other parts of the Ottoman Empire which are not comprised within the limits of Egypt, and within those of the Pashalic of Acre, as above defined.

SECTION 2.

If within the space of ten days, fixed as above, Mehemet Ali should not accept the above-mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pashalic of Acre; but His Highness will still consent to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space of the ten days next following; that is to say, within a period of twenty days, to be reckoned from the day on which the communication shall have been made to him; and provided that in this case also, he places in the hands of the agent of the Sultan, the necessary instructions to his military and naval Commanders, to withdraw immediately within the limits, and into the ports of the Pashalic of Egypt.

SECTION 3.

The annual tribute to be paid to the Sultan by Mehemet Ali, shall be proportioned to the greater or less amount of territory of which the latter may obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or the second alternative.

SECTION 4.

It is, moreover, expressly understood, that, in the first as in the second alternative, Mehemet Ali (before the expiration of the specified period of ten or of twenty days), shall be bound to deliver up the Turkish Fleet, with the whole of its crews and equipments, into the hands of the Turkish Agent who shall be charged to receive the same. The Commanders of the Allied Squadrons shall be present at such delivery.

It is understood, that in no case can Mehemet Ali carry to account or deduct from the tribute to be paid to the Sultan, the expenses which he has incurred in the maintenance of the Ottoman Fleet, during any part of the time it shall have remained in the ports of Egypt.

SECTION 5.

All the Treaties, and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, shall be applicable to Egypt, and to the Pashalic of Acre, such as it has been above defined, in the same manner as to every other part of the Ottoman Empire. But the Sultan consents, that on condition of the regular payment of the tribute above mentioned, Mehemet Ali and

his descendants shall collect, in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegate of His Highness, within the provinces, the administration of which shall be confided to them, the taxes and imposts legally established. It is moreover understood, that in consideration of the receipt of the aforesaid taxes and imposts, Mehemet Ali and his descendants shall defray all the expenses of the civil and military administration of the said provinces.

SECTION 6.

The military and naval forces which may be maintained by the Pasha of Egypt and Acre, forming part of the Ottoman Empire, shall always be considered as maintained for the service of the State.

SECTION 7.

If, at the expiration of the period of twenty days after the communication shall have been made to him (according to the stipulation of Section 2), Mehemet Ali shall not accede to the proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt, the Sultan will consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow, in consequence, such ulterior course as his own interests and the counsels of his Allies may suggest to him.

SECTION 8.

The present Separate Act shall have the same force and validity, as if it were inserted, word for word, in the Convention of this date. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London at the same time as those of the said Convention.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON.

(L.S.) CHEKIB.

(L.S.) NEUMANN.

(L.S.) BULOW.

(L.S.) BRUNOW.

PROTOCOL signed at London, on the 15th of July, 1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of

*Great Britain ;
Austria ;
Prussia ;
Russia ; and
Turkey.*

IN affixing his signature to the Convention of this date, the Plenipotentiary of the Sublime Ottoman Porte declared :

That in recording by Article IV. of the said Convention the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of which, it has been at all times forbidden to Foreign Vessels of War to enter within the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, the Sublime Porte reserves to itself, as heretofore, to deliver passes to light vessels under Flag of War, which may be employed according to custom, for the service of the correspondence of the Legations of Friendly Powers.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, took note of the above Declaration, for the purpose of communicating it to their respective Courts.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
BULOW.
BRUNOW.

*RESERVED PROTOCOL signed at London on the 15th of July,
1840, by the Plenipotentiaries of*

*Great Britain ;
Austria ;
Prussia ;
Russia ; and
Turkey.*

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, having, in virtue of their full powers

concluded and signed this day a Convention between their respective Sovereigns for the pacification of the Levant ;

Considering that, in consequence of the distances which separate the Capitals of their respective Courts, a certain space of time must necessarily elapse before the ratifications of the said Convention can be exchanged, and before orders founded thereupon can be carried into execution ;

And the said Plenipotentiaries being deeply impressed with the conviction, that by reason of the present state of things in Syria, the interests of humanity, as well as the grave considerations of European Policy which constitute the object of the common solicitude of the Contracting Parties to the Convention of this day, imperiously require that, as far as possible, all delay should be avoided in the accomplishment of the pacification which the said Convention is intended to effect ;

The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, have agreed, that the preliminary measures mentioned in Article II. of the said Convention, shall be carried into execution at once, without waiting for the exchange of ratifications ; the respective Plenipotentiaries recording formally, by the present Instrument, the consent of their Courts to the immediate execution of these measures.

It is moreover agreed between the said Plenipotentiaries, that His Highness the Sultan will proceed immediately to address to Mchemet Ali the communication and offers specified in the Separate Act annexed to the Convention of this day.

It is further agreed that the Consular Agents of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, at Alexandria, shall place themselves in communication with the Agent whom His Highness may send thither to communicate to Mehemet Ali the above-mentioned offers ; that the said Consuls shall afford to that Agent all the assistance and support in their power ; and shall use all their means of influence with Mehemet Ali, in order to persuade him to accept the arrangement which will be proposed to him by order of His Highness the Sultan.

The Admirals of the respective squadrons in the Mediterranean shall be instructed to place themselves in communication with the said Consuls on this subject.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.
NEUMANN.
BULOW.
BRUNOW.

CHEKIB.

*PROTOCOL of a Conference held at London the 17th of September
1840.*

Present :

The Plenipotentiaries of

Great Britain ;

Austria ;

Prussia ;

Russia ; and

Turkey.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, after having exchanged the Ratifications of the Convention concluded on the 15th of July last, have resolved, in order to place in its true light the disinterestedness which has guided their Courts in the conclusion of that Act, to declare formally :

That in the execution of the engagements resulting to the Contracting Powers from the above-mentioned Convention, those Powers will seek no augmentation of territory, no exclusive influence, no commercial advantage for their subjects, which those of every other nation may not equally obtain.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Courts above mentioned have resolved to record this Declaration in the present Protocol.

The Plenipotentiary of the Ottoman Porte, in paying a just tribute to the good faith and disinterested policy of the Allied Courts, has taken cognizance of the Declaration contained in the present Protocol, and has undertaken to transmit it to his Court.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

CHEKIB.

NEUMANN.

SCHLEINITZ.

BRUNOW.

NOTE V.

Reply of Earl Stanhope as Secretary of State to his Britannic Majesty, to a Note of the Czar of Muscovy, under date of the 14th of December, 1719.

The considerations his Majesty has for the Czar having engaged him to cause the memorial presented by the Sieur Resident Wesselski, the 14th of December last, to be examined and maturely weighed, and the memorial being intermixed with facts that concern his Majesty as King, and others that concern him only as Elector, he caused an answer to be given with reference to the latter, by his German Chancery, and as for the others he has commanded me to return the answer following:—

His Majesty has ever made it his care and application to follow the maxims of his Royal Predecessors, those principally which tend to the maintaining of peace and friendship between him and the other Potentates of Europe, and to the cultivating commerce with them for mutual advantages.

His Majesty has shewn in particular a sincere desire to live in amity with the Czar, although the Crown of Great Britain had no formal engagements with that Prince; and one may well ascribe to the advances his Majesty has made to gain the Czar's friendship, the resentment of the late King of Sweden against his Majesty, the effects of which have appeared on several occasions.

'Twas in order to establish a good correspondence with the Czar on a solid foundation that his Majesty desired to make with him a Treaty of Commerce.

'Tis true Prince Kurakin repaired hither for that negotiation, about the beginning of the year 1716; but instead of making suitable returns to his Majesty's advances, there were started several difficulties too tedious to be related in this place, and, in particular, the King's subjects were denied the liberty of trading at Casan and Astracan, a privilege which had been granted them by his Czarish Majesty's predecessors; but what chiefly rendered this negotiation fruitless was, that the Czar would never come into this Treaty of Commerce, unless an Alliance were concluded at the same time, which was to extend so far, as inevitably to engage Great Britain in a rupture with the

Crown of Sweden, its ancient Ally, whose destruction is equally inconsistent with the peace and the balance of Europe, and with the support of the Protestant religion; to which his Majesty, both in regard to conscience and to reason of State, is under so many obligations to contribute with all his power.

The Seventh Article* of that Alliance, which is set here in the margin, shews that there was demanded of his Majesty, not only the guarantee of so many Provinces which the Czar has conquered from Sweden, (without a great part whereof it is impossible for that Crown to subsist,) but that they *insisted also on the assistance of a British Fleet* to act directly against Sweden, and even that that Fleet should be under the command of the Czar and his Admirals; which, with regard to Great Britain, was the most odious and the most impracticable thing in the world; so that it is evident his Majesty could not enter into any such engagements, without rendering all peace and agreement with Sweden utterly impossible; since he must have guaranteed to the Czar, Provinces, which that Czar can never give up. And besides, his Majesty would thereby have drawn upon himself the powers concerned in the preservation of Sweden,

• A copy of the Seventh Article of the Project of Alliance proposed by Prince Kurakin in 1716, and which in all the subsequent negotiations has ever been laid on the part of the Czar, as a condition *sine quâ non* :

“ Art. 7th.—His Britannic Majesty promises and engages on his part, that in the negotiations of Peace with the Crown of Sweden, he will, like a good Ally, assist his Czarish Majesty with all his power and interest, so that, by virtue of that peace, the Crown of Sweden shall yield up and make over for ever to his Czarish Majesty and his Successors, the Provinces which at present are actually under the Dominions of his said Czarish Majesty, to wit, Ingria, Livonia, Esthonia, and Carelia, with all their Dependencies, the town of Wybourg inclusive. And if his Czarish Majesty and his Successors happen to be attacked or disturbed in the said Provinces and Places, his Britannic Majesty engages, both for himself and his Successors, to assist them at his own expense two months after he or they shall be required so to do, with fifteen Ships of the Line of Battle, which shall serve where his Czarish Majesty shall desire, and the said Squadron shall act under the command of his Czarish Majesty and his Admiral.”

Thus we see that the monstrous act recently committed by our Minister—that by which he placed the British Fleet under the command of a Russian Minister in the Mediterranean, was attempted by Peter so early as the year 1716, in the Baltic!

and those which are obliged to it by their alliances and guarantees ; the friendship of which Powers was moreover so necessary to the King, in order to bring about, in concert with them, the great schemes he had formed for the tranquillity of Europe. Let any one judge, whether his Majesty, how desirous soever he might be to secure the Czar's friendship, could purchase it at so dear a rate.

It was for these causes the negotiation of a Treaty of Commerce in the month of February, 1716, miscarried, and not on account of the affair of Mecklenburgh, which did not happen till the month of October following. Whatever share the King might have in this last-mentioned affair as Elector, he did not intermeddle in it as King. Sir John Norris made no attempt either against the Czar's fleet or against his land forces ; no concert was framed for that purpose, and the meaning of the writer of the memorial is not to be understood, when he insinuates that Admiral Norris was just going to act in an hostile manner against the Czar's fleet, then at Copenhagen.

An imputation of this nature ought never to be advanced without sufficient proof ; and if the Czar entertained any such suspicion, it can be founded on no fact that ever came to the knowledge of his Majesty or any of his Ministers ; it ought rather to be believed, that this affectation of insinuating such jealousies in the memorial, is on purpose to *divert the Reader's attention from the designs which the Czar's conduct at that time gave just grounds to suspect him of*. For if it be true that he had such views, and that being in the most intimate alliance with the King of Denmark, he yet had projected no less than to possess himself of the Sound and of Copenhagen, (instead of a descent upon Schonen, with which the world had been amused for several months,) it is natural that he should endeavour to put the public upon a wrong scent, and to turn the bias of their thoughts by recriminations, that have no manner of foundation.* Now if the Czar really had such intentions, it is possible he was kept from bringing them to effect, by a just apprehension that his Majesty's fleet might oppose them, which it would infallibly have done in such a case ; and might not the Czar's resentment, at the disappointment of so vast a project, by the fear of a British fleet, have been the cause of his being so much estranged from his Majesty ever since

* How perfectly has the Policy of Russia been carried out since that time—but now they can do precisely as they think proper, for it is not part of the “ *civilization* ” of the times to take any notice of that which tends to the destruction of the interests of England !

that time? For from thence may be dated the commencement of that animosity which on so many occasions he has shewn against his Majesty.

This appeared soon after, when by the letters that passed between Count Gyllembourg and Baron Gortz it was discovered, that the Czar was incensed against his Majesty to such a degree, that he thought in good earnest of a reconciliation with the King of Sweden, of making a separate peace with him, and of assisting the Pretender at the same time to possess himself of the Throne of Great Britain; and, in truth, whatever assurances of the contrary were given in the memorial of 1717, the Czar's conduct, ever since, seems to have *been entirely suited to such a scheme*. The negotiations of one Jernegan, and of Sir Hugh Patterson, brother-in-law to the late Lord Mar, with the Russian Ministry, while the Czar was in Holland, are not unknown; no more than are the intrigues of that Ministry, both with the late Duke of Ormond, whilst he lay *incognito* at Mittau, and with Sir Harry Stirling, and the said Jernegan, at Petersburg; nor the correspondence, which, by means of the person last named, was settled between the Czar and the Court of Spain.

It appeared publicly that the Czar gave all manner of protection and encouragement to a great number of his Majesty's rebel subjects. It is well known that the conferences at Aland, which were set on foot without his Majesty's knowledge, had their rise from an interview with Baron Gortz, at Loo, in August, 1717. That Minister's papers have discovered the design of those conferences; and that the invasion of Scotland was immediately to follow the conquest of Norway; so that it is not strange the Czar should take no care to prevent the loss of that country, or to succour his Ally, the king of Denmark in so pressing an exigence: in short, it is sufficiently known, that the Czar caused repeated proposals to be made to the *Court of Spain, to bring them into an offensive alliance against his Majesty, in favour of the Pretender*.

The King, not yet discouraged by such proceedings, endeavoured by all kind of means to gain the Czar's friendship. He did for that purpose send to him, in August, 1717, Admiral Norris and Mr. Witworth, both known and, as his Majesty thought, acceptable to him; but the whole was again set aside, by proposing on his part that alliance in which it was known the King could never enter, and which was made the more impracticable by the condition they continued to insert in it, that the *British Squadron should be under the command of the Czar's Admirals*.

Though, as things stood, his Majesty had reason to believe that the memorial which was presented to him by the Resident, in Summer, 1718, making mention of the Czar's inclination to live in friendship with him, was no more than an artifice to cover the negotiations and intrigues before-mentioned ; yet, that nothing might be wanting on his part, he took occasion from thence to send Mr. Jefferyes, his Resident, to Petersbnrg, and even ordered Admiral Norris to go thither likewise ; but the Admiral being sailed from the Baltic, on his return to England, before Mr. Jefferyes arrived at Copenhagen, he proceeded on his journey without him. He omitted nothing that might bring to effect the good disposition he had been assured he should find in the Czar ; but those assurances soon appeared to be a further amusement ; for, instead of making any proposals to him, he was asked what he had to offer ? and when he spoke of re-establishing ancient friendship, and of concluding a Treaty of Commerce, he was told that an alliance must first be thought of, and a plan settled for the operations of a War against Sweden ; which proposal it was well known could never be admitted by British Ministers.

The designs concerted at Aland with Baron Gortz, being at length entirely overthrown by the King of Sweden's death, the Czar not finding in the Princess who succeeded him any disposition to pursue such unjust and dangerous schemes, resolved to compel her to it by force, and by such violent extremities as are scarce to be paralleled. Being full of this imagination, he was alarmed at the Fleet his Majesty was obliged to send yearly into the Baltic, to protect the Trade of his subjects : he demanded in an imperious and threatening manner, upon what design this was done ; and he wrote to Admiral Norris in such language, as the Crown of Great Britain has not been used to.

However, the King made no other return to all these proceedings but mild applications and offers of his mediation, by the Lord Carteret and Admiral Norris ; whilst the Czar would not so much as receive their letters on this subject, on pretence that they had no credentials to him ; an objection which none of the other powers, engaged in the War against Sweden had started, though their case was exactly the same.

To avoid whatever might exasperate, nothing shall be said here of the ill treatment of his Majesty's subjects in the Czar's dominions, of British Seamen forced to serve on board the Russian Fleet, of artificers denied the liberty of returning to their country, of merchants confined without cause, and of ships and cargoes seized and confiscated without law or justice.

His Majesty still persists in the same sentiments of moderation towards the Czar, desiring to live in friendship and good correspondence with him, and to incline him to be able to restore tranquillity in the North. With this view he again offers his mediation, hoping the Czar will not be the only Prince in Europe that opposes so just and salutary a design. It may be said that nothing can be more suitable to his interest, since this is proposed to be attained by procuring a peace, that will secure to him a considerable part of his conquests. His Majesty hopes that so knowing a Prince as the Czar, will not only moderate his pretensions for the advancement of the peace in general, but will likewise distinguish, that it is more becoming his prudence to secure to himself, by good Treaties and by the consent of other Great Powers, such considerable tracts of land, the cession of which it is hoped may be procured from the Crown of Sweden, than to expose the fruits of all his happy success to the events of a War, in which he will stand alone; Sweden neither ought nor can yield up Revel to him; but though the Czar should restore that place, he would still remain possessed of other ports, and of a vast extent of territory along the coasts of the Baltic Sea.

The complaisance which the King is willing to show, in being the mediator of a Treaty that should procure such advantage to the Czar, is an invincible proof of the disposition his Majesty is in to live in amity with him; and if the public should find any fault in such conduct, it would be that, in the opinion of many, that complaisance is carried too far. If, after such offers, the Czar persists in his unwillingness to restore Revel, he will thereby only alarm all the other Powers, and unite most of them against him.

The King's sincere desire to see a general Peace established, and his earnestness to renew for that end his former union with the Czar, induce his Majesty upon this occasion to offer him friendly advice, and to exhort him to give a serious attention to it.

If, unhappily, and contrary to all expectation, these advances and good intentions of his Majesty should, through the Czar's refusal, be ineffectual; and that the King, by virtue of his engagements with Sweden, which he is resolved to stand by, should find himself obliged to enter upon measures disagreeable to the Czar, he will satisfy himself with having omitted nothing on his part, to prevent the grievous consequences which may ensue.

Done at Whitehall, the 11th of February, 1719-20.

STANHOPE.

*Reply of the Earl Stanhope in the name of the King of England as
Elector of Hanover, to the Memorial of the Russian Envoy.*

HIS Majesty has ordered Answer to be returned to the Memorial presented by the resident Wesselowski, as far as that Memorial concerns him, in the quality of Elector. That he was very much surprised to see the reproaches contained in it, because he has not deserved them from his Czarish Majesty, whose friendship he has always cultivated very carefully, as well before as since his accession to the crown.

It is not his Majesty who has deviated from the Treaty of 1715 ; on the contrary, it is his Czarish Majesty who has departed from it, seeing nothing could be more against it, than his coming to establish himself in the Empire with an army, and to possess himself of Provinces contiguous to his Majesty's dominions in Germany. It may be remembered, that his Majesty observing the Russian troops in Mecklenbourg, a magazine formed at Rostock for their subsistence, and the country ruined by their exactions, discharged towards his Czarish Majesty the office of a friend and an ally, by causing to be represented to him the prejudice he was doing himself by such a proceeding, and the danger he was in, by drawing upon himself the head and the members of the Empire.

Those who consider the rank which his Majesty holds, as well in the Empire as in the circle, and the interest he had in the tranquillity of his neighbourhood, will doubtless judge, that such instances were not only founded in justice and equity, but likewise that his Majesty could not avoid making them and that he was obliged to it by all manner of reasons. Accordingly, it was much wondered it did not produce any effect, and that the Czar's ministers should seek only to gain time, and to amuse the world with illusory promises of a march of their master's troops, without ever fixing a time for that march. It even appeared plainly, that those instances of the King gave rise to that animosity of the Czar against his Majesty, which has since broke out on so many occasions. One effect of it was the interview which the Czar and his Ministers had, at Loo, with Baron Gortz, who had been newly dismissed from his confinement at Arnheim, seeing that Baron was then intrusted to bring about a separate peace between the Czar and the King of Sweden. His Czarish Majesty did not only not communicate that interview at all to the King, but when the Resident Weber spoke of it a little after to his

ministers at Petersburg, they thought fit to deny it. And yet it was that interview which gave to the congress at Aland, which was formed without his Majesty's knowledge; insomuch, that when M. Osterman set out to go thither in the month of January 1718, he denied the matter with oaths to the Resident Weber, and assured him he was going to Moscow, where his Czarish Majesty then was. The Czar would never admit his Majesty's Minister to the conferences at Aland, nor impart to him what was treating there; nor will this be wondered at, if it be considered, that his Czarish Majesty was framing plans there, the drift of which was no less than to unite his forces with those of the King of Sweden, for carrying the war into his Majesty's dominions in Germany, and for invading *Scotland* after the conquest of *Norway*. It was the interview at Loo, and several other suspicious proceedings of the Czar, that induced his Majesty to send into *Sweden* the councillor Schrader, to endeavour to discover, whether there were any grounds for the rumours which were spread of a separate peace, ready to be concluded between his Czarish Majesty and *Sweden*.

It is affirmed in the memorial, that those secret negotiations of his Majesty determined the Czar to form the Congress at Aland; whereas it is publicly well known, that the Czar's two plenipotentiaries set out from Petersburg in the middle of the month of January 1718, and councillor Schrader did not begin his journey till the month of March the same year. His stay at Lunden in Schonen was but for three weeks, and he did not see the King of Sweden, who was then at Stromstat. The death of that King happening at the end of the year 1718, his Czarish Majesty took thereupon a resolution to make the utmost efforts to oppress Sweden, and force it to accept the conditions he should please to prescribe. No man is ignorant of the ravages and burnings which he caused to be made for gaining his point. He sent M. Osterman to Stockholm, instructed to promote exorbitant terms: but if his Czarish Majesty did then employ both force and negotiation, it was only for procuring his own separate peace. His Britannic Majesty's interests were no part of the question; on the contrary, the business in hand was, after the conclusion of the Czar's peace with Sweden, to take measures with that crown for coming into the Empire with united forces, and recovering for the Swedes what they had lost there.

In this situation, or to speak more properly, in this extremity, his Britannic Majesty thought it time at last to look to himself, and

hinder the ruin of a protestant kingdom, in uniting with it by alliances.

But this was done without proceeding to any hostilities against his Czarish Majesty. On the contrary, the King offered him his mediation, which he had the more right to do, because Great Britain was never engaged with the war in the North, and because this mediation had been accepted by the Queen of Sweden.

It is manifest, therefore, that if the King has prevented the Czar by his treaty with Sweden, he was authorised, not to say forced, to do it, by the many proceedings of that Prince, who had so long a time been treating of peace, in exclusion of his Majesty, in a public congress formed without his consent, and was on the point of putting Sweden under a yoke. His Majesty's British Minister will take care to set forth, in the answer which they will deliver to the Resident, his Majesty's just causes of complaint, in the quality of King of Great Britain.

In the meantime, it depends wholly on the Czar to re-establish entirely friendship and good intelligence, and to let the troubles of the North cease, by making use of a mediation, which has no other aim than to put an end to them, and in their room to settle peace and tranquillity.

Done at St. James's the 21st. January, 1720,

NOTE VI.

Letter from Lord Palmerston to M. Thiers, with the Reply and Rejoinder.

Foreign Office, August 31, 1840.

SIR,

Various circumstances have prevented me from sooner transmitting to you, and through you to the French Government, some observations which Her Majesty's Government is desirous of making upon the memorandum delivered to me on the 24th of July, by the French Ambassador at this Court, in reply to the memorandum which I had delivered to His Excellency on the 17th of that month; but I now proceed to do so.

Her Majesty's Government observed, with great satisfaction, the friendly tone of the French memorandum, and the assurances which it contains of the earnest desire of France to maintain peace, and to uphold the balance of power in Europe. The memorandum of the 17th July was conceived in a spirit of equal friendliness towards France; and Her Majesty's Government is as anxious as that of France can be to preserve the peace of Europe, and to prevent any derangement of the existing balance of power.

Her Majesty's Government also saw with much pleasure the declarations which the French memorandum contains, that France wishes to act in concert with the other four Powers in regard to the affairs of the Levant; that she has never been actuated in these matters by any other motive than a desire to preserve peace; and that in the judgment she has formed upon the propositions which have been made to her, she has never been influenced by any selfish interests of her own, being, in fact, as disinterested as any other Power can be in the affairs of the Levant.

The sentiments of Her Majesty's Government upon these points are in all respects similar to, and corresponding with, those of the Government of France. For, in the first place, in the whole course of the negotiations which have been going on upon these matters during more than twelve months, it has invariably been the anxious desire of the British Government that a concert should be established between the five Powers, and that all the five should agree

in a common course of conduct ; and Her Majesty's Government feels that it can refer for proofs of this desire to the various propositions which, from time to time, have been made to the Government of France, and which are alluded to in the French memorandum ; and, in the next place, Her Majesty's Government can safely affirm that no Power in Europe can be less influenced than Great Britain is by any selfish views, or by any desire or expectation of exclusive advantage to arise to herself out of the settlement of the affairs of the Levant ; for, on the contrary, the interest of Great Britain in those affairs is identified with that of Europe at large, and lies in the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, as a security for the preservation of peace, and as an essential element in the general balance of power.

In these principles the French Government has declared its full concurrence ; and it has stated that concurrence upon many occasions, but especially in Marshal Soult's despatch of the 17th July, 1839, which was communicated officially to the four Powers, in the collective note of the 27th of July, 1839, and in the speech of the King of the French to his Chambers, in December, 1839.

In these documents the French Government declared its determination to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under its present dynasty, as an essential element of the balance of power, and as a security for the preservation of peace ; and it is also asserted in Marshal Soult's despatch, its resolution to oppose, by all its means of action and influence, every combination which might be hostile to the maintenance of that integrity and independence.

The Governments of Great Britain and of France, are, therefore, perfectly agreed as to the objects at which their policy in regard to the affairs of the Levant ought to aim, and as to the fundamental principles by which that policy ought to be guided ; and the only difference which exists between the two governments, is a difference of opinion as to what means are best calculated to attain the common end—a point upon which, as the French memorandum observes, various opinions may naturally be expected to exist.

Upon this point there has, indeed, arisen a considerable difference of opinion between the two governments ; a difference which seems to have become wider, and more confirmed, in proportion as the two governments have more fully explained their respective views ; and which for the present, has prevented the two governments from co-operating together for the attainment of their common object.

On the one hand, Her Majesty's Government has all along declared the opinion, that it would be impossible to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and to uphold the independence of the Sultan's throne, if Mehemet Ali were to be left in the occupation of Syria. Her Majesty's Government has stated that it considers Syria to be the military key of Asiatic Turkey ; and that if Mehemet Ali were to continue to occupy that province, in addition to Egypt, he would be able at all times to menace Bagdad to the South, Diarbekir and Erzeroum to the East, and Koniah, and Persia, and Constantinople, to the North ; that the same spirit of ambition which has led Mehemet Ali, on former occasions, to revolt against his Sovereign, would soon prompt him again to take up arms for further encroachment ; and that for this purpose he would always keep a large army on foot ; that the Sultan, on the other hand, must see the danger by which he would constantly be threatened, and must be obliged also to remain armed ; that thus the Sultan and Mehemet Ali would continue to maintain large armies to watch each other ; that collision must inevitably arise out of mutual suspicion and alarm, even if there were no intentional aggression on either side ; that any such collision would necessarily lead to foreign interference in the interior of the Turkish Empire, and that such interference, so occasioned, would produce the most serious differences between the Powers of Europe.

But Her Majesty's Government has pointed out a danger still greater than this, as a probable, if not certain consequence of the continued occupation of Syria by Mehemet Ali ; and that is, that the Pacha, confiding in his military strength, and tired of his political condition of subject, should execute the intention which he frankly informed the Powers of Europe, two years ago, he would never abandon, and should declare himself independent. Such a declaration on his part would be an undeniable dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire ; and yet that dismemberment might happen under circumstances which would render it more difficult for the Powers of Europe to co-operate together in order to compel the Pacha to retract such a declaration, than it is for them now to combine in order to force him to evacuate Syria.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, has invariably contended that all those Powers who wish to preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and to uphold the independence of the Sultan's throne, ought to unite to assist the Sultan in re-establishing his direct authority in Syria.

The French Government, on the other hand, has argued that Mehemet Ali, if once secured in the permanent occupation of Egypt and Syria, would remain the faithful subject, and would become the firmest supporter of the Sultan. That the Sultan could not govern Syria if he got it back again, and that the military and financial resources of that province would be more available for the Sultan's defence when in the hands of Mehemet Ali, than if they were restored to the hands of the Sultan himself; that implicit reliance might be placed upon Mehemet Ali's abjurations of any further ambitious views, and in his protestations of devoted fidelity to his sovereign; that the Pacha is an old man, and that at his death, in spite of any hereditary grant made to his family, the whole of his acquired power would revert to the Sultan, because all possessions in Mahometan countries, be their nominal tenure what it may, are practically nothing more than life-holds.

The French Government, moreover, contended that Mehemet Ali would never of his own accord consent to evacuate Syria; and that the only means which the Powers of Europe could employ to compel him, would be either naval operations, which would be insufficient, or land operations, which would be dangerous; that naval operations would not expel the Egyptians from Syria, and would only provoke Mehemet Ali to make an attack upon Constantinople; and that the measures which must be resorted to in such a case to defend the capital, but still more any land operations by troops of the allied Powers to expel Mehemet's army from Syria, would be more fatal to the independence of the Turkish Empire, than could be the state of things which such proceedings might be intended to remedy.

To this Her Majesty's Government replied that no reliance could be placed on Mehemet Ali's present protestations; that ambition is insatiable, and only increases by success; and that to give Mehemet Ali the power to encroach, and still to leave within his reach objects to covet, would be to sow the certain seeds of future collisions; that Syria is not further from Constantinople than many well-administered provinces of other Empires are from the capital, and might be governed from Constantinople as easily as from Alexandria; and that it is impossible that the resources of that province could be as useful to the Sultan, when in the hands of a chief who might at any time turn those resources against the Sultan, as they would be if in the hands and at the disposal and command of the Sultan himself; that Ibrahim, having an army under his orders,

has the means to secure his succession, at Mehemet Ali's death, to any authority which Mehemet might die possessed of; and that it would not be fitting for the great Powers to advise the Sultan to make an ostensible arrangement with Mehemet Ali, with a secret and reserved intention of breaking that arrangement on the very first occasion on which it might become applicable to events.

The French Government, however, still retained its opinion and declined to be a party to any arrangement which included the employment of coercive measures against Mehemet Ali.

But the French memorandum states that, 'in the last circumstances no positive proposition has been made to France, upon which she was called upon to explain herself; and that, consequently, the determination which England communicated to her in the memorandum of the 17th of July, no doubt in the name of the four Powers, must not be imputed to refusals which France has not made.' This passage renders it necessary for me shortly to recapitulate to you the general course of the negotiation.

The original opinion entertained by Her Majesty's Government, and which was made known, in June 1829, to the other four Powers, France included, was, that the only arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali which could ensure permanent peace in the Levant, would be that which should confine Mehemet Ali's delegated authority to Egypt alone, and should re-establish the direct authority of the Sultan in the whole of Syria, as well as in Candia, and the holy cities; thus interposing the Desert between the Sultan's direct authority and the province to be administered by the Pacha; and Her Majesty's Government proposed that, as a compensation for the evacuation of Syria, Mehemet Ali should receive the assurance that his male descendants should succeed him as governors of Egypt, under the Sultan.

To this proposal the French Government objected, saying, that such an arrangement would undoubtedly be the best, if there were the means to carry it into effect; but that Mehemet Ali would resist it, and that any measures of force which the Allies might employ to compel him to yield, would produce consequences which would be more dangerous to the peace of Europe and to the independence of the Porte, than the present state of things between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali could be. But though the French Government thus declined to agree to the British plan, yet for a considerable time afterwards it had no plan of its own to propose.

However, in September 1839, Count Sebastiani, the French ambassador at the court of London, proposed that a line should be drawn East and West, from the sea somewhere near Beyrout, to the Desert near Damascus, and that all to the south of that line should be administered by Mehemet Ali, and all to the north of that line by the direct authority of the Sultan; and the French Ambassador gave Her Majesty's Government to understand that if such an arrangement were agreed to by all the five Powers, France would, in case of need, unite with the other four in the employment of coercive measures to compel Mehemet Ali to submit to it.

But I pointed out to Count Sebastiani, that such an arrangement would be liable, though in a somewhat less degree, to all the objections which apply to the present relative position of the two parties, and therefore could not be agreed to by Her Majesty's Government; and I observed, that it appeared to be inconsistent, that France should be willing to employ coercive measures against Mehemet Ali to compel him to subscribe to this arrangement, which would evidently be incomplete and insufficient for its professed purpose, and yet that France should refuse to employ coercive measures to compel Mehemet Ali to consent to the arrangement proposed by Her Majesty's Government, which even France herself admitted would, if carried into execution, be complete and effectual for its purpose.

To this, Count Sebastiani replied, that the objection felt by the French Government to employ coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, was founded upon domestic considerations; and that those objections would be removed if the French Government were able to show to the public and to the Chambers, that it had procured for Mehemet Ali the best terms which could be obtained for him, and that he had refused to accept those terms.

This suggestion not having been adopted by Her Majesty's Government, the French Government, on the 27th September, 1839, communicated officially its own plan, which was, that Mehemet Ali should be made Hereditary Governor of Egypt, and of the whole of Syria, and Governor for life of Candia, giving up nothing but Arabia and the district of Adana. The French Government, however, did not say that it knew that Mehemet Ali would consent even to this arrangement; nor did it declare that, if he should refuse to accept it, France would join in coercive measures to compel him to do so.

To this plan, of course, Her Majesty's Government could not consent, because it would be even more objectionable than the present state of things; inasmuch as by giving Mehemet Ali a legal and hereditary title to a third of the Ottoman empire, which he now only occupies by force, it would at once be a virtual, and would at no distant time lead to a real dismemberment of that empire. But Her Majesty's Government, in order to prove its anxious desire to come to an understanding with France on these matters, stated, that it would waive its well-founded objection to any extension of Mehemet Ali's authority beyond Egypt, and would join with the French Government in recommending to the Sultan to give to Mehemet Ali, in addition to the Pachalic of Egypt, the administration of the lower part of Syria, bounded to the North by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to the southern end of Lake Tiberias, and to the eastward by the Jordan, the western shore of the Dead Sea, and by a line from thence down to the Gulf of Akaba; provided that France would engage to co-operate with the four Powers in coercive measures, if Mehemet Ali should refuse this offer.

This proposal, however, was declined by the French Government, and that government now declared that it could not possibly co-operate in any coercive measures against Mehemet Ali, and could not therefore be a party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali should not spontaneously consent.

During the time that this discussion had been going on with France, a separate negotiation had been carried on between Great Britain and Russia, with every detail and step of which, however, the French Government was regularly made acquainted. The negotiation with France was suspended for a time in the early part of this year, first by an expected, and afterwards by an actual change of ministry in France. But in the beginning of May the Baron de Nieumann and myself determined, on the part of our respective governments, to make one more attempt to bring France to an agreement with the other four Powers; and we resolved to submit to the French Government, through M. Guizot, another proposition for an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali.

One objection which had been urged by the French Government to the last British proposal was, that, although it would give Mehemet Ali the strong defensive position extending from Mount Carmel to Mount Tabor, it would deprive him of the fortress of Acre. In order, therefore, to meet this objection, Baron de Nieu-

mann and myself proposed to M. Guizot, that the northern boundary of that part of Syria which should be administered by the Pasha, should be drawn from Cape Nakhora to the northern end of Lake Tiberias, so as to include within its limits the fortress of Acre; and that the eastern boundary should run down along the western bank of Lake Tiberias; and thence, as before proposed, to the Gulf of Akaba. But we said that the government of this lower part of Syria could only be given to Mehemet Ali for his life; and that neither England nor Austria could consent to recommend the grant of hereditary tenure to Mehemet Ali in regard to any part whatever of Syria; and I stated, moreover, to M. Guizot, that this proposal was the utmost extent to which we could go in the way of concession, in order to obtain the co-operation of France, and it was therefore our last offer.

The Baron de Nieumann and myself made this communication to M. Guizot separately; Baron de Nieumann on one day, and I upon the next. M. Guizot told me he would report to his government the proposition I had made, and the statements with which I had accompanied it, and would let me know their reply whenever he should receive it.

Soon afterwards the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia stated to me, that they had reason to believe that the French Government, instead of deciding upon this proposal themselves, had transmitted it to Alexandria, for the decision of Mehemet Ali. That this was placing the four Powers in negotiation, not with France, but with Mehemet Ali. That, besides the delay which would be thereby occasioned, this was what their respective Courts neither intended to do nor could consent to do; and that the French Government had thus placed the Plenipotentiaries in a very embarrassing situation. I replied, that I agreed with them in all their objections to the step which they believed the French Government to have taken, but that M. Guizot had said nothing to me as to any reference made, or to be made, to Mehemet Ali. That the French Government was then much occupied by Parliamentary affairs, and might naturally require some time to give us its answer to our proposal; and that no great practical inconvenience could arise from some trifling delay in this matter. Towards the end of June—I think it was on the 27th of that month—M. Guizot came to me, and read to me, from a letter addressed to him by M. Thiers, the answer of the French Government to our proposal. This

answer was a positive refusal. M. Thiers stated 'That the French Government knew for certain that Mehemet Ali would not consent to any division of Syria, unless compelled thereto by force. That France could not co-operate in the employment of force against Mehemet Ali for such a purpose; and, therefore, France could not be a party to the proposed arrangement.'

France having thus refused the ultimatum of the British Government, it became necessary for the Plenipotentiaries of the four Powers to consider what course their governments should then pursue.

The position of the five Governments was this; all five had declared their conviction that it is essential for the balance of power, and for the preservation of the peace of Europe, that the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire under its present dynasty should be maintained; and all five had pledged themselves to employ all their means of action and influence to maintain that integrity and independence. But France, on the one hand, contended that the best way to maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire was to leave the Sultan to the mercy of Mehemet Ali, and to advise the Sultan to submit to any terms which Mehemet Ali might determine to insist upon as a *sine qua non* of peace; while the four Powers, on the other hand, considered that the further continuance of the present state of military occupation of the Sultan's provinces by Mehemet Ali, would be destructive of the integrity of the Turkish empire, and fatal to its independence. They thought, therefore, that it was necessary to confine Mehemet Ali within narrower limits.

France, after nearly two months' deliberation, had not only refused to agree to the plan proposed by the four Powers as an ultimatum of concession on their part, but had again declared that she could be no party to any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali should not of his own accord, and without coercion consent. The four Powers, therefore, had no other alternative but either to adopt the principle of settlement pressed upon them by France, and which consisted in recommending to the Sultan entire submission to the demands of Mehemet Ali; or else to act upon their own principle, which was, that Mehemet Ali should be compelled to agree to some arrangement consistent in its form with the rights of the Sultan, and compatible in its substance with the integrity of the Turkish empire. By the first course, the co-operation of

France would have been obtained ; by the second course, that co-operation must be foregone.

The earnest desire of the four Powers for the co-operation of France had been sufficiently manifested by the persevering efforts they had made to obtain it during many months of negotiation. They well knew its value, not only in regard to the particular object at present in view, but with reference to the general and permanent interests of Europe ; but that which they wanted, and that which they valued, was the co-operation of France for the purposes of peace ; for the attainment of future security to Europe ; for the practical execution of principles which all the five Powers had concurred in declaring. They valued the co-operation of France not for its own sake alone, nor for the advantage and convenience of the moment, but for the good it was to accomplish, and for the future consequences that were to result from it. They were anxious to co-operate with France in doing good, but they were not prepared to co-operate with France to do evil. Therefore, believing, as they did, that the policy recommended by France was injudicious, was unjust towards the Sultan, was pregnant with future dangers to Europe, was at variance with the public engagements of the five Powers, and inconsistent with the principles which the five Powers had deliberately professed, the four Powers felt that they could not make the sacrifice which was required at their hands as the price of the co-operation of France ; if, indeed, that can be called co-operation, which was to consist in letting events take their own course. Unable, therefore, to adopt the views of France, the four Powers determined to carry into execution their own.

But this determination had not been unforeseen, nor had its probability been concealed from France.

On the contrary, at various times during the negotiation, and as early as October last, I had stated to the French Ambassador at this court, that our desire to remain united with France on these matters must have a limit ; that we were anxious to go forward with France, but that we were not prepared to stand still with France ; and that if France could not find the means of coming to a common understanding with the four Powers, she must not be surprised if the four Powers were to come to an understanding together, and were to act without her.

To this Count Sebastiani replied, that he foresaw that we should do so, and that he would foretell the result. That we should try to

accomplish our own arrangement without the participation of France, and that we should find our means insufficient; that France would remain a perfectly quiet and passive spectator of events; that after a year, or a year and a half, of unsuccessful efforts, we should acknowledge that we had failed, and should then address ourselves to France; and that France, as friendly after our failure as she had been before our attempt, would give her good offices to arrange matters, and would probably persuade us then to agree to things which we declined to consent to now.

Similar intimations were also made to M. Guizot as to the course which the four Powers would probably pursue, if they should be unable to come to an agreement with France. Therefore, the French Government having declined the ultimatum of the four Powers, and having, in declining it, again laid down a principle of conduct which it knew that the four Powers could not adopt—the principle, namely, that no settlement ought to be made between the Sultan and his subject except upon such conditions as the subject might choose spontaneously to accept, or, in other words, to dictate—the French Government must have been prepared to see the four Powers determined to act without France, and the four Powers, in determining so to do, could not justly be represented as separating themselves from France, or as excluding France from the settlement of a great European affair. On the contrary, it was France who separated herself from the four Powers. For it was France who had laid down for herself a principle of action which rendered her co-operation with the other four Powers impossible.

And here, without wishing to indulge in controversial observations on the past, I feel it indispensably necessary to remark that this voluntary separation of France from the four Powers was not merely evinced by the course of the negotiations in London, but, unless Her Majesty's Government has been greatly misinformed, it had also taken place in a still more decided manner by the course of the negotiations at Constantinople.

The five Powers had, by the collective note which was presented to the Porte on the 27th of July, 1839, by their representatives at Constantinople, declared to the Sultan that their union was assured; and they had requested him to abstain from any direct negotiation with Mehemet Ali, and to make no arrangement with the Pasha without the concurrence of the five Powers. And yet her Majesty's Government have good reason to believe that for many months past the French representative at Constantinople had, with respect

to the matters to which that note referred, distinctly separated France from the other four Powers, and had earnestly and repeatedly pressed the Porte to negotiate directly with Mehemet Ali, and to make an arrangement with the Pasha, not only without the concurrence of the other four Powers, but under the single mediation of France, and according to the particular views of the French Government. It is France, therefore, that has separated herself from the four Powers, and not the four Powers that have separated themselves from France.

With respect to the course pursued by Great Britain, the French Government must admit that the views and opinions of Her Majesty's Government upon the affairs of the Levant have never, from the commencement of these negotiations, varied in the slightest degree, except in as far as Her Majesty's Government has offered to modify those views for the purpose of obtaining the co-operation of France; and those views and opinions have at all times been frankly and unreservedly explained to the French Government, and have been most earnestly and constantly pressed upon that government by arguments which, to Her Majesty's Government, appeared to be conclusive.

✱ In the early stages of the negotiation, the declarations of principle made by the Government of France led Her Majesty's Government to imagine that the two governments could not but agree as to the means of carrying their common principles into execution. If the intentions and opinions of the French Government upon the means of execution differed, even in the outset of the negotiations, from those of the British Government, then France has no right to represent, as an unexpected schism between England and France, a difference which the French Government knew all along to exist. If the intentions and opinions of the French Government as to the means of execution have undergone a change since the negotiations began, then France has no right to impute to Great Britain a divergence of policy, which arises from a change on the part of France, and not from a change on the part of Great Britain. But in any case, when four out of the five Powers found themselves agreed upon one course, and when the fifth had determined to pursue a course entirely different, it could not reasonably be expected that the four should, in deference to the fifth, give up opinions in which they were daily more and more confirmed, and which related to a matter of vital importance to the great and permanent interests of Europe.

But as France still holds to the general principles which she declared at the outset, and still affirms that she considers the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire under its present dynasty necessary for the preservation of the balance of power, and for the security of peace ; as France has never denied that the arrangement which the four Powers intend to effect between the Sultan and the Pacha would, if it could be executed, be the most complete and the best ; and as the objections of France have applied not to the end in view, but to the means by which that end is to be accomplished, her opinion being that the end was good, but the means insufficient or dangerous, Her Majesty's Government trusts that the separation of France from the other four Powers, which her Majesty's Government most deeply regret, cannot be of long duration.

For when the four Powers shall, in conjunction with the Sultan, have brought about such an arrangement between the Porte and its subject, as may be compatible with the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and with the future peace of Europe, there will no longer remain any point of difference between France and the allies ; and there can then be nothing to prevent France from concurring with the four Powers in such further engagements for the future as may appear to be necessary, in order to give due stability to the good effects of the interposition of the four Powers in favour of the Sultan, and to secure the Ottoman empire from a recurrence of danger.

Her Majesty's Government will look forward with eagerness to the moment when France will thus be at liberty again to take her place in the union of the five Powers ; and Her Majesty's Government hope that the arrival of that moment will be hastened by the full exertion of the moral influence of France. Although the French Government has, for reasons of its own, declined to take part in measures of coercion against Mehemet Ali, surely that government cannot object to employ its means of persuasion to induce the Pasha to submit to the arrangements which are to be proposed to him ; and it is obvious that there are many topics which might be urged, and many prudential considerations which might be pressed upon the Pasha with more effect by France, as a neutral Power, taking no part in those affairs, than by the four Powers who are actively engaged in executing the measures of coercion.

But be this as it may, Her Majesty's Government feels confident that Europe will acknowledge the integrity of purpose which has

actuated the four Powers on this occasion ; for their object is disinterested and just. They look to reap no selfish advantage from the engagements which they have contracted ; they seek to establish no exclusive influence, and to make no territorial acquisition ; and the ends they aim at must be as beneficial to France as to themselves, because France, like themselves, is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power, and in the preservation of general peace.

You will transmit officially to M. Thiers a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

*Reply of M. Thiers to the Memorandum of Lord Palmerston,
of August 30, 1840.*

Paris, Oct. 3, 1840.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
TO THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE IN LONDON.

MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR,

You have had cognizance of the despatch written by Lord Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer, in order to explain the conduct of the British Government in the important negotiation which terminated by the treaty of the 15th July. This despatch, the perfectly appropriate and moderate tone of which I acknowledge with pleasure, contains, nevertheless, assertions and arguments which the Government of the King cannot allow to be established. Doubtless, not to aggravate a situation already so menacing, it would be preferable to leave the past in oblivion, and not to revert to contestations too frequently renewed ; but Lord Palmerston would have the right of complaining, if no answer was given to his communication ; and moreover, it is important to represent in its real light the respective conduct of every Court during this important negotiation. The despatch of Lord Palmerston, communicated to all the legations, under the form of printed copies, has already become public. It was, therefore, essential to give it a reply. The one I send you, and of which I trust that the British Cabinet will have no reason to complain, will give to the facts which have occurred between the different Cabinets the real sense which to us they seem to have. You will have the goodness to send a copy of this to the Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty.

If I have rightly seized the meaning of the *exposé* presented by Lord Palmerston, it may be resumed as follows:—

“Great Britain, completely disinterested in the Eastern question, has pursued but one end—*viz.*, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This is the end she proposed to all the Courts, the end they all adopted and pursued, France as well as the others. In this end it was requisite to reduce to smaller proportions the immense pretensions of the Viceroy of Egypt; it was necessary to remove, as far as possible, from the Taurus the possessions and the armies of that ambitious vassal. The best thing that could be done was to place the Desert between the Sultan and the Pasha, to reduce Mehemet Ali to Egypt, and to restore Syria to the Sultan Abdul Medjid. The Desert of Syria would then have served as a barrier between the two States, and would soon have tranquillised the Ottoman empire, and Europe, interested in the safety of that empire, against the ambition of the Egyptian family.

“This is what England has proclaimed at every period of the negotiation. France, by the collective note signed at Constantinople on the 27th of July, 1839—by a circular addressed on the 17th of the same month, to all the Courts—had seemed to adhere to the common principle, in proclaiming, in a manner as absolute as the other Cabinets, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire.

“Nevertheless, she afterwards departed from this principle, by demanding, on behalf of the Viceroy of Egypt, a dismemberment of the empire, incompatible with its existence. Desirous of securing the adhesion of France, the four Powers that signed the treaty repeatedly endeavoured to induce her to enter into their views. They even made considerable sacrifices for that purpose, for they added to Egypt, granted for ever, the Pachalic of Acre, with the exception of the fortress of that name, and even afterwards consented to join to the preceding the fortress itself. But all these sacrifices remained without effect. France persisted in departing from the principle which the five Cabinets had judged fit to proclaim in common.

“The other Courts have not been able to follow her in this proceeding, However desirous they may have been to secure her adhesion, they thought it their duty at last to separate from her, and sign an act which should not surprise her, as she had been more than once warned that, if no agreement could be obtained, it would

become necessary to solve between four, the question that could not be solved between five.

“In fact, Lord Palmerston had carefully repeated to the Ambassador of France, that the proposition contained even in the treaty of the 15th July was his *ultimatum*, and that, if that proposition was refused, he would not make another. It became necessary to proceed, and not to allow the Ottoman empire to perish through too long hesitations. The other Courts cannot be accused of having wished to offend France, on this occasion. Four Cabinets, agreed on a question of the highest importance, could not indefinitely sacrifice to a fifth their entirely disinterested views, and intentions.

“Besides, in acting thus, the four Cabinets recollected that France had, in September 1839, by the organ of her Ambassador in London, proposed a plan of arrangement, founded nearly on the same bases as the treaty of the 15th July; that later, in combating the project presented by England, she had acknowledged that, the difficulty and danger of the means of execution apart, it would be incontestibly preferable to every other; that in short, on every occasion, she had manifested the intention of placing no impediment against those means of execution. They therefore naturally thought that if, for particular considerations, she refused to join them in forcible measures against Mehemet Ali, she would in no wise impede their efforts, and would even second them by employing her moral influence at Alexandria. The four Cabinets still hope that, when the treaty of the 15th July shall have been executed, France will again join them, in order to settle, in a definitive manner, the maintenance of the Ottoman empire.”

This is, if I mistake not, the exact and rigorous analysis of the *exposé* which Lord Palmerston and the four Courts in general, continue to make of the negotiations to which the Turco-Egyptian question has given rise.

According to the *exposé*—

France has been inconsistent.

She was desirous of, and is no longer desirous of, the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire.

The four Courts have made repeated sacrifices to her views.

They have finished, by presenting her an *ultimatum*, founded on a former proposition from her own Ambassador.

They did not proceed till after that *ultimatum* had been refused.

They have reason to be surprised at the manner in which France received the treaty of the 15th July, for, according to her own declarations, it was natural to expect that she would give to this treaty more than a passive adhesion, and at least her moral influence.

The exact account of facts will give a complete answer to this manner of presenting the negotiations.

When the Porte, ill-advised, renewed its hostilities against the Viceroy, and lost at once its army and its fleet; when to all those losses was added the death of the Sultan Mahmoud, what was the fear of England and of France, then perfectly united? Their fear was to see Ibrahim victorious, cross the Taurus, threaten Constantinople, and bring the Russians, on the instant, into the capital of the Ottoman empire. This uneasiness was entertained by every enlightened mind in Europe.

What were the propositions of Lord Palmerston on this subject? A first time, in his own name, a second time in the name of his Cabinet, he proposed to France to join two fleets—one English, the other French—to direct them towards the coasts of Syria, to address a summons to the two belligerent parties, in order to compel them to suspend hostilities, to support the summons by naval means; then to assemble the two fleets at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and to ask the Porte for leave to enter, if the struggle between the Pasha and the Sultan had brought the Russians to Constantinople.

What England—and with her all political men, gifted with any foresight—then meant by the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, was, to preserve it from the exclusive protection of the Russian armies, and to prevent the Viceroy from marching on Constantinople, in order to exclude the cause for that protection.

France entered fully into this thought. She employed her influence with Mehemet Ali and his son to stop the progress of the victorious Egyptian army; she succeeded therein, and, to provide against the more serious danger of seeing the Russian armies in Constantinople, she proposed, before forcing the Dardanelles, a previous measure—*viz.*, that of requesting the Porte to allow the entrance of the two fleets in case a corps of Russian troops should cross the Bosphorus.

England acceded to these propositions, and the two Cabinets

were perfectly agreed. The words "independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire" did not then mean (and attention cannot be too much directed to this) that Mehemet Ali should be deprived of such and such parts of the countries he occupied, but that he should be prevented from marching on the capital of the empire, and from attracting, by the presence of Egyptian soldiers, the presence of Russian soldiers.

The Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty, conversing on the subject with M. de Bourqueney, on the 25th May and 20th June, acknowledged that there existed in France and in England an opinion favourable to the Egyptian family; that in France the opinion was far more general; that, consequently, the French Government must be much more favourable than the English Government to Mehemet Ali; that this was doubtless a difficulty, but that it was of secondary consideration; that the main consideration should predominate over all others, and that was the necessity of saving the Ottoman empire from an exclusive protection, and a mortal one for it if England and France did not act in concert. France partook of these ideas. Their policy had consequently a double object—that of stopping the Viceroy when, from a powerful but submissive vassal, he changed his part to that of an unsubmissive vassal, menacing the throne of his master, and to substitute for the exclusive protection of one Power, that of the five preponderating Powers in Europe.

It is in this view that it signed in common the note of the 27th July—a note tending to place the protection of the five Powers between the conquered Sultan and the victorious Pasha; it is with this view it addressed, on the 17th of July, a circular to all the Courts to call forth a common profession of respect for the integrity of the Ottoman empire; it is in this view she was herself the first to propose to associate Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to all the resolutions relative to the Turkish and Egyptian question.

Lord Palmerston will remember, without doubt, that he was less disposed than France to invite this general agreement of the five Powers; and the French Cabinet cannot but with great regret call to mind, in comparing the past with the present moment, that it was on France chiefly that the English Cabinet believed it could count for assuring the safety of the Turkish empire.

No one then thought that the integrity of the Ottoman empire consisted in the limit which separated in Syria the possessions of the

Sultan and the Viceroy. All the world agreed in placing it on a two-fold fact—to prevent Ibrahim from menacing the capital, and preventing the Russians from succouring it. France partook with the other Cabinets this opinion, and she has remained faithful to it since.

Austria and Prussia adhered to the views of France and England. The Court of Russia refused to take part in the conferences which were to be held at Vienna, with the end of generalizing the European protectorate of the Sultan. She did not partake of the anxiety of the western Powers to meddle in the affairs of the East. "The Emperor," said M. Nesselrode, in a despatch written the 6th August, 1839, to M. Medem, and communicated officially to the French Government—"the Emperor does in no way despair of the safety of the Porte, provided that the Powers of Europe know how to respect its repose, and that by a foolish agitation they do not finish by enfeebling that which they seek to strengthen." The Court of Russia then thought it very inconvenient to interpose between the Sultan and the Pasha; believing that it was sufficient to prevent the Viceroy threatening Constantinople; and it appeared to regard a direct arrangement as the least advisable resource in that situation. "Besides," said M. de Nesselrode, to the Ambassador of France, in the commencement of August 1839—"A little more or a little less of Syria, given or taken from the Pasha, affects us but little; our only condition is, that the Porte shall be free in the consent which it may give."

At this period, then, the four Courts, who have since signed the treaty of the 15th of July—the four Courts were not united in opinion, as it is sought to make believe, to-day, in presence of France, the only dissentient, and preventing all accord by her perpetual refusals.

The danger was postponed when Ibrahim suspended his victorious march—two belligerent parties were in presence—the Pasha all-powerful, the Sultan conquered, and without resources, but both motionless—thanks to the intervention of France. The British Cabinet proposed to force the Turkish fleet from the hands of Mehemet Ali; France refused, fearing to provoke new hostilities. Then commenced the unhappy difference which has separated France from England, and which must for ever be regretted in the interests of peace and the civilization of the world. The bad dispositions of the British Cabinet against the Viceroy of Egypt broke

forth with greater vivacity—France tried to soothe them. The British Cabinet, on the representation of France, perceiving the danger of brute force, gave up the idea of recovering the Turkish fleet by violent means. This proposition was not followed up.

It became necessary still further to explain for the purpose of knowing in what manner the territorial question between the Sultan and the Viceroy could be settled. The difference between the views of France and of England broke forth more strongly. Lord Palmerston declared that in his eyes the Viceroy ought to receive Egypt hereditarily, but that for the price of this heirship he should abandon immediately the holy cities, the Isle of Candia, the district of Adana, and all Syria. He then consented to modify a little these views, and to join to the hereditary possession of Egypt the possession (also hereditary) of the Pashalic of Acre, with the exception of the fortress of Acre itself?

France did not admit these propositions. She judged that the Viceroy, a conqueror of the Sultan at Nezib, without having been the aggressor, having still farther consented to stop when he could have fallen upon the empire and overthrown the sceptre of the Sultan, merited more consideration. She thought that with the Powers who engaged the Pasha in 1833 to accept the conditions of Kutaiah there would be very little equity in imposing upon him more rigorous conditions when he had done nothing to lose the benefit of that transaction. She believed that after taking from him the holy cities, the Island of Candia, the district of Adana, an offensive position, and which, restored to the Porte, gave to the latter a full security, the hereditary possession of Egypt and of Syria should be preserved to the Viceroy. The victory of Nezib, gained without aggression on his part, might alone have secured for him the heirship of his possessions from the Nile to the Taurus; but in considering the victory of Nezib as nought (*non avenue*), in making Mehemet Ali purchase the heirship at the price of a part of his actual possessions, there was at least strict justice in not taking from him more than Candia, Adana, and the holy cities. Besides France asked how Mehemet Ali was to be reduced? Without doubt all the European Cabinets were strong against him when he sought to menace Constantinople; in this case the fleets in the Sea of Marmora sufficed to stop him; but to deprive him of Syria, where were the means?—Means little efficacious, such as a blockade not very legitimate—such as provocations to insurrection—and most

dangerous and most contrary to the end proposed—that of a Russian army. France proposed, then, in 1839, to give to the Viceroy the heirship of Egypt and the heirship of Syria.

Never, in any period of the negotiation, did France propose anything else, except in these latter times, when she advised the Viceroy to be content with the life possession of Syria. I have examined the despatches anterior to my administration, and I cannot see anywhere that General Sebastiani had been authorised to propose the limits contained in the treaty of the 15th of July, or that he had spontaneously taken upon himself to propose them. I have demanded from him himself what were his recollections in this respect, and he has assured me that he made no proposition of that nature. France then proposed, in 1839, the giving to the Viceroy the heirship of Egypt and the heirship of Syria. She was, unfortunately, at complete variance with England.

This variance, for ever to be regretted, was speedily known to all Europe. Suddenly, and as if by enchantment, it made cease the differences which had separated the four Courts, and brought between them a sudden accord. Austria, which at first had given a full adhesion to our propositions, which on the point of notifying this adhesion to London, had, as she said to us, only suspended this notification to give us time to put ourselves in accord with England. Austria commenced saying that between France and England she would pronounce in favour of either of those two Courts who agreed to give the greatest extent of territory to the Sultan : it is true that till then she still protested against the idea of having recourse to coercive means, of which she was the first to proclaim the danger. Prussia adopted the sentiments of Austria. Russia sent to London M. Brunow, in September 1839, to offer his propositions—Russia, which lately refused as most irregular the idea of European intervention between the Sultan and the Viceroy, and sought for no result but in a direct arrangement. Russia adhered now to all the territorial arrangements which it pleased England to adopt, and demanded, in the case of the renewal of hostilities, that she should be allowed, in the name of the five Courts, to cover Constantinople with an army, while the English and French fleets blockaded Syria.

These propositions realised exactly the combination which England had till then regarded as the most dangerous for the Ottoman empire—the protection of a Russian army, a combination to be dreaded, not by the possibility that a Russian army would

be allowed to remain definitively at Constantinople, but solely because Russia, thus adding to the fact of 1833 a second fact, exactly similar, would make in its favour the authority of precedents.

These propositions were not accepted. M. Brunow quitted London, and returned in January 1840, with new propositions. They differ from the first, inasmuch as they accorded to France and England the faculty to introduce three vessels of war in a limited part of the Sea of Marmora, while the Russian troops occupied Constantinople. This negotiation was going on for several months, from the month of February to July 1840. In this interval a new ministry and a new ambassador were charged with the affairs of France. The French Cabinet had always repeated that it did not think it just to cut off Syria from the number of the Egyptian possessions; that if it were possible, if the Viceroy consented to it, France would not be for the Viceroy more ambitious than he was himself; but that if it were necessary to take Syria from him by force, the French Government did not see, to succeed therein, but inefficient or dangerous means, and that in such a case it would isolate itself from the other Courts, and hold a conduct altogether distinct.

While the French Cabinet held this language in London with frankness and perseverance, the French Ambassador at Constantinople did not seek to negotiate an arrangement direct between the Sultan and the Viceroy; he did not give—as it seems Lord Palmerston believes, without daring to affirm it—he did not give the first example of separation. Never did our representative at Constantinople hold the line of conduct imputed to him; never did the instructions of the Government of the King prescribe such a course. Without doubt France never ceased to labour for an accommodation between the Sultan and the Viceroy, and to dispose one and the other to reasonable concessions, and thus to facilitate the delicate task of which Europe had determined the accomplishment; but we have constantly recommended, as well the Count de Pontois as M. Cochelet, to avoid with the greatest care all that which could be considered as an attempt to set aside the other Powers; and they have been scrupulously faithful to this recommendation.

England had to choose between Russia, offering her the abandonment of the Viceroy, on condition of adopting the proposition of M. Brunow, that is to say, the execution agreed to by Europe at the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi;—and between France, demanding only an equitable and moderate negotiation between the Sultan and

Mehemet Ali; a negotiation which prevented new hostilities, and, as the consequence of these hostilities, the most dangerous case for the integrity of the Ottoman empire, the protection, direct and material, of one powerful State.

Before making its definitive choice between Russia and France, the Cabinet of London did not make us the reiterated offers spoken of, to bring us to its views. Those offers are limited to one single proposition.

In 1839, they gave the Viceroy the hereditary possession of Egypt and of the Pashalic of Acre, less the citadel. In 1840, Lord Palmerston proposes to us to give the Pashalic of Acre, with the citadel, but without the heirship. Assuredly this is to take from the first offer more than is added to it, and it cannot be said that it was either a new proposition, or one more advantageous.

But this proposition, so little worthy the title of a new proposition, for it contained no new advantage, had in no respect the character of an *ultimatum*; it was not presented to us as such. We were so far from considering it under that aspect, that, on a hint of M. de Bulow and M. de Nieumann, we conceived the hope of obtaining for the Viceroy the life-possession of all Syria, joined to the hereditary possession of Egypt.

On the affirmation of M. Bulow and M. de Nieumann, that this proposition, if it were made, should be the last concession of Lord Palmerston, we sent M. Eugene Perier to Alexandria, to dispose the Viceroy to consent to this arrangement, which seemed to us to be the best possible. It was not, as says Lord Palmerston, to make the negotiation depend on the will of a Pasha of Egypt, but to dispose of opposing inclinations, and bring them to an amicable arrangement, which would prevent the cruel spectacle given to-day to Europe.

France had some right to think that so long a negotiation would not terminate without a final explanation; that the great and useful alliance which for ten years bound her to England, would not be dissolved without a last effort at conciliation.

The insinuations which had been given, and which tended to make believe that possibly the life-possession of Syria would be granted to the Viceroy, encouraged this hope. Suddenly, on the 17th July, Lord Palmerston calls to the Foreign Office the Ambassador of France, and informed him that a treaty had been signed the night before, and told him so without even giving him any knowledge of the text of the treaty. The French Cabinet had

reason to be surprised. It was not ignorant, no doubt, that the three Continental Courts had adhered to the views of England, and that consequently an arrangement of the four Courts, without France, was possible? but it could not believe that this arrangement could take place without her being previously advised, and that the French alliance would be thus promptly sacrificed.

The offer which the Viceroy made in June to the Sultan to restore the Turkish fleet, and which it was feared would give rise to a direct arrangement secretly proposed by us, and the possibility which at this moment offered to excite Syria to insurrection, appeared to be the motives which induced the English Cabinet, after a long apathy, to take a sudden resolution. If the British Cabinet had wished to have had with us a last and frank explanation, the French Cabinet could have shewn it that the offer to send back the fleet was not a combination made by France to bring about a direct arrangement, because she did not know of the offer until after it was made; possibly she could have shewn that the insurrection of Syria was a means little worthy, and not sure.

Such are the facts, the truth of which France affirms with the sincerity and loyalty belonging to a great nation.

It results evidently—

1. That the independence and integrity have been understood from the commencement of the negotiation as France understands them to-day, not as a territorial limit, more or less immaterial between the Sultan and the Viceroy, but as a guarantee of the five Courts against an offensive movement of Mehemet Ali, and against the exclusive protection of one only of the five Powers.

2. That France, far from modifying her opinions in presence of four Courts, always agreed in views, intentions, and language, has constantly, on the contrary, understood the Turco-Egyptian question in one single manner, while she has seen the four Courts first in dissent, unite in the idea of sacrificing the Viceroy; and England, satisfied by that sacrifice, go round to the three others and form a union, it is true, at present very persevering in its views, very sudden, very alarming in its resolutions.

3. That repeated sacrifices have not been made to France to induce her to join the project of the four Courts, since they confined themselves to offer in 1839, to join to Egypt the hereditary pashalic of Acre, without the fortress of Acre; and to offer, in 1840, the pashalic of Acre, not hereditary, with the fortress.

4. That she has not been warned, as is said, that the four Courts

would proceed if she did not adhere to their views ; that quite on the contrary, she had some reasons to expect fresh propositions when, on the news of the departure of Sami Bey for Constantinople and of the insurrection of Syria, without her receiving any notice, the treaty of the 15th July, of which she had no cognisance till after it had been signed, and no communication till two months after, was suddenly signed.

5. In fine, that there is no right to reckon on her passive adherence to the execution of this treaty, since, if she has especially insisted on the difficulty of the means of execution, she nevertheless never professed for the end, any more than for the means, an indifference which allowed the inference to be drawn that she would in no case intervene in what might take place in the East ; that, far from it, she constantly declared that she would isolate herself from the other four Powers if certain resolutions were adopted ; that no one of her agents has been authorised to say a word from which it might be inferred that this isolation would be inactive, and that she always meant, as she still means, to reserve to herself full liberty in this respect.

The French Cabinet would not revert to such contestations if the note of Lord Palmerston did not make it imperative for it so to do. But it is ready to place them in complete oblivion, to sift things to the bottom, and to draw the attention of the Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty to the really serious side of the question.

The existence of the Turkish empire is in peril ; England is highly attentive to the subject, and she is right ; all the Powers who are friends to peace should be attentive to it also ; but what means are to be employed to strengthen this empire ? When the Sultans of Constantinople, no longer possessing the power of governing the vast provinces which belonged to them, have seen Moldavia, Wallachia, and, more recently, Greece, glide insensibly from their hands, what measures were adopted ? Did a European decision, supported by Russian troops and English fleets, endeavour to restore to the Sultans the subjects which were escaping their control ? Certainly not. What was impossible was not attempted. The possession and direct administration of the provinces falling away from the empire were not restored to them. An almost nominal sovereignty was left them over Wallachia and Moldavia—they were completely deprived of Greece. Is this the spirit of injustice ? Certainly not. But the empire of facts, stronger than the resolutions of Cabinets, prevented the Porte from having restored to it

either the direct sovereignty of Moldavia and Wallachia, or the administration, even indirect, of Greece; and the Porte had no peace until after this sacrifice had been frankly effected. What view directed the Cabinets in these sacrifices? It was to render independent, to preserve from the ambition of all the neighbouring states, the portions of the Turkish empire which were falling off from it. Unable to reform a great whole, they wished the detached portions to be states independent of the empire adjoining.

A similar fact has just occurred relative to Egypt and Syria. Has Egypt ever been really under the domination of the Sultans? No one thinks it; and no one would, at the present day, believe that it could be governed directly from Constantinople. This judgment is apparent, since the four Courts grant hereditary Egypt to Mehemet Ali, with the reserve of the Sultan's supremacy. In this they understand the integrity of the Ottoman empire in the same manner as France; they confine themselves to wishing to preserve him all that he can keep under his authority. They wish to preserve a feudal tie as much as possible between the empire and its detached parts. They wish, in a word, all that France wishes. The four Courts, in granting to the fortunate vassal who has managed to govern Egypt the hereditary possession of that province, grant him, moreover, the pashalic of Syria; but they refuse granting him the other three pashalics of Syria—the pashalics of Damascus, Aleppo, and Tripoli. They call this saving the integrity of the Ottoman empire! Thus the integrity of the Ottoman empire is saved, even when Egypt and the pashalic of Acre have been detached from it; but it is destroyed, if Tripoli, Damascus, and Aleppo, are detached from it! We assert, frankly, that such a thesis cannot gravely be supported in the face of Europe.

Evidently there cannot be, to give or take away these pashalics from Mehemet Ali, but reasons of equity and policy. The Viceroy of Egypt has founded an empire with genius and constancy. He has learned to govern Egypt, and even Syria, which the Sultans could never govern. The Mussulmans, long since humiliated in their noble pride, behold in him a glorious prince who restores to them the sentiment of their force. Why weaken this useful vassal, who, once separated by a well-selected frontier from the states of his master, will become for him the most precious of all auxiliaries? He aided the Sultan in his struggle against Greece, why then should he not help him in his struggle against neighbours of a different faith? His own interest answers for him in fault of his fidelity.

When Constantinople shall be menaced, Alexandria will be in danger. Mehemet Ali knows this very well ; he shows every day that he is well aware of it.

It is necessary to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman empire from Constantinople to Alexandria—it is necessary, at the same time, to save the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt, the latter submitted to the former by a feudal tie. The Taurus is the line of separation indicated between them. But it is thought to take from the Pasha of Egypt the keys of the Taurus. Be it so. Let them be restored to the Porte, and for that let the district of Adana be taken from Mehemet Ali. They also wish to take from him the key of the Archipelago. Let them refuse him Candia—he consents to it. France, who did in fact promise her moral influence to the treaty of the 15th July, but who gives it all to peace, has advised Mehemet Ali to make those sacrifices, and he has made them. But in truth to take from him two or three pashalics, and not to give them to the Sultan but to anarchy—to ensure the singular triumph of integrity, already deprived of Grece, of Egypt, of the pashalic of Acre ; to call upon this integrity the only serious danger which menaces it, which England found so dangerous last year and to prevent which it proposed to force the Dardanelles, is an extraordinary means to provide for its great interests.

Let us admit, however, for the moment, that the views of the British Cabinet are better understood than those of the French Cabinet, is not the alliance of France worth more for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and for the peace of the world, than this or that boundary of Syria ?

We should not be so much alarmed for the integrity of the Ottoman empire, were no dread entertained for great changes in the territory of the world ; if war were not dreaded, which alone renders those great changes possible. Now, what is the most efficacious combination to prevent them ? Is it not the alliance of France and England ? From Cadiz to the banks of the Oder and of the Danube—ask the people. Ask them what they think in this respect, and they will answer that it is this alliance, which for ten years has saved the peace and the independence without injuring the liberty of nations.

It will be said that this alliance is not broken, and that it will re-appear after the completion of the 15th July. When four Powers have pursued, without us, and in spite of us, an end in itself bad—which we at least believe, and have declared to be so—

when they have pursued it by alliance, too, similar to those coalitions which, for fifty years, have deluged Europe with blood—can it be believed that France will be found without mistrust, without resentment at this offence? This would be to form of her national pride an idea which she has never given to the world.

They have then sacrificed, gratuitously, for a secondary result, an alliance which has maintained the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire much more surely than the treaty of the 15th of July can do. It may be said that France might make the same reflection, and that she could, if the question of the limits in Syria appeared to her secondary, yield to the views of England, and purchase, by that sacrifice, the maintenance of the alliance.

To this a very simple answer can be given. France, once agreed in the end with her allies, would have made not any of those sacrifices which no nation owes to another, but merely the sacrifice of her manner of considering certain questions of boundary. She has proved this by the concessions she has demanded and obtained from the Viceroy. But she has been allowed no choice. She was informed of a new alliance, when that alliance was already concluded. From that moment she was obliged to take up an isolated position. She had done so, but did not do it till then. Since, constantly faithful to her pacific policy, she has advised the Viceroy of Egypt to act with the most pacific moderation. Although armed, and free in her action, she will do her utmost endeavour to avoid grief and catastrophes to the world. Except sacrifices which would affect her honour, she will make all those she can to maintain peace; and if she holds this language to the British Cabinet, she does so less as a matter of complaint than to prove the loyalty of her policy, not only to Great Britain, but to the world, the opinion of which, no State, at present, however powerful it may be, can despise. The Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty has been desirous to prove the justice of his conduct; the Secretary of State of His Majesty the King of the French owes it also to his king and country to prove the consistency and the loyalty of French policy in the grave question of the East.

Receive, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, the assurances of my high consideration.

The President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Signed)

A. THIERS.

Paris, Oct. 8, 1840.

P.S.—While writing this despatch deplorable events have come to-day to add to the gravity of the situation. To the conciliatory advances of the Pasha of Egypt they have answered by the most violent hostilities.

The Porte, yielding to evil counsels, has pronounced his deposition. It is not sought alone to restrain the power of Mehemet Ali—they seek to make it disappear from the face of the political world.

If such were the serious intentions of the Powers united in the Treaty of the 15th July—if we are to see in what has just happened anything beyond the *entraînement*, almost involuntary, of a false situation, of which the consequences could not be foreseen, we might despair of the re-establishment of harmony between the great Powers.

In consequence, I think it my duty to add to the present communication the subjoined note.

A. T.

Additional Note.

Paris, Oct. 8, 1840.

MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR,

The grave question which pre-occupies at this moment the attention of all parties has assumed an aspect altogether new, since the reply made by the Porte to the concessions offered by the Viceroy of Egypt.

Mehemet Ali, in reply to the summons of the Sultan, has declared that he submitted himself to the will of his august master; that he accepted the hereditary possession of Egypt; and that he placed himself, with respect to the remainder of the territories actually in his occupation, entirely at the magnanimity of the Sultan.

We have made known to the British Cabinet the interpretation which must be put upon this mode of expressing himself; and although Mehemet Ali would not consent to declare immediately the full extent of the concessions to which he had been led to agree by the pressing recommendations of France, we have taken it upon ourselves to make them known, and we have announced that the Viceroy resigns himself to the necessity of accepting the hereditary

sovereignty of Egypt, and the possession during his life of Syria ; at the same time consenting to abandon immediately Candia, Adana, and the Holy Cities. We must also add that had the Porte adhered to this arrangement we would at once have consented to guarantee its fulfilment in concert with the Powers which are occupied in determining the future condition of the Ottoman empire. Every enlightened mind was struck by the loyalty of France, who, notwithstanding she was forced to proceed on a separate path, never ceased to exercise her influence to bring about a solution, at once moderate and pacific, of the Oriental question ; nor has the wisdom which guided the Viceroy in listening to the dictates of prudence and moderation been less appreciated by the high intelligence of Europe.

In reply to these concessions, the Porte, either acting spontaneously, or else swayed by hasty and inconsiderate counsels, proffered on the spot at the moment—the Porte, I repeat, before any reference could be made to the allied Powers, replied to the submissive answer of the Viceroy, by declaring his deposition. Such a step, equally outrageous and unexpected, goes beyond even the spirit of the treaty of July 15, and exceeds also the most extraordinary results which might have been expected to arise out of that document. This treaty which France was not able to invoke, inasmuch as she had never adhered to or recognised it, but which she now brings into notice for the purpose of showing the rapidity with which the subscribing parties have been drawn into its most dangerous consequences—this treaty, in the event of an absolute refusal on the part of the Viceroy to comply with one and all of its conditions, gave the Porte the faculty of its withdrawing its first proposals, and of acting as it might deem most advantageous to its interests, according to the counsels of the allied Powers. But still there were two supposed contingencies involved in this treaty—namely, an absolute and peremptory refusal on every one of the points contained in it, on the part of the Viceroy, and a consequent reference to the four Powers for advice. Nothing of the kind, however, has taken place. The Viceroy has not offered an absolute refusal, and the Sultan has not even given himself the time to concert a reply in conjunction with his allies. He met unhopcd-for concessions by an act of deposition.

The four Powers could not approve of such conduct, and we *know in effect that several* of them *have already expressed their disapprobation of it*. Lord Palmerston has caused a communication to be

made to our Cabinet, that we must only look upon this proceeding in the light of a threat (*comminatoire*), without any necessary or relative consequences. The Count d'Appony, in an interview which I had with him on this subject, announced to me that the same opinion was entertained by his Cabinet of the proceeding. We have willingly taken cognizance of this wise intimation, and we now seize the opportunity of stating the intentions of France with respect to this matter.

France has declared that she will use every means in her power to preserve the peace and the balance of power in Europe. Now is the time for her to explain clearly what meaning this declaration is to have. In accepting, with a religious fidelity, the state of Europe, such as is settled by existing treaties, France has understood, that during the general peace which has happily prevailed since 1815, this state should not be changed either for the profit or to the detriment of any one of the existing Powers. It has been under this impression that she has always declared in favour of preserving the Ottoman empire ; the Turkish people, by their national qualities, amply merited, on their own account alone, respect for the independence of that kingdom ; but apart from this consideration, the dearest interests of Europe were bound up in the continued existence of Turkey. This empire, in being prostrated, could only be made subservient to the aggrandisement of the adjoining states, to the detriment of the general equilibrium, and her fall would have occasioned such a change in the existing proportions of the great Powers as to have altered the aspect of the globe altogether. France, and the other Powers in common with her, so strongly felt this contingent result, that she, in concert with her allies, has constantly and loyally united in maintaining the Ottoman empire, however deeply their respective interests might be involved relatively to the preservation or fall of that kingdom.

But the integral portion of the Ottoman empire spreads itself from the shores of the Black to those of the Red Sea. It is as essential to guarantee the independence of Egypt and Syria, as the independence of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. A Prince Vassal has succeeded in establishing a firm rule in two provinces, which during a long period the Sultans of Constantinople were unable to govern. This Prince Vassal, if he has not been able to introduce into the countries which he governs the humanity which distinguishes European civilisation, and which probably would ill comport with the present manners of the country he administers,

has at least introduced a greater degree of order and regularity in them than exist in any other part of the Turkish empire. found the means to levy a public force; he has raised troops, and he has created a fleet; he has roused the pride of the Ottoman people, and he has restored to them somewhat of that confidence in themselves which it is indispensable for a nation to possess, in order to be able to defend and maintain its independence. This Prince Vassal has become, according to our view, an essential and necessary part of the Ottoman empire. If he be destroyed, the empire will not the more acquire, now-a-days, the means which were formerly wanting to enable the Sultan to govern Syria and Egypt; and the Porte will lose a vassal who is, at this moment, one of its principal bulwarks. Other Pashas will succeed who will be disobedient to their masters, and who will be the dependants of every foreign influence. In a word, one portion of the integral Turkish empire will be compromised, and, together with this, the general equilibrium will be endangered. In the opinion of France the existence of the Viceroy of Egypt, in the provinces which he governs, and in the seas where his power is exerted, is essential for the purpose of ensuring the proportions, as they actually exist, between the different parts of the globe.

In this conviction, France, equally disinterested in the Oriental question with the four Powers who have signed the protocol of September 17, believes herself to be under the necessity of declaring that the deposition of the Viceroy, if put in force, will be, in her estimation, a blow given to the general equilibrium.

The question with respect to the limits which ought to be established in Syria, in order to divide the possessions of the Sultan from those of the Viceroy of Egypt, might with safety be left to the chances of the war now actually in progress; but France cannot prevail upon herself to abandon to such a chance the existence of Mehemet Ali as a Prince Vassal of the empire. Whatever territorial limits may ultimately separate the two Powers by the fortune of war, their continued double existence is necessary to Europe, and France cannot admit the suppression either of the one or of the other. Disposed as she is to enter upon and take part in every acceptable arrangement which shall have for its basis the double guarantee of the existence of the Sultan and that of the Viceroy of Egypt, she confines herself at present to the declaration on her part that she cannot consent to the carrying into execution of the act of deposition pronounced at Constantinople.

In other respects, the spontaneous manifestations of several of the Powers who have signed the treaty of July 15, prove to us that in this respect we understand the term "balance of Europe" in the same sense that they do, and that in this respect their views are not at variance with ours. We should regret this disagreement, which as yet we do not perceive, but we could in nowise swerve from this manner of comprehending and of assuring the maintenance of that equilibrium.

France entertains the hope that Europe will appreciate the motives by which she has been induced to break the silence hitherto preserved by her. Her love of peace may be relied upon, as that sentiment has constantly animated her, notwithstanding the proceedings of which she believes she has a right to complain. Her disinterestedness may also be relied upon, for it is not possible even to suspect her of aspiring to any acquisitions of territory in the East. What she does aspire to is the maintenance of the equilibrium of Europe. This is also the care of the great Powers in common with her, and it ought to form at once the object of their glory and of their ambition.

Accept, &c.

(Signed)

A. THIERS.

Despatch from Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville.

Foreign Office, November 2, 1840.

MY LORD,—The despatch of the 8th October from Mr. Thiers to M. Guizot, which was officially communicated to her Majesty's Government by M. Guizot on the 10th of October, afforded to her Majesty's Government the liveliest satisfaction by the renewed assurances which it contained, that love of peace is a constant sentiment of the French Government; that Europe may reckon upon the disinterestedness of France in regard to the affairs of the Levant; that France considers the existence of the Turkish empire, in its integrity and independence, essential for the dearest interests of Europe, because the fall of that empire would increase the power of neighbouring states, at the expense of the general equilibrium; and that France will devote all her means to the maintenance of peace, and to the upholding of the balance of power in Europe.

These assurances, indeed, are in strict accordance with all the previous diplomatic communications which her Majesty's Government has received from that of France during the progress of these negotiations; and they are of high value in the eyes of her Majesty's Government as pledges that, notwithstanding some differences of opinion between the powers of Europe as to the particular matters of detail, the general agreement of all the great powers upon the fundamental principles which ought to regulate their conduct in these affairs will prevent any interruption of peace.

The main subject of M. Thiers' despatch is the edict of the Sultan depriving Mehemet Ali of his government of Egypt; and my despatches to your Excellency, No. 291, of the 17th ultimo, and to Lord Ponsonby, No. 195, of the 15th ultimo, which have been communicated to the French Government, contain so full a statement of the view which has been taken by her Majesty's Government of that measure, that it is unnecessary for me on the present occasion to add anything further upon that point. But there are some remarks which have suggested themselves to her Majesty's Government upon some passages of M. Thiers' despatch, which your Excellency is instructed to submit for the consideration of the French Cabinet.

M. Thiers says that France, in accepting with a religious fidelity the state of Europe, such as it resulted from treaties (by which it is presumed are meant the treaties of 1815), has understood that the state should not be changed, either for the benefit *or to the detriment* of any existing power. In this understanding her Majesty's Government entirely agrees; and her Majesty's Government conceives that an arrangement which has for its object to prevent Egypt and Syria from being severed from the Turkish empire is in strict conformity with this understanding, and in accordance both with its letter and with its spirit.

M. Thiers states that the integrity of the Ottoman empire embraces the shores of the Black Sea and those of the Red Sea, and that it is as important to maintain the independence of Egypt and Syria as that of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. But her Majesty's government presumes that what is meant to be expressed in this passage is, not that the particular portions of the Turkish empire therein mentioned should be made separately independent, because that would be a dissolution of the Turkish empire; but that the sovereign power which rules the whole of the Turkish empire should be able to exert its paramount authority with

entire independence of foreign control, as fully and completely on the shore of the Red Sea as on that of the Black Sea ; in Egypt and in Syria, as on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In this opinion her Majesty's government concurs, and the measures which are now in course of execution by the Four Powers, in regard to Syria, appear to her Majesty's government to be strictly in furtherance of these views.

So far her Majesty's government is glad to find itself concurring in the positions laid down in M. Thiers' despatch ; but her Majesty's government cannot equally agree in the opinion expressed therein, that the present condition of the Pasha of Egypt is an essential element of the balance of power in Europe.

The whole of M. Thiers' argument on this point seems to rest on the assumption, that the continued existence of Mehemet Ali in his present condition as Pasha of Egypt is a source of strength to the Sultan, and tends to enable the Sultan the better to defend himself against foreign and domestic danger ; because it is admitted that Mehemet Ali is a governor using against his sovereign an authority which has been confided to him for the benefit of that sovereign, and employing in hostility against the supreme power of the state, the resources, military, naval, and financial, of an important portion of the empire itself ; if, in short, he is, to use the words of the despatch, " a Pasha disobedient towards his master, and depending upon all sorts of foreign influences," it is manifest that the continued existence of a subject in such a state of insubordination and enmity towards his Sovereign, must be a source of weakness, and not of strength, to that Sovereign, and must render him less, instead of more, able to defend himself against either foreign or domestic danger, and must, therefore, according to the principles of M. Thiers' despatch, impair the balance of power.

But the opinion of the Turkish Government, which may be allowed to be a competent judge on this matter, has for some time been, that the continued existence of Mehemet Ali in his present state of military power, and with his hostile intentions towards the Sultan, is incompatible with the internal peace and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and destructive of the independence of the Sultan as regards his relations with foreign powers : and, undoubtedly, the experience of the last few years has too fully shown that this opinion is not unfounded.

The extent of the limits within which it may be necessary to confine the delegated authority of Mehemet Ali, in order to make

it probable that for the future he may be an obedient instead of a disobedient subject, and may therefore become a source of strength instead of being a cause of weakness to the Ottoman Empire, is a point upon which opinions may differ ; and that question it is not requisite for me now to discuss. But her Majesty's Government conceives that whatever may be the opinions entertained on this point by Foreign Powers, such opinions can only serve to regulate the advice which those Powers may tender to the Sultan, or to determine the extent of the assistance which they may be disposed to afford him ; but that it rests with the Sultan, as Sovereign of the Turkish Empire, to decide which of his subjects shall be appointed by him to govern particular portions of his own dominions, and that no Foreign Power has a right to control the Sultan in the discretionary exercise of one of the inherent and essential attributes of independent sovereignty.

The question of principle which I have thus adverted to, may probably not have any practical bearing upon events now in progress, but her Majesty's government has felt anxious that it should not, by silence on this matter, leave its opinions liable to be misunderstood.


Your Excellency will give a copy of this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.







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